Concept
Statutory Duties and Plaintiff Conduct
Related effects of the plaintiff's conduct and consent
Statutory Duties and Plaintiff Conduct
The reckless-disregard rules closed with a plaintiff who assumes the risk arising from the defendant's reckless disregard of his safety; that plaintiff is barred from recovery for such harm.1 Each rule so far has paired the plaintiff's conduct with the defendant's state of mind (negligence, recklessness, intent, or strict liability) and asked what the pairing does to recovery. This unit changes the defendant's side of the pair. When the defendant's negligence consists of violating a statute, a legislature wrote the rule of conduct, and the question becomes what the legislature meant the plaintiff's own choices to do to the protection it created.
In the ordinary statutory case very little changes. A violation of a safety statute usually supplies the standard of care against which the defendant is measured, and the plaintiff's carelessness and knowing choices are handled by the rules already covered in this chapter. The exceptions come from the statute's purpose. A legislature that protects a particular class, such as factory workers or children, does so because class members cannot be relied on to protect themselves.2 If an implied assumption of risk or a signed release could defeat every claim by a member of that class, the statute would protect chiefly the people who needed it least, since the plaintiffs whose choices are least free are the ones the statute was written for. Legislatures also sometimes act directly, abolishing a plaintiff-conduct defense in a limited situation.3 Whether the common-law rules survive, narrow, or disappear therefore depends on whom the statute protects and why.
Two questions follow, and they divide by the form the plaintiff's willingness took. The first asks when a knowing choice, inferred from conduct, defeats a claim built on a statutory violation. The second asks whether a signed release can waive a precaution the statute requires. In each, start with what the statute was meant to protect and whom.
Assumption of Risk When the Defendant Violated a Statute
Assumption of risk remains a defense to a negligence claim built on a statutory violation, except for statutes intended to protect a class of persons from dangers against which they cannot protect themselves.4 The general rule leaves the earlier analysis in place because of how the doctrine is defined. Assumption of risk is the plaintiff's voluntary consent to encounter a known danger created by the defendant's negligence, while contributory negligence is unreasonable conduct, so the difference is between consent and conduct.5 A statute changes how the plaintiff proves the defendant's negligence. It does not change whether the plaintiff consented, and consent is the whole of the defense.
Because the doctrine turns on consent, the same three criteria apply when the breach is statutory: the plaintiff's conduct must manifest consent, and the plaintiff must encounter the risk voluntarily and with full knowledge and appreciation of the danger.6 The defendant pleads and proves the defense, and it is a question of fact for the jury.7 Knowledge means actual knowledge, understanding, and appreciation of the specific risk that caused the injury, and many courts have rescued plaintiffs by finding that they did not appreciate the exact risk.8 The products cases state the same two requirements in another way: a person cannot consent to what he does not know or to what is forced upon him, so the encounter must be both informed and voluntary.9 Contributory negligence follows a parallel path, since it generally remains a defense when the defendant is negligent per se from violating a statute.10
What the defense accomplishes varies by state. In a good number of states, assumption of risk remains a total bar to liability, which distinguishes it from contributory negligence, now generally a damage-reducing factor under comparative fault.11 In comparative-fault states, what was once termed assumption of risk may instead be used to show that the plaintiff is at fault, and liability is apportioned.12 A pedestrian who crosses mid-block, though she does not consent to a driver's negligence, may have liability apportioned to her on the same principle.13
The exception covers statutes written for people who cannot weigh a danger the way an adult with real options can. The sources place in this group statutes that prohibit child labor, the sale of firearms to minors, and the sale of liquor to intoxicated persons, along with statutes that require safety devices to protect factory workers.14 A court applying the exception must find that the statute was enacted to protect a class of persons from their inability to exercise self-protective care.15 That finding takes the defense away because of what the defense would otherwise do. A statute that keeps minors off dangerous machinery exists because minors underestimate such danger and find it hard to refuse an employer's assignment. If the minor's acceptance of the danger answered the claim, the employer would defeat the statute with the very vulnerability that moved the legislature to act. The legislature's safety judgment controls, and the individual plaintiff's tolerance of the danger does not. Dmitri stands on the other side of the line. He is an adult with real alternatives, and the traffic ordinance has no purpose of protecting people in his position from their own acceptance of its violation.
Employment is where this reasoning mattered most, and its history shows why legislatures stepped in. Assumption of risk, together with the other common-law employer defenses, was applied vigorously in the employer's favor, and absent legislation most victims of industrial accidents carried the loss themselves, as best they could.16 Some states went so far as to hold that an employee could assume the risk of his employer's violation of safety statutes passed for his protection.17 That holding shows the difficulty plainly: a safety statute that a worker's continued presence on the job could waive would give the employer a way out of the very duty the legislature imposed. Decisions in some states limited or abolished these defenses in certain cases,18 and legislatures removed them for particular plaintiffs by statute.
The Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) is the clearest case. For an interstate railroad employee, the Act preserves the common-law negligence action against the employer while abolishing assumption of risk and the fellow-servant rule as defenses, and the pure form of comparative negligence applies.19 Once the defense is gone, the worker's own carelessness is answered only by reducing damages in proportion to her share of fault, and her knowledge of the hazard cannot defeat the claim. The Act goes further when the injury results from the railroad's violation of a federal safety requirement. The contributory negligence defense is abolished,20 the railroad is strictly liable, the employee need not prove the violation was negligent, and her own negligence neither bars the claim nor mitigates her damages.21
Dmitri and Yolanda each knew the specific danger and went ahead, so the plaintiff's knowledge does not explain the different results. The source of the claim does. Dmitri sued under ordinary negligence law, with a traffic statute supplying the breach, so the defense stayed available. Yolanda sued under a statute in which the legislature had already decided that a worker's acceptance of the job's hazards must not excuse the employer. An exam answer therefore starts with the statute and the plaintiff's class, and reaches the plaintiff's state of mind only afterward.
The plaintiff's willingness can also be put in writing before the injury, and whether a signed release can waive a statutory safety duty is a separate question, taken up next.
Releases Cannot Waive Statutory Safety Duties
A plaintiff who puts willingness in writing before any injury faces a firmer rule when the duty comes from a statute. A release, meaning a signed agreement made in advance not to hold the other party liable for a later injury, cannot waive a precaution that a statute itself requires. In Hargis v. Baize, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that a party cannot contract away liability for damages caused by its failure to comply with a duty imposed by a safety statute.26 The same limit applies when a statute sets safety standards for a whole industry. An exculpatory clause, which is any contract term that excuses a party from liability for its own conduct, is unenforceable when it purports to release an industry member from liability for violating those standards.27 Courts have applied the limit to a mine-safety statute in Martin County Coal Corp. v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Co., a Sixth Circuit decision, and to a home-inspection statute in Finch v. Inspectech, LLC, a West Virginia decision.28
Two reasons support the rule. First, a statutory precaution is a command adopted by the legislature to protect a class or the public, and two private parties have no authority to repeal or soften it between themselves. A release of an ordinary duty of care stands differently, because disclaimers are best understood as negating the duty of care owed to the plaintiff, which prevents the plaintiff from proving negligence in the first place.29 Second, the people a safety statute protects usually deal with an operator who sets the terms, and someone who must sign or go without the service has little power to refuse. The general law of disclaimers shows the same concern, since it withholds enforcement where there is a gross disparity of bargaining power or the matter involves the public interest.30 If a signature could waive the statute, every operator would make the waiver a condition of service, and a standard written to protect everyone would protect no one.
A stadium ticket that carries a printed release shows the rule at work. Suppose a statute mandates safety standards for public stadiums, such as the number of exits or a maximum number of patrons. A court would likely refuse to enforce a ticket release that accepts the risk of injury from negligence the statute covers, because operators should not be able to avoid the statute's purpose by requiring the protected class to waive its protection in order to see the game.31 The ticket is a standard form, the spectator cannot negotiate its terms, and the only alternative to accepting it is staying home, facts that also match the public-interest factors discussed below.32 Were the clause enforced, an operator that overfilled the stands or blocked an exit would hold a ready answer to every injured patron, and the exits and occupancy limits would bind nobody. The same logic explains why implied assumption of risk gave way for statutes protecting people who cannot protect themselves. In both settings the legislature's safety judgment controls, and the individual's acceptance of the danger does not displace it.
Where no statute sets the precaution, the same kind of paper generally works. In the skydiving example, Knieval hires Newman to teach him the sport, and Newman agrees only if Knieval consents in writing not to hold Newman liable for resulting injuries. Contractual disclaimers of this kind are valid in a majority of jurisdictions,33 and courts generally enforce such express agreements even for a negligently created risk.34 The usual reasons are respect for the participant's free choice to accept a dangerous pursuit and the wish to keep high-risk activities available by insulating providers from the cost of injuries.35 Those reasons carry little weight against a statutory precaution, because the legislature has already decided that the precaution is owed whatever an individual prefers. Enforcement still has conditions. The agreement must be knowingly and voluntarily made, and the risk that caused the injury must fall within its scope.36 The plaintiff must clearly consent to that particular risk, and some courts have held that a provision releasing the defendant from 'all claims for personal injury' does not waive negligence, since it does not bring home the extent of the risks accepted.37 Because the provider drafts the release, an unclear one is construed against the provider.38 Most courts also refuse to enforce a release as to willful or wanton misconduct or intentional torts.39
Both patrons signed the same paper, so the source of the duty that was breached decides each result. A statutory precaution cannot be waived, and an ordinary duty of care can be waived if the release is clear, freely given, and within the risks the parties contemplated.
A statute need not prescribe a precaution to limit a release. A statute that immunizes an industry from a certain range of claims may lead a court to conclude that a release cannot go further without violating public policy.40 In Rothstein v. Snowbird Corp., a Utah decision, a release purporting to waive all claims against a ski resort was held unenforceable as contrary to public policy in light of a statute that immunizes ski operators from liability for inherent risks.41 The logic follows the shape of the statute. The legislature drew a line between risks the operator need not answer for and risks it must, and a blanket release would move that line to wherever the operator's form chose to put it. The extension is not uniform, because a later Utah decision, Penunuri v. Sundance Partners, Ltd., is cited as contrary authority.42 An answer should therefore state the rule about statutory precautions firmly and describe the immunity-statute extension as a view some courts take.
A statute is one route to invalidating a release, and general public policy is another. The parties cannot disclaim liability for intentional torts or willful, wanton, or reckless conduct, where there is a gross disparity of bargaining power, or in a matter of public interest. Defendants cannot disclaim liability for negligence if they are common carriers, innkeepers, or employers requiring disclaimers as a condition of employment.43 In Tunkl v. Regents of the University of California, the California Supreme Court listed six factors for deciding when an exculpatory agreement adversely affects the public interest, including a business suitable for public regulation, a service of great public importance, a decisive bargaining advantage, and a standardized adhesion contract.44 Those factors ask a court to weigh the facts of each transaction, while a statutory precaution settles the question in advance because the legislature has already made the public-policy judgment.
On an exam, a stem that pairs a signed release with a fire code, a mine-safety act, or any other statute setting precautions for the defendant's business calls for starting with the statute. Students lose the point by treating the signature as the end of the analysis, or by asking whether the plaintiff understood the clause, when the clause fails at the first step whatever the plaintiff knew. Where the stem contains no statute, the analysis turns to whether the release was clear, freely given, and within the risk, and the plaintiff's knowledge and bargaining position matter there.