Concept
How Courts Analyze the Activity
Strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities
How Courts Analyze the Activity
Section 519 imposes strict liability on one who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity, and § 520 lists the factors that decide whether an activity qualifies.1 Before a court weighs any factor, two prior questions need answers: who decides, and what is being decided about. The judge decides, and the subject of the decision is the defendant's activity, not the substance at its center. Each answer shapes how the factors that follow are used.
A Question for the Court
Whether an activity is abnormally dangerous is a question for the judge. Comment l to § 520 says so directly: the issue “is to be determined by the court.”2 The allocation can surprise a student, because in an ordinary tort trial the jury applies the governing standard to the facts, and strict liability can look like just another standard. But classifying an activity as abnormally dangerous does not apply a standard; it selects one. That selection is a policy decision about the nature of the duty owed by those who conduct the activity, and it belongs to the court for the same reason that the existence of a duty of care is a question of law in a negligence case. A jury that made the selection would be making law as well as applying it.3
A federal court applying Michigan law met the issue head-on in Doe v. Johnson, an action for damages from the transmission of HIV in which the plaintiffs' strict liability count was dismissed.4 The plaintiffs argued that abnormal danger is a jury question and leaned on Perry. The court noted that Michigan follows the Restatement on strict liability and held that the question is one of law for the court, finding little support for the plaintiffs' contrary position.5 Perry did not help them, because it was not a strict liability case. It concerned general liability for inherently dangerous conditions, and the Perry court had itself distinguished that doctrine from strict liability.6 The technique carries beyond Michigan: when a decision appears to send an “inherently dangerous” question to a jury, check which doctrine it actually applies before citing it on who decides.
Other courts agree. In Langan v. Valicopters, Inc., the Washington Supreme Court called the question one of law for the court, considered each § 520 factor itself, and observed that the factors need not all weigh equally in favor of abnormal danger.7 In Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., which involved a rail shipment of acrylonitrile through a metropolitan area, the parties agreed that the question was one of law under comment l, so the Seventh Circuit owed no particular deference to the district court's conclusion.8 The consequence is practical: an appellate court may decide the classification afresh.
Calling the question one of law does not mean the judge decides it in a vacuum. Each § 520 factor rests on facts, and the judge must take them into account before balancing. In a fumigation case, for instance, the court would consider how toxic the fumigant is, how quickly it spreads, whether it is easily detected, and what alternative methods exist, and then balance the Restatement factors.9 Both sides therefore build a record on every factor, and the judge, not the jury, draws the conclusion from it.
The judge's ruling fixes the standard, and the jury works within it. It finds what happened, whether the activity caused the harm, and what damages follow. It does not ask whether the defendant used the utmost care, because even the utmost care does not defeat liability for an abnormally dangerous activity.10 Whether the plaintiff's own fault reduces recovery is a separate matter, taken up with the defenses; on that question the Restatement (Second) treats abnormally dangerous activities the same way it treats wild animals.11
The ruling also marks only the start of the inquiry into what strict liability covers, because liability is limited to the kind of harm whose possibility makes the activity abnormally dangerous.12 In a fumigation case, a plaintiff injured in a truck-delivery accident was not hurt by the poisoning risk that makes fumigation abnormally dangerous. Delivering the chemical by truck is no more likely to cause that accident than delivering topsoil or lumber, so fumigation's strict liability status did not reach it.13 A later section develops that limit.
The Activity, Not the Substance
Strict liability attaches to the defendant's activity, defined by what the defendant does, how, and where. The text of § 519 says as much: liability falls on one who “carries on an abnormally dangerous activity.”15 The Nevada Supreme Court built its answer around that point in Valentine v. Pioneer Chlor Alkali Co., Inc., where a federal court had put the question whether Pioneer's activity was abnormally dangerous. The court looked to the § 520 factors and stated its method: “we must not look at the abstract propensities or properties of the particular substance involved, but must analyze the defendant's activity as a whole.”16
The reason for the rule has two parts. The first is its consequence. If a substance's abstract danger were enough, virtually any commercial or industrial activity involving a substance dangerous in the abstract would be deemed abnormally dangerous, a result the court called intolerable.17 The second comes from the factors themselves, which ask about conduct, not chemistry. Whether reasonable care can eliminate the risk depends on how the defendant handles the material.18 Whether the activity is a matter of common usage depends on who else engages in it.19 Whether it is inappropriate to its place depends on where it is carried on.20 The name of a substance answers none of these questions, so the inquiry has to begin with the operation.
The court's own disposition illustrates the method. It declined to answer the general question in the abstract and left the § 520 weighing to the federal district court, on the totality of the evidence. If that court found Pioneer's activity abnormally dangerous, strict liability would attach; if it found otherwise, strict liability would not apply.21
Even dynamite gets this treatment. In Bridges v. Kentucky Stone Co., Indiana's supreme court held that “whether the storage of dynamite in any particular circumstance is an ‘ultrahazardous activity’ must be determined on a case-by-case basis” under the § 520 factors, and it concluded that the storage in that case did not warrant strict liability, although it did not elaborate on each factor.22 No substance, however dangerous, settles the question without an examination of the circumstances, and the examination can come out for the defendant.
The Seventh Circuit stated the principle in its sharpest form in Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. American Cyanamid Co. The plaintiff emphasized that acrylonitrile is flammable and toxic. The court answered that “ultrahazardousness or abnormal dangerousness is, in the contemplation of the law at least, a property not of substances, but of activities.”23 The relevant activity was the transportation of acrylonitrile by rail through populated areas, and the court observed that natural gas is both flammable and poisonous although operating a natural gas well is not an ultrahazardous activity.24 Notice how precisely the court states the activity, with its method (rail transportation) and its setting (populated areas). An exam answer should define the activity with the same precision and say why.
The activity focus matters for suppliers. Whatever the situation under products liability law, the court added, a manufacturer is not engaged in an abnormally dangerous activity merely because its product becomes dangerous when handled or used after it leaves the manufacturer's premises, even if the danger is foreseeable.25
It is doubtful that a seller's exposure continues after the sale. Such liability would be endless, essentially a form of product liability and not liability based on the activity of selling. The hospital stands differently: storing an explosive chemical is an activity, and whether it is abnormally dangerous depends on further facts about the Restatement factors.26 The two doctrines ask different questions. Product liability concerns a supplier's responsibility for selling a product with an excessive and often unexpected danger. Abnormal-danger liability concerns an actor who introduces a substantial, unavoidable danger into a setting where the hazard is not part of the common landscape, as a contractor does who explodes a large charge of dynamite in a city.27
Who counts as carrying on the activity is a further question. Jurisdictions differ on when a hiring party answers alongside an independent contractor.28 The Restatement Third hinges direct liability for work entrusted to an independent contractor on retained control,29 yet it retains vicarious liability for those who hire independent contractors in eight situations, among them work involving abnormally dangerous activities.30