Concept
Deliberate Versus Inadvertent Encounters
Voluntariness of the plaintiff's choice
Deliberate Versus Inadvertent Encounters
A plaintiff who understood a danger can meet it in two very different ways, and the assumed-risk rule must say which way counts. The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that a plaintiff does not assume a risk of harm unless he voluntarily accepts it.1 The same requirement is usually put in terms of the plaintiff's encounter with the risk, which must be both informed and voluntary.2 Neither statement says when the acceptance must occur. A machine operator may decide in a general way to work beside a rotating shaft and later be pulled in by an arm that slipped. The operator's encounter looks voluntary if the inquiry asks about the earlier decision, and involuntary if it asks about the final physical contact. Courts divide over which moment controls.
The clearest voluntary encounter is the calculated risk. A plaintiff who knows the specific danger and decides to face it anyway has made the informed risk-utility choice on which the defense rests. By choosing to face the risk instead of using a safety device, the plaintiff assumes responsibility for that choice and absolves the seller of the duty to install the device.3 Decided cases show the pattern. One user pushed meat into a grinder with his hand instead of a metal stomper. Another reached from outside a forklift between its horizontal cross bars to engage the throttle and had a bar come down on his arm.4 Suppose the second worker made that reach knowingly, gambling that he could pull the arm clear in time. The act that injured him was then the very act he chose to perform with the specific danger in mind, so the encounter is voluntary on either view of timing. The choice must still be an informed one. Without adequate knowledge of the risk-utility factors that make the product defective, a plaintiff's more limited decision to face a known risk does not satisfy the rule.5
Many plaintiffs meet a known risk by accident instead. The same body of decisions treats as assumption of risk a slip from the top of a tanker truck covered with oil the plaintiff knew was “real slick,” a fall from playground equipment after a slip while climbing, and a slip that ended in a cut from a power mower blade left spinning while the plaintiff moved an obstacle in its path. It also reaches a case in which a raised bed suddenly descended when one of the men accidentally bumped the pullout cable, after a warning that the bed would crash down if the cable were hit.6 In each of these the plaintiff understood the hazard, yet the contact itself was an error rather than a decision.
Courts treat such plaintiffs in two ways. Many apply the defense on a finding that the plaintiff's encounter was voluntary, reasoning from the earlier general decision to work around the risk.7 Another line of authority looks to the specific physical encounter at the time of the accident and treats an inadvertent act as involuntary by definition, because behavior that was purely a slip was never chosen.8 The contrast to hold onto is between the general decision to work near a risk and the specific encounter that causes the injury. People often decide in a general way to face future risks, and they seldom meet a particular risk by choice at the moment an accident happens.9
The specific-encounter approach follows from what the defense is. Assumption of risk rests on consent, and a person cannot consent to what he does not know or to what is forced upon him.10 At the moment a hand slips into a machine, the plaintiff is seldom weighing how dangerous the contact is or whether it is worth making, so the contact is a mistake.11 Treating a mistake as consent would turn a doctrine about accepting risk into a doctrine about carelessness. An Oklahoma decision from 1988, Thomas v. Holliday, made the same point in describing the touchstone of the rule as “consent to harm and not heedlessness or indifference.”12
The courts that apply the defense to inadvertent encounters have an answer worth stating fairly. At the moment of contact, the plaintiff alone controls the risk and holds the last, often the best, chance to prevent the injury.13 That shows the plaintiff could have avoided the harm, which is a point about fault. It does not show that the plaintiff agreed to bear the risk.
The earlier sections asked whether the defendant left the plaintiff any real choice. This section asks whether the plaintiff was choosing at all at the moment of injury. Only a truly calculated risk, one that consciously involves the specific physical interaction that causes the injury, satisfies both the general-decision view and the specific-encounter view.14 Because the inquiry turns on the plaintiff's state of mind, including whether the choice to encounter the risk was free and voluntary, it is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury. The exception is the plain, palpable, and indisputable case in which the facts show a risk the plaintiff fully comprehended and freely accepted as a matter of law.15 A choice that was voluntary in this sense may still have been an unreasonable one, which the next section takes up.