Concept
Weighing the Factors Together
Strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities
Weighing the Factors Together
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520 lists six factors for deciding whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, but it supplies no scoring rule, no minimum number that must favor strict liability, and no ranking among them.1 Courts have filled the gap by treating the six as one interrelated set and giving each the weight the evidence justifies.2 The weights are far from equal. The factors that measure danger, and whether care can control it, do most of the work.
Because the factors interact, no single one decides a case. The Restatement comment says that any one factor is not necessarily sufficient by itself and that ordinarily several will be required for strict liability. It adds that, because of the interplay among the factors, abnormally dangerous activities cannot be reduced to any exact definition.3 The word ordinarily leaves room for the cases below in which one overwhelming showing carries the result. Winning a single factor gains a defendant little in any event. A court is unlikely to reject strict liability merely because the activity was carried on in an appropriate place.4 Facts must be considered, but it is the court that balances the Restatement factors in deciding whether strict liability is appropriate.5
The danger factors lead because they track the reason strict liability exists. If an activity can be performed safely with ordinary care, negligence is both an adequate remedy for injury and a sufficient deterrent to carelessness. Strict liability is reserved for selected uncommon and extraordinarily dangerous activities for which negligence is an inadequate deterrent or remedy.6 The central question is therefore whether reasonable care could make the activity safe. Where a serious risk survives all reasonable care, the victim has no breach to prove, and a fault rule gives the actor no reason to relocate the activity, to substitute a less hazardous method, or to reduce its scale. Those are the responses strict liability is meant to encourage.7 Economic analysis adds two supports. The more dangerous an activity, the more violent it is likely to be and the more likely it is to destroy the evidence a plaintiff needs to prove negligence, so strict liability reduces information and error costs. And the more uncommon an activity is in an area, the better the incentives created by strict liability operate on potential injurers rather than on potential victims.8 Decided cases bear out the ordering. Whether care can eliminate the danger has been the most significant factor. The commonness of an activity has rarely been influential. Community value, though sometimes mentioned, has been least influential, and some courts have ruled it irrelevant to strict liability.9
Crop dusting and a leaking tank car make the contrast plain, because both involve hazardous chemicals and the cases come out differently on whether care can control the risk. The drift of sprayed chemicals is virtually unpredictable. It turns on three uncertain and uncontrollable factors: the size of the dust or spray particles, the air disturbances the aircraft itself creates, and natural atmospheric forces.10 Careful flying therefore does not reliably keep the chemicals on the target field. In Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. American Cyanamid Co. a tank car of acrylonitrile leaked, and the court, speaking through Judge Posner, refused to impose strict liability. The accident might have been prevented at reasonable cost by greater care on the part of those who handled the tank car, but it is difficult to see how a change in the activity of transporting the chemical would have prevented it at reasonable cost.11 Strict liability exists to push defendants toward relocating, substituting, or shrinking an activity, and where due care can substantially control the risk those extreme measures are not called for.12 The chemical is dangerous in both settings. What separates the cases is whether the care available to the defendant would have controlled the risk.
Courts have already sorted many familiar activities, and knowing which side of the line an activity usually falls on shortens the analysis. Strict liability has been applied to blasting, pile driving, crop dusting, fumigating part of a building with cyanide gas, drilling oil wells or operating refineries in thickly settled communities, and storing explosives or inflammable liquids in quantity in the midst of a city.13 Mining wastes held in retaining pools and rock blasted for a road belong on the same side, even though both are done in an appropriate place.14
The other side of the line holds activities that are everyday and controllable. Ordinary construction work carries a risk of falling objects, but it is common, many in the community engage in it and are exposed to it, it lacks the extreme risk of an explosion or a dam collapse that could wipe out a community, and precautions in the course of the work can reduce most of its risks to a minimum.15 Construction is not harmless. It stays outside strict liability because care controls the risk and the community shares it.
The classification matters beyond the activity's own operator. The Restatement retains vicarious liability for those who hire independent contractors in several situations, and one of them is work involving abnormally dangerous activities, so a court's weighing can decide who pays when a contractor does the dangerous work.16
Two factors favor the firm in that scene, and the firm still loses, which is why counting factors misleads. The useful question is which factors speak to the problem strict liability exists to solve. Place and usefulness speak to it only weakly when the danger travels with the activity.
Hauling gasoline on public highways shows how a close case resolves, because the factors split and the court must decide which to trust. In Siegler v. Kuhlman, a tank trailer separated from its truck and overturned on a highway, and a high school student on her way home from her after-school job came upon the spill.17 The Washington Supreme Court held that strict liability applied to the transportation of gasoline as freight in a tanker truck.18 Taken one factor at a time, the analysis runs as follows.19
- Factors (a) through (c) support strict liability only in part. Gasoline is highly flammable, and an explosion could cause severe injury, but care can keep accidents to a minimum.
- Factor (d) cuts both ways. Tank trucks are a familiar sight on highways, but hauling gasoline in bulk is not something most people do.
- Factor (e) weighs against strict liability, because an interstate highway is probably the safest place to haul gasoline.
- Factor (f) weighs against strict liability, because the availability of gasoline has great value to the community.
On that scorecard the plaintiff should struggle, yet strict liability was imposed. The court concentrated almost exclusively on the extreme risk of hauling gasoline. It was unimpressed by the argument that a highway is the appropriate place for the activity, because the impracticability of moving gasoline any other way does nothing to reduce the abnormally high risk.20 A second consideration supports the result. A gasoline explosion tends to destroy the evidence needed to show whether anyone was careless, so a fault-only rule may leave the loss with the victim.21 The same logic explains why the tank-car leak could come out the other way. A leak that greater care by the handlers would have prevented is the kind of failure negligence can deter.22
Because the weighing is discretionary, courts applying the same Restatement analysis reach different results on similar activities. Washington found crop dusting strictly liable in Langan v. Valicopters, Inc., while Mississippi applied negligence to crop dusting in Lawler v. Skelton.23 Washington held a fireworks display strictly liable in Klein v. Pyrodyne Corp., and an Illinois court using the same analysis reached the opposite result in Cadena v. Chicago Fireworks Mfg. Co.24 A Colorado federal court applied strict liability to the storage of large amounts of gasoline in underground tanks at a service station near a residential area in Northglenn v. Chevron USA, Inc., while Oregon refused it in Hudson v. Peavey Oil Co. because filling stations are common in residential areas.25 An exam answer on a close case should say that outcomes vary by jurisdiction and then commit to a result with reasons.
Step three does the real work. If reasonable care can make the activity safe, negligence is enough and strict liability does not apply.26 If reasonable care cannot eliminate a substantial risk of grave physical injury, strict liability will probably apply even though the activity is socially valuable and conducted conscientiously, and the defendant's best argument is that the activity is one of common usage.27 An answer that merely tallies how many factors favor each side misses that difference in weight. The Third Restatement states the emphasis in two questions: whether the activity creates a foreseeable and highly significant risk of physical harm even when all actors exercise reasonable care, and whether it is not one of common usage.28 The next section compares that test with the six-factor Second Restatement formulation.