Concept
Intervening Acts Within the Risk
Strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities
Intervening Acts Within the Risk
Section 519(2) of the Second Restatement limits strict liability to the kind of harm whose possibility makes the activity abnormally dangerous.1 That limit leaves a question open. Suppose the harm is of the right kind, but something unexpected set it off: a careless driver, a stray bullet, a flood. Lawyers call such an event an intervening cause, an act or force that enters after the defendant's conduct and contributes to the injury. Negligence law tends to confine liability to foreseeable accidents, because a defendant who fails to foresee the unforeseeable has not been careless. The Second Restatement declines to carry that confinement into strict liability.
Section 522 gives the Second Restatement's answer. The actor has created, for the actor's own purposes, a risk that is not a usual incident of the ordinary life of the community. If that risk ripens into injury, it is immaterial that the harm came through the unexpectable action of a person, an animal, or a force of nature. The only question under § 519(2) is whether the harm comes from the risk that makes the activity abnormal. If it does, how the risk matured matters little.
The rule follows from what the liability rests on. Strict liability is not based on fault but on the choice to engage in the activity in the first place, and courts place the damages flowing from that choice on the actor, not on those who suffer injury, even blameless injury.2 A foreseeability screen would bring a fault-like inquiry back into a doctrine built to do without one, and the cost would fall on a plaintiff who did nothing wrong.
The rule also fits factor (c), the risk that reasonable care cannot eliminate. That factor looks for an unusual risk of accident that remains despite due care, as it does when a company transports gasoline.3 Other people's lapses belong to that remainder. A company that hauls gasoline cannot control who else is on the road, and as long as drivers are human, the chance of meeting a careless one cannot be removed. The encounter is part of the irreducible risk that makes the hauling abnormally dangerous.
Petrosur's argument fails. Two things combined to injure Hendrix: Dean's negligent driving and the unusual risk that gasoline hauling imposes on the community.4 A negligent driver who strikes an ordinary car may injure that car's occupant, but cannot cause a fire that burns someone many feet away. The burn is the very kind of harm that makes hauling abnormally dangerous, so § 519(2) is satisfied, and Dean's carelessness explains only how the risk ripened. Hendrix recovers from Petrosur without proving that Petrosur was careless, and he may still sue Dean in negligence. The hauler's liability does not affect that claim.
The injury is the explosion that makes the storage abnormally dangerous, so under the Second Restatement the hospital is liable even though no one could have expected the ricochet. This scene removes even a careless actor, and the result is the same. The hospital chose, for its own purposes, to impose the explosion risk on the community, and the loss from that choice falls on the hospital and not on the man who was hurt.
The rule has a boundary, because a trigger is immaterial only after the harm passes the § 519(2) test. A truck accident during fumigation shows the difference. Delivering Vikane by truck is no more likely to cause a collision than delivering topsoil or lumber, and fumigation is a strict liability activity because of the risk of Vikane poisoning, not truck accidents.5 Ordinary construction work is similar. Its risks, such as falling objects, are common, many people create and face them, and precautions can reduce them to a minimum, and they do not threaten the explosion or collapse that can wipe out a community.6 Harm of that kind does not support strict liability, whoever acted carelessly. The order of analysis therefore matters: first ask whether the harm is of the abnormal kind, and only then treat the trigger as beside the point.
Courts do not uniformly follow § 522. Some deny recovery when an unforeseeable event, a natural disaster, or an intentional act of a third person brings about the accident, even though the risk that makes the activity abnormally dangerous caused the injury. Smith v. Board of County Commissioners took that position where excessive rainfall produced the harm.7 Kaufman involved flammable liquid discharged into a stream and ignited by sparks from a passing truck, and it is cited for the rule that an unforeseeable intervening cause defeats strict liability.8 Many courts have declined to follow § 522, apparently on the theory that a defendant held to an insurer's liability should be able to predict the limits of that liability with reasonable certainty.9 Critics answer that strict liability rests on the choice to engage in the activity and not on fault, so a foreseeability limit retreats toward the fault inquiry the doctrine set aside.10
The Third Restatement takes a middle course. It applies the ordinary scope-of-risk rule to third-party intervention and asks whether the harm falls within the risks that justified liability in the first place. Strict liability is appropriate only when those risks included the risk that third persons would join in or trigger the harm.11 If storing dynamite carries no special risk that others will set it off, a defendant escapes liability when a striking worker fires a rifle at the stored dynamite and the explosion injures a neighbor, a result that Pecan Shoppe of Springfield, Missouri, Inc. v. Tri-State Motor Transit Co. supports.12 Yukon Equip. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. reached the opposite result on a deliberate explosion, because one reason that storing large amounts of dynamite is abnormally dangerous is that third persons may set it off.13 The two decisions do not conflict. They differ on whether third-party interference is among the reasons the activity is abnormally dangerous. Klein v. Pyrodyne Corp. states a similar limit: the defendant is relieved only if the intervening acts were unforeseeable in relation to the extraordinary risk the activity creates.14 Foreseeability is thus measured against the activity's own risk, not against the world at large.
The gasoline-hauling decision in Siegler v. Kuhlman itself drew a note of disagreement. Justice Rosellini concurred to say that the majority should not be read to apply strict liability where a third party's negligence causes the accident.15 The Second Restatement, by contrast, in effect treats intervention by others as part of the risk of an abnormally dangerous activity, at least when the intervening actor does not intend harm.16
An exam answer should proceed in order. Confirm first that the injury is of the kind that makes the activity abnormally dangerous under § 519(2). Next, state that the Second Restatement treats the trigger as immaterial. Then note that courts following a foreseeability or scope-of-risk limit ask whether the trigger lies within the activity's own risk, and commit to a conclusion with reasons.