Concept
Abnormally Dangerous Domestic Animals
Strict liability for harm done by animals
Abnormally Dangerous Domestic Animals
A domestic animal is not strictly dangerous by classification, but its possessor becomes strictly liable once he knows or has reason to know that it has dangerous propensities abnormal to its class. Section 509(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts then makes him answerable for the harm the animal does although he used the utmost care to prevent it.1 The consequence matches the wild-animal rule: care is no defense, and the plaintiff need not prove negligence. The trigger differs. A wild animal reaches strict liability through its class alone, while a domestic animal reaches it through its keeper's knowledge.
The difference tracks risk. Keeping a wild animal creates an unusual danger that neighbors seldom match, but large dogs are a common risk, and under the common law dog-bite victims have usually had to prove negligence.2 Knowledge changes the picture for a single animal. A keeper who has seen the warning signs holds an animal more dangerous than the customary risk, and he alone can confine it, restrain it, or get rid of it. Strict liability then follows the animal, and it reaches anyone who harbors such an animal as well as the possessor.3 It stops at the edge of the keeper's knowledge, because section 509(2) limits the liability to harm resulting from the propensity he knows or has reason to know about.4 The three subsections below take up the knowledge requirement, the proof of knowledge, and that limit in turn.
The Knowledge Requirement
Section 509(1) has three working parts. The animal must have a dangerous propensity abnormal to its class; the possessor must know or have reason to know of it; and when both are true, the possessor answers for the harm although he exercised the utmost care.5 The first two parts decide whether the rule applies at all. The third says what the rule does once it applies.
The first part compares the individual animal with its class. A trait that animals of the class commonly show does not count, however alarming it looks to the person it injures. Aggressiveness in a bull and friskiness in a horse are ordinary for those classes, so a keeper is not strictly liable for harm flowing from them unless the plaintiff shows something more.6 The community already tolerates the ordinary risks of the animals it customarily keeps and leaves them to the fault system.7
The Maine court in Sandy v. Bushey stated the claim in its simplest form. A person who keeps a vicious or dangerous animal that he knows is accustomed to attack and injure mankind assumes the obligation of an insurer, and no measure of care in keeping it will excuse him. The plaintiff has only to allege and prove the keeping, the vicious propensities, and the scienter, which means the keeper's knowledge. Negligence need be neither alleged nor proved.8
Courts describe the rule in different vocabularies, and the Restatement's is the safest to use. In Jividen v. Law, the West Virginia court held that liability for injuries caused by a domestic animal requires two elements: that the animal had a dangerous or vicious propensity, and that the owner or keeper had actual or constructive knowledge of it. Scienter, the court added, is a critical component of the claim, and it described its approach as similar, if not identical, to the Restatement's.9 The word vicious can send a student looking for a savage temperament. The question is narrower: does this animal have a particular dangerous tendency that animals of its class do not usually have? Actual or constructive knowledge corresponds to the phrase knows or has reason to know, so it covers the keeper who saw the tendency himself and the keeper who held information that would alert a reasonable person.
Knowledge does for a domestic animal what classification does for a wild one. Custom tells everyone in advance that a tiger is dangerous, but nothing tells anyone that a particular dog is except its keeper's own experience. Requiring knowledge ties strict liability to the moment the keeper can no longer treat the animal as an ordinary member of its class, which is also the moment he gains a real choice to confine it, give it away, or destroy it. A rule that charged him for a danger he could not see would give him nothing to respond to.
Knowledge makes harm foreseeable, yet the claim is not negligence. The liability is imposed even if the defendant exercised reasonable care to prevent the harm.10 A keeper who knew of his dog's tendency could defeat a negligence claim by proving a sturdy fence and a latched gate, but the same proof leaves a section 509(1) claim where it was.11 What the careful keeper still does is keep the animal. Once he knows of the danger, continuing to keep it is a decision to run a known risk, and only he can end that risk by confining the animal for good, giving it away, or destroying it. Liability despite utmost care puts the remaining risk on the person who chose to keep the animal, and it gives him a reason to remove it and not merely to handle it carefully.
The guest loses only the strict-liability theory. Where the possessor of a domestic animal lacks the knowledge, he is liable if he intentionally causes the harm or is negligent in failing to prevent it.12 West Virginia adds that a negligence claim of this kind depends on showing, with particular emphasis on the animal's past behavior and characteristics, that the injury could reasonably and foreseeably have been anticipated.13 What separates this family from a keeper held strictly liable is the knowledge they had before the injury. Their care on the day of the bite plays no part in that comparison.
Statutes in some states change the picture for dog bites, as the later section on dog-bite statutes explains. Where a stem names no such statute, section 509 governs, and the analysis runs in order.
The usual exam error is to spend the answer on whether the keeper was careful. Care is irrelevant once the abnormal propensity and the keeper's knowledge are established, and it never revives a claim that failed at step two or three.
Proving the Keeper's Knowledge
The knowledge element is met when the possessor knows or has reason to know of a dangerous propensity abnormal to the animal's class, and that language does not require the animal to have hurt anyone before.15 The slogan that every dog gets one free bite describes the most common way to prove notice, because courts generally impute knowledge to the owner when there is evidence of at least one attack.16 Read as a count of bites, though, the slogan overstates the rule. The element asks what the keeper knew or should have recognized about this animal before the injury, and a prior bite is only one way to answer. A dog that constantly barked, bared its teeth, and strained at its leash can establish dangerous propensities even if it never attacked anyone.17
Notice is the trigger because of what strict liability is for here. A keeper whose dog has lunged at visitors for months has the same choice as one whose dog has bitten once. If the law demanded a completed bite, an owner who ignored every warning sign would be protected until someone was hurt, and the first victim would pay for a danger the owner had watched develop. Because scienter is what justifies liability without fault, anything that shows what the keeper was in a position to know can prove it.
In Bard v. Jahnke, the New York Court of Appeals recognized that proof of vicious propensities is not confined to prior attacks. An animal that behaves in a way that would not necessarily be called dangerous or ferocious can still be found to have vicious propensities if it shows a proclivity to act in a way that puts others at risk of harm, but only when that proclivity results in the injury in the lawsuit.18 That last condition matches section 509(2), which confines liability to harm resulting from the propensity the possessor knows or has reason to know about, and the next subsection develops it.19
Other decisions show how varied proof of notice can be. Courts have treated each of the following as evidence of the keeper's knowledge:20
- A prior injury short of a serious bite, such as the deep scratch a dog had earlier inflicted on a child's nose in Coogan v. Nelson, or a mule that had thrown two earlier riders in Walters v. Grand Teton Crest Outfitters, Inc.
- Hostile displays without an attack, such as the dog in Zarek v. Fredericks that snarled at guests and was almost always accompanied by its owners.
- The way the keeper handled the animal, such as the 75-pound watch dog in Frederickson v. Kepner that was kept tied during the day.
- The keeper's own warnings, as in Perkins v. Drury, where the owner had told children to stay away from the dog.
- The animal's reputation, as in Hill v. Moseley, where the dog had a bad name in the neighborhood.
Each item works for the same reason. Knowledge is a fact about the keeper's mind, and a plaintiff seldom has an admission, so the proof is circumstantial: what the animal did where the keeper could see it, and what the keeper did in response. Chaining a watch dog by day and warning children away are acts that make little sense unless the keeper already feared the animal, and a bad neighborhood reputation is the kind of talk that reaches an owner and gives reason to know.
The plaintiff in Bard met the opposite pattern. The animal was a bull named Fred, who had never attacked any farm animal or person before the day of the injury. He had always moved unrestrained within the barn's low cow district, coming into regular contact with other animals, farm workers, and members of the family without incident or any hint of hostility. Nothing had put his keepers on notice, and the court held that the plaintiff could not recover under the traditional strict-liability rule.21 A plaintiff in that position has not necessarily lost everything. Where the possessor lacks knowledge, the Restatement allows recovery if he intentionally caused the harm or was negligent in failing to prevent it, and in Duren v. Kunkel a plaintiff whose bull showed no abnormal propensity could still take the negligence question to the jury.22 New York stands apart, because Bard itself refused to add a separate negligence claim to the strict-liability rule.23
Courts divide on whether breed alone can supply the knowledge. Comment e to section 23 of the Restatement (Third) points one way: if pit bulls as a variety are known to be particularly prone to bite, and to do serious harm when they do, then the owner of a pit bull that mauls a visitor is strictly liable even if the mauling was the dog's first bite.24 Indiana in Poznanski v. Horvath recognized that a plaintiff could offer evidence that a dog belonged to a breed known for dangerous tendencies as proof that the owner knew the particular dog had them, although it declined to apply the idea to a mixed-breed sheepdog.25 Most decisions insist on proof about the individual animal. In Moore v. Gaut the court rejected an attempt to call a Great Dane dangerous because of the breed's size and strength and required a showing that this Great Dane was known to its owner to be dangerous, and courts in Maine, New York, and Rhode Island reached comparable results for pit bulls and breeding bulls.26 An individual history shows what this keeper saw, while a breed label describes only what dogs of that kind tend to do. Maryland shows how unsettled the question is. Its high court held pit bulls subject to strict liability without proof of a propensity in the particular dog, narrowed that holding to purebred pit bulls on reconsideration, and the legislature then removed breed or heritage as a factor affecting liability.27
A group of animals can supply the knowledge when the individual cannot be singled out. In Olier v. Bailey, a visitor was attacked by domestic geese, and a police officer had earlier been attacked by one of the geese, which was confined elsewhere on the day of the visitor's injury. The Mississippi court held that a person who keeps a large group of essentially indistinguishable animals, some of which have shown dangerous propensities, can be strictly liable for injuries attributable to characteristics the animals exhibited collectively.28 The plaintiff cannot tell one goose from another, and neither can the keeper, so a keeper who knows the flock behaves aggressively is on notice about the flock.
On an exam, a stem that supplies a prior bite makes the knowledge element easy. A stem that supplies none is where the analysis happens: search for growling, snapping, a failed attempt, an unusual form of restraint, warnings, or a reputation, and treat a bare breed label as an open question that most courts answer by requiring proof about this animal. When the stem shows an animal with no history of hostility at all, the strict-liability claim fails for lack of notice, and the remaining question is negligence.
Harm Within the Known Propensity
Section 509(2) limits a keeper's liability for an abnormally dangerous domestic animal to harm that results from the abnormally dangerous propensity he knows or has reason to know about.30 Subsection (1) removes the keeper's care as a defense once knowledge exists. Subsection (2) answers a different question: which harms that knowledge reaches. Strict liability is not absolute liability, and the plaintiff must show that the known propensity, and not a normal trait or an unknown danger, caused the injury.31
The limit follows from what justifies the liability. The keeper answers without fault because he has notice of a specific danger and is the one person able to confine, restrain, or dispose of the animal. Notice of one danger gives him a choice about that danger and no more. A keeper who knows his dog bites visitors has reason to fence the dog or give it away, but that history gives him nothing to act on regarding a tendency he has never seen. If knowledge of one trait made him answerable for everything the animal later did, liability would come loose from the knowledge that justified it and become insurance against whatever a pet might do.
The first scene is the standard illustration of the limit: a dog known to bite but not known to chase bicycles does not make its keeper strictly liable for a cyclist's fall.32 The Georgia court in McNair v. Jones stated the requirement plainly: “it is necessary that he have reason to know of its propensity to do harm of the type which it inflicts.”33 The same reasoning separates two injuries from a dog known to bite house guests. The keeper is strictly liable for its bites, but not when the dog simply gets in a visitor's way and the visitor falls, because that harm results from a different characteristic of the animal.34
The second scene reverses the answer because the known trait itself includes the conduct that hurt the plaintiff. A keeper who knows that a dog attacks by running down its target stands differently, since a victim who falls while fleeing is injured by the very danger the keeper knew about. The cyclist's fall and the dog's pursuit are identical in both scenes. What moves the answer is whether pursuit was part of the danger the keeper had notice of.
Notice can also fail to carry across, and Allen v. Cox shows where. The plaintiff was hurt while trying to save her own cat from an attack by a neighbor's cat, and the owner knew that the neighbor's cat tended to attack other animals. The court held that knowledge of a tendency to attack animals does not necessarily imply knowledge of a propensity to harm persons, but that it was enough to create a jury question.35 The reasoning is the same as for a dog known to attack other dogs: notice of that kind is not, by itself, notice that the dog will attack humans, because the harm must correspond to the knowledge.36 A plaintiff who steps into the middle of the very conduct the keeper knew about, here an attack on another animal, can ask the jury to find that the injury came from the known trait, even though the court will not treat the question as settled in her favor.
There are two opposite ways to go wrong. Reading the known trait too narrowly would excuse the keeper of a dog that bites a visitor's left hand because it had only ever bitten the right, which makes notice useless. Reading it too broadly, so that any dangerous-dog label covers any injury, produces the insurance rule just rejected. The workable question lies between them.
Step three does the work, and it is the step students skip when a stem establishes notice of one trait and then describes an injury from another. A passing remark that the animal was known to be dangerous does not carry the plaintiff past it.
Failing the scope limit ends only the strict-liability theory. In most states a plaintiff whose harm falls outside the known propensity may still try to prove negligence, and the animal's past behavior and characteristics bear on whether the injury could reasonably have been anticipated.37 New York is the exception, because it permits no negligence claim alongside the strict-liability rule for domestic animals.38 An answer should therefore say that the strict-liability claim fails for the unrelated injury and then say whether negligence remains open in the jurisdiction at issue.