Concept
Necessity the Defendant Did Not Create
Voluntariness of the plaintiff's choice
Necessity the Defendant Did Not Create
A plaintiff can have no good option and still choose voluntarily. Section 496E(2) treats acceptance of a risk as involuntary only when “the defendant’s tortious conduct” has left the plaintiff no reasonable alternative.1 The preceding subsections asked whether the plaintiff had a way out of the danger; this one asks who closed it.
When the compulsion comes from somewhere else, the acceptance stays voluntary. A plaintiff who acts “under the compulsion of circumstances, not created by the tortious conduct of the defendant,” accepts the risk voluntarily even though those circumstances left no reasonable alternative.2 The rule adds a condition: the defendant must be “under no independent duty to the plaintiff.” If so, a plaintiff who faces “a choice of risks,” or who is “driven by his own necessities to accept a danger,” presents a situation that “is not to be charged against the defendant.”3 The qualification implies that this reasoning does not carry over automatically to a defendant who does owe such a duty. In this setting, then, “voluntary” tracks the source of the dilemma and says nothing about the quality of the choice.
The rule rests on what makes a forced choice defeat consent in the first place. A defendant who puts the plaintiff “to a choice of evils” commits “a species of duress, which destroys the idea of freedom of election.”4 Duress is something one party does to another. If the defendant did nothing to produce the dilemma, there is no duress to charge, and the plaintiff is simply weighing one risk against another. Sometimes, too, the plaintiff is in a better position than the defendant to decide whether to risk being injured by the defendant’s negligence; one source illustrates the point with a plaintiff who suffers accidental injury on a country road.5
The rule’s own illustration is a tenant. A plaintiff who is forced to rent a house in obviously dangerous condition because he cannot find another dwelling, or cannot afford another, assumes the risk notwithstanding the compulsion under which he acts.6 The landlord did not create the shortage of housing or the tenant’s poverty. What decides the case is that the landlord did not make the tenant’s predicament.
The Maryland court applied the same logic to a delivery worker in ADM P’ship. Hurt on an ice-and-snow-covered walkway, she contended that she was compelled to cross it. The court agreed with the trial court that she had several alternatives, including refusing to deliver the package, and noted that neither her employer nor the defendant “ever demanded that she traverse the ice and snow covered walkway against her will.” There was, the court said, “not a shred of evidence” from which her concern for her job if the delivery were not made could be inferred.7 Her assertion of a compelled choice could not substitute for evidence of one, and nothing in the record traced any compulsion to the defendant.
Express assumption is a separate route to the same defense. Parties can assume risks, including the risk of another’s negligence, by agreeing to do so, and a person who has accepted a release clause broad enough to reach injury “from any source whatever” and the operator’s negligence is barred.8 The question in this unit arises when no such agreement exists and the defendant argues that the plaintiff simply proceeded into a known danger.
Pruitt’s negligence does not settle voluntariness; the source of the emergency does. Dana faced a choice between the risk of the brakes and the risk of lying injured on a deserted road, and Pruitt, who owed her no duty to relieve the emergency, did not create that dilemma. Her choice is therefore not charged to him, even though she had no good alternative.9 Change one fact and the result reverses. Had Pruitt’s own negligent driving caused the accident that injured Dana, one tortfeasor would have produced both the emergency and the hazard, and a defendant who puts the plaintiff to a choice of evils cannot rely on the choice he forced.10 The same point appears when the defendant’s fault lies in design: a plaintiff whose own unreasonable conduct contributes to an injury from a machine has not thereby made a “voluntary” choice to assume responsibility for the machine’s design.11
The second step does the work, and it is the one a sympathetic plaintiff’s facts tend to obscure, because a plaintiff who was truly cornered looks involuntary even when the defendant did not build the corner.