Concept
Reckless Disregard Rules
Related effects of the plaintiff's conduct and consent
Reckless Disregard Rules
Reckless disregard of another's safety is governed mostly by the rules of negligence, with two adjustments: one for causation and one for the plaintiff's own conduct. The causal adjustment comes from Restatement (Second) of Torts § 501(2). The fact that an actor's misconduct is in reckless disregard of another's safety, rather than merely negligent, is taken into account in deciding whether a jury may reasonably find that the conduct bears a sufficient causal relation to the harm to make the actor liable.1
The adjustment for the plaintiff's conduct takes up most of this section, because recklessness sits above negligence on the culpability scale and changes what a plaintiff's own fault can do. Courts describe reckless conduct as differing from negligence in kind as well as in degree.2 A negligent actor fails to notice or guard against a danger, while a reckless actor runs a serious danger he perceives.
The plaintiff may have been careless, reckless, or may have assumed the risk, and the defendant may have been negligent or reckless. Of the six combinations, the two with a negligent defendant and a careless or risk-assuming plaintiff belong to the negligence baseline above. The other four each receive a heading below, and they do not all come out alike:
- A careless plaintiff is not barred by contributory negligence when the defendant was reckless.3
- A reckless plaintiff who sues a negligent defendant is treated like a contributorily negligent one.4
- A reckless plaintiff who sues a reckless defendant is barred.5
- A plaintiff who assumes the risk of the defendant's recklessness is barred.6
Two of these four ask whether the plaintiff's own conduct was reckless, and a third requires sorting a careless plaintiff from a reckless one. One yardstick answers every such question: the factors that determine when conduct is in reckless disregard of another's safety also determine whether it is in reckless disregard of the actor's own.7 The first heading below states the default under which recklessness borrows the negligence rules, and the yardstick gets its own heading just before the first reckless-plaintiff combination needs it.
Recklessness Treated Like Negligence
Section 501(1) sets the default. Except as stated in subsection (2) and in § 503, the rules that determine an actor's liability to another for reckless disregard of the other's safety are the same as those that determine liability for negligent misconduct.8 A reckless defendant therefore faces the same working parts as a negligent one: a duty to the plaintiff, a breach, a causal link, and damages. What differs is how consciously the actor ran the risk, and that difference needs no separate liability system. A court starts from the negligence rules and asks whether either exception displaces them.
Two exceptions are named. Subsection (2), the causal adjustment, comes next. Section 503 governs how the plaintiff's own conduct interacts with a reckless defendant, and the remaining headings work through it. A student who treats recklessness as a freestanding claim with liability rules of its own has skipped the default and will misplace the analysis.
Subsection (2) works on the causal element alone. It leaves the duty owed and the definition of breach where negligence puts them, and it does not excuse the plaintiff from proving causation. It adds one consideration: when the causal link is arguable, the defendant's recklessness counts in deciding whether a jury may reasonably find the link sufficient.9
Neither scene shows recklessness creating causation out of nothing. Had Lindqvist been hurt by an event with no connection to the driving, no degree of culpability on Okafor's part would supply the missing link. Recklessness matters at the margin, where the causal connection is arguable. On an exam, a reckless defendant with a strained causal chain is the cue for subsection (2), and a reckless defendant whose victim carelessly contributed to the harm is the cue for § 503.
Careless Plaintiff, Reckless Defendant
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 503(1) fills the first reckless-defendant combination: a plaintiff's contributory negligence does not bar recovery for harm caused by the defendant's reckless disregard for the plaintiff's safety.11 Against a merely negligent defendant, the plaintiff's own failure to use reasonable care was traditionally a complete defense.12 Section 503(1) withdraws that defense once the defendant's conduct is reckless, which makes it one of the displacements that § 501(1) reserved to § 503. The rule is traditional Restatement Second doctrine, and the comparative-fault discussion below explains how many states have changed its remedy.
The rule borrows from the law of intentional torts. It is standard hornbook law that contributory negligence is not a defense to an intentional tort, so a defendant cannot answer a battery claim by arguing that the plaintiff was negligent in failing to duck. Almost every jurisdiction has extended the same rule to wanton and willful or reckless conduct, on the view that such conduct differs from negligence in kind and not only in degree.13 A court applying the rule to a battery carried it one step further: because contributory negligence does not bar recovery against an intentional wrongdoer, the plaintiff is not barred by failing to be attentive to his surroundings so as to discover the aggressive act and avoid its consequences.14 Section 503(1) gives the reckless defendant the same treatment.
The plaintiff's carelessness is identical in the two scenes, so the defendant's state of mind decides the outcome. When an exam stem gives a plaintiff who jaywalked or ignored a warning, ask first what the defendant was doing, because only a defendant who consciously disregarded a serious risk triggers § 503(1). Then sort the plaintiff. A merely careless plaintiff is protected, while one whose conduct reaches reckless disregard of his own safety is measured by the factors that define recklessness toward others,15 and a plaintiff who was reckless toward his own safety meets the bar of § 503(3).16 Assumption of risk behaves differently too: contributory negligence is no defense to reckless conduct, but a plaintiff who assumes the risk is barred.17
Many jurisdictions now apply comparative fault to some or all cases involving willful and wanton conduct, and Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability §§ 1 and 7 takes that position.18 In those jurisdictions a careless plaintiff's recovery may shrink by his share of fault where the traditional rule would have left the claim untouched. States differ, so an answer should state the traditional rule first and then note the comparative-fault alternative.
Punitive damages stand apart. Where the defendant's reckless misconduct is sufficient to justify punitive damages, those damages are not reduced under the comparative negligence rule.19
Measuring Reckless Disregard of Self
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 502 supplies the yardstick for every combination in which the plaintiff's own conduct is in question. The factors that determine when an actor's conduct is in reckless disregard of another's safety also determine whether his conduct is in reckless disregard of his own safety.23 No second definition of recklessness exists. A court asking whether a plaintiff was reckless toward himself applies the test it would apply to a defendant who endangered a stranger.
A single test makes sense because recklessness is a state of mind that does not change with the direction of the risk. A double standard would call the same conduct reckless when it endangers others and merely careless when it endangers oneself, and it would put a plaintiff who courted a grave danger beside one who never noticed it. The sorting matters because a careless plaintiff and a reckless plaintiff fare differently against a reckless defendant.
The yardstick polices a line between two ways a plaintiff may court harm. One is careless failure to recognize or appreciate a risk, and the other is conscious taking of an unreasonable risk. Ordinary analysis treats each as contributory negligence.24 Recklessness toward oneself lies at the conscious end of that line. A plaintiff who never appreciated a danger cannot have disregarded it, so inattention, however foolish in hindsight, is negligence toward oneself and nothing more.
A neighboring line should be kept separate. Realizing that an activity may be dangerous is not appreciating the specific danger that causes injury, and the assumption-of-risk defense applies only if the specific risk is fully understood.25 Recklessness toward oneself asks how conscious and how serious the plaintiff's risk-taking was. Assumption of risk, taken up in the last heading of this section, asks whether the plaintiff accepted a particular danger.
What separates the two plaintiffs is what each knew before acting. The visitor lacked any awareness of the danger and falls on the careless side. The rider appreciated a serious danger and proceeded, and § 502 lets a court say so with the same factors it would use against a defendant who sent that motorcycle toward a crowd. On an exam, a stem that tells you what the plaintiff knew and that the plaintiff went ahead anyway signals recklessness toward oneself, while a stem that says only that the plaintiff should have noticed describes negligence. The next two headings pair a reckless plaintiff first with a negligent defendant and then with a reckless one, and the outcomes differ.
Reckless Plaintiff, Negligent Defendant
Section 503(2) governs the pairing of a reckless plaintiff with a negligent defendant. Except as stated in subsection (3), the rules that determine the effect of the plaintiff's reckless disregard of his own safety are the same as those that determine the effect of his contributory negligence.28 A plaintiff who perceived a serious danger to himself and ran it anyway therefore goes to whatever regime the jurisdiction applies to plaintiff fault generally. The opening qualification matters, because it tells you the default has a limit, and that limit turns on the defendant's conduct, which the next heading takes up.
The default is sensible because a negligent defendant has not climbed the culpability scale, while the plaintiff's recklessness is worse than the carelessness the contributory negligence defense has always answered. A rule that barred or reduced a careless plaintiff's recovery yet spared one who deliberately courted danger would reward the more culpable behavior.
At common law the answer is a complete bar. Before comparative fault, the conduct defenses barred a plaintiff's claim completely,29 and under the traditional contributory negligence rule a plaintiff recovers nothing even when the defendant was far more at fault.30 A reckless plaintiff who sues a merely negligent defendant in such a state recovers nothing, the same result a careless plaintiff would meet.
All but a handful of states now use comparative fault instead. The other 46 states, by decision or statute, have adopted some form of comparative fault or comparative negligence, under which the jury expresses each party's fault as a percentage and the plaintiff recovers her total damages multiplied by the defendant's percentage.31 If damages are $100,000 and the jury finds the defendant 90 percent at fault, the plaintiff recovers $90,000 where under the traditional rule she would recover nothing.
Comparative fault does not spare the reckless plaintiff the heavy share that recklessness deserves. The standard factors for assigning percentages weigh the nature of each person's risk-creating conduct, including any awareness or indifference with respect to the risk and any intent with respect to the harm, along with the strength of the causal connection between that conduct and the harm.32 A plaintiff who perceived a serious danger and went ahead displays the awareness the first factor weighs, so recklessness toward oneself should draw a large share.
An essay stem that describes a plaintiff who consciously courted danger invites the instinct to apply § 503(2) at once, and that instinct skips the question the opening qualification asks about the defendant.
The plaintiff's conduct is the same in both scenes, so the defendant's state of mind decides which rule applies, just as it did for the careless plaintiff under § 503(1). A reckless defendant displaces the § 503(2) default, and recklessness on both sides is the combination the next heading works through. Where the defendant is only negligent, the answer follows from classifying the plaintiff's recklessness as contributory negligence, which an exam response can do in four moves.
Reckless Plaintiff, Reckless Defendant
Section 503(3) completes the pairing that § 503(2) left open: a plaintiff whose conduct is in reckless disregard of his own safety is barred from recovery against a defendant whose reckless disregard of the plaintiff's safety is a legal cause of the plaintiff's harm.36 The preceding heading treated a reckless plaintiff as a contributorily negligent one when the defendant was merely negligent. Subsection (3) marks where that default ends, and the trigger is the defendant's state of mind. The rule mirrors § 503(1): a reckless defendant defeats contributory negligence as a defense against a careless plaintiff, yet a plaintiff who was himself reckless is barred.
The logic of the pairing follows from the gap between the parties. A careless plaintiff recovers from a reckless defendant because the two stand on different footings, since courts treat reckless conduct as different in kind from negligence and refuse the contributory negligence defense on that ground.37 When the plaintiff's own conduct reaches recklessness, that difference between the parties disappears. Each has knowingly run a serious danger, neither holds the superior claim, and the law has no reason to move the loss from one to the other.
The bar therefore rests on three findings, and an answer should establish each. The defendant's conduct must be in reckless disregard of the plaintiff's safety, and that recklessness must be a legal cause of the harm, a question on which the greater culpability is itself weighed when the causal link is arguable.38 The plaintiff's conduct must be in reckless disregard of his own safety, which a court decides with the same factors that define recklessness toward others.39 The second finding does the sorting. A plaintiff who never appreciated a danger cannot have disregarded it, so inattention remains contributory negligence however foolish it looks afterward, while a plaintiff who perceived a serious danger and went ahead satisfies § 503(3).
What would the result be if the injured motorist had not been racing at all?
Almeida's conduct is identical in the two scenes, so the only fact that moves the answer is what the injured driver knew and chose before the collision. Against a reckless defendant, a plaintiff who merely failed to notice a danger keeps the claim, and a plaintiff who consciously ran it loses it. A third type of plaintiff, the one who assumed the risk, is also barred, and the next heading develops that rule.40
The traditional bar is not the whole picture in every state. Jurisdictions that apply comparative fault to some or all willful and wanton cases follow a different path, and Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability §§ 1 and 7 takes that position.41 A court in such a jurisdiction may assign the reckless plaintiff and the reckless defendant percentages of fault and reduce the award, where § 503(3) would have denied recovery altogether. An answer should state the § 503(3) bar as the traditional rule and mention apportionment when the facts point to a comparative-fault jurisdiction.
Assuming the Risk of Recklessness
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 503(4) supplies the last combination: a plaintiff who assumes the risk arising from the defendant's reckless disregard of his safety is barred from recovery for such harm.45 This combination tests the difference between consent and fault more sharply than any other. Against a reckless defendant, a careless plaintiff keeps the claim under § 503(1), and a reckless one loses it under § 503(3). Section 503(4) reaches a plaintiff who may fit neither description, because it asks whether the plaintiff accepted the danger, and how carefully the plaintiff behaved is secondary. The Restatement Second states the rule as a complete bar, and the last paragraphs of this heading explain how comparative fault has altered it.
The outcomes diverge because the two doctrines measure different things. Contributory negligence is unreasonable conduct, while assumption of risk is the plaintiff's voluntary consent to encounter a known danger, so the distinction is between conduct and consent.46 Three criteria support a finding of implied assumption of risk: the conduct must manifest consent, and the risk must be encountered voluntarily and with full knowledge and appreciation of the danger.47 A plaintiff who has made that choice has answered the question the law would otherwise have to decide, which is who bears the loss if the danger materializes. That is why contributory negligence is no defense to reckless conduct while assumption of the risk bars the claim.
The two bars can overlap without being the same. A plaintiff who knowingly rides with a driver he can see racing has probably perceived and run a serious danger to himself, so § 503(3) and § 503(4) may both reach one set of facts. Each rests on its own footing. Section 503(3) asks how conscious and how serious the plaintiff's own risk-taking was, while § 503(4) asks whether the plaintiff accepted a particular danger. Four questions keep the consent genuine, and because the failure of any one defeats the bar, they are best run in order.
Knowledge is the step where the bar most often fails. To excuse the defendant, the consent must be an informed one, so the defendant must show that the plaintiff actually knew, understood, and appreciated the risk, and the test is subjective: what the plaintiff actually knew, not what a careful person should have known.48 The knowledge must also be of a specific risk. A plaintiff who knows that careless drivers share every busy highway has not thereby assumed the risk of a collision with one.49 If the plaintiff did not actually know of the particular danger, he did not consent to assume it, even though his conduct may or may not have been negligent.50 With a reckless defendant the same limit applies: the plaintiff must appreciate the reckless danger itself, and a background chance that the defendant or the activity may misbehave is not enough.
Voluntariness is the second requirement, because no consent can be inferred unless the plaintiff's exposure was free.51 Courts often infer a free choice from the plaintiff's entering or remaining in the zone of danger, even reluctantly or under protest, but some cases, usually involving employees, present exposure that is not truly free. Exposure the plaintiff could not avoid shows no willingness to bear the loss. It shows only that the plaintiff faced a poor choice.
The third step marks the boundary of consent. A court addressing a battery claim quoted a California decision, Ordway v. Superior Court, for the point that a plaintiff who engages in a dangerous activity is held to consent to the known, apparent, or reasonably foreseeable consequences of participating, while participants do not consent to acts by others that are reckless or intentional.52 The same decision says assumption of risk has little or no application to intentional or reckless conduct. That statement reaches further than § 503(4), but the two fit together if consent is read narrowly: ordinary participation consents to ordinary risks, and only a plaintiff who actually perceives the specific reckless danger and chooses to stay has consented to it. Consent covers the conduct the plaintiff had in mind or acts substantially similar. One who plays football consents to ordinary tackles even if one renders him quadriplegic, but the privilege stops at the conduct consented to.53 A pickup-game participant who expects hard fouls has therefore consented to hard fouls, and an opponent's deliberate elbow to the face falls outside that consent unless the participant specifically perceived that danger and chose to stay in the game.
The fourth step addresses an express agreement, the clearest form of assumption. An express agreement reaches only the risk the plaintiff clearly consented to accept. The plaintiff must clearly consent to the particular risk that led to the injury, and some courts have held that a provision releasing the defendant from “all claims for personal injury” does not waive recovery for the defendant's negligence, because it does not bring home to the plaintiff the extent of the risks she is accepting.54 Advance agreements have their defenders. Allowing participants to agree in advance to accept the risk of injury from high-risk activities keeps those activities available by insulating providers from the cost of injuries they produce.55 A form signed before the activity begins, however, cannot supply actual knowledge of a particular reckless act that has not yet happened. Whether a given jurisdiction will enforce any advance release of reckless conduct is a question of local law, and an answer should flag it instead of assuming it.
Comparative fault has reshaped this combination. If unreasonable assumption of risk is a species of contributory negligence, as most courts now conceive it, then it is subject to comparative negligence and does not result in a complete bar.56 Because the plaintiff's unreasonable conduct in encountering a known risk also satisfies the requirements of contributory negligence, many courts have abolished assumption of risk as a separate affirmative defense, and most that keep it require an unreasonable, voluntary encounter with a known risk.57 Prosser's jaywalker shows the shift. What was once termed assumption of the risk may now be used to show that the plaintiff is at fault,58 and a person who crosses the street mid-block, although not consenting to the negligence of a driver, may have liability apportioned to her under comparative fault.59 For reckless defendants in particular, many jurisdictions apply comparative fault to some or all willful and wanton cases, so the complete bar of § 503(4) is the traditional rule and varies by state.60
With § 503(4) in place, the traditional approach sorts a plaintiff's conduct into three outcomes against a reckless defendant:
- A plaintiff who was merely careless keeps the claim.61
- A plaintiff who was reckless toward his own safety is barred.62
- A plaintiff who knowingly and voluntarily accepted the specific risk is barred as well.63
Only the last outcome turns on consent, so the analysis there asks what the plaintiff knew and chose and needs no comparison of fault.