Concept
Assumption and Fault Doctrines
Implied assumption of risk: knowledge and appreciation of the risk
Assumption and Fault Doctrines
A defendant whose negligence created a danger will often plead two defenses against the plaintiff who met it: implied assumption of risk and contributory negligence. The two “arise from the same set of facts and frequently overlap,” yet courts have emphasized that they are “essentially different” because they are “based on different theories.”1 This unit sets the implied defense beside each of the fault doctrines. The first part separates it from contributory negligence. The second follows it into comparative fault, where most jurisdictions no longer treat a plaintiff’s knowing choice as a separate complete defense.2
This unit concerns implied assumption as a defense to a negligence claim, and two neighboring doctrines work differently. An express agreement to assume a risk, often a release or disclaimer, is ordinarily governed by contract principles, and its first question is whether the risk that injured the plaintiff fell within the unambiguous scope of the agreement’s terms.3 A release of the inherent risks of horseback riding, for instance, raises the question whether a kick from the guide’s horse is covered when the plaintiff’s own horse behaved well.4 A strict products liability claim differs from the outset: a plaintiff who alleges a manufacturing defect may recover by proving that the product was dangerously defective, without proving that the manufacturer’s negligence led to the defect.5 The usual setting for implied assumption is a danger created by the defendant’s negligence and a plaintiff who chooses to meet it.6
Assumption Versus Contributory Negligence
The Restatement states the implied defense entirely in terms of the plaintiff’s understanding and choice. A plaintiff who fully understands a risk of harm caused by the defendant’s conduct or by the condition of the defendant’s land or chattels, who voluntarily chooses to enter or remain within the area of that risk, and who does so under circumstances that manifest willingness to accept it, may not recover for harm within that risk.7 The formulation never asks whether a careful person would have made the same choice.
Contributory negligence asks precisely that. It rests on a lack of due care, a departure from the reasonable-person standard, while implied assumption has always depended on voluntary acceptance of a risk with knowledge and appreciation of it.8 The usual shorthand is consent versus conduct: assumption is the plaintiff’s voluntary consent to encounter a known danger created by the defendant’s negligence, and contributory negligence is unreasonable conduct. One set of facts may therefore support either defense or both.9
The sharpest difference lies in how knowledge is measured. The defendant must show that the plaintiff actually knew, understood, and appreciated the risk, and unlike contributory negligence the test is subjective: what did the plaintiff actually know, not what should the plaintiff have known.10 A plaintiff cannot assume a risk of an activity or condition of which he was ignorant, whether through age or lack of information, experience, intelligence, or judgment. His conduct may still be contributory negligence if it does not conform to the community standard of the reasonable person, because contributory negligence can involve exposure to a danger the plaintiff did not subjectively know about but would have seen with due care.11
Priya satisfies both defenses. She knew the specific defect and chose to climb, which is consent, and the choice was unreasonable, which makes it contributory negligence as well.12 At common law either defense would have barred her.13 Owen satisfies only one. Without actual knowledge he consented to nothing, although his failure to look may still fall below the standard of care.14 Dana presents the combination that matters most for what follows. She knew and chose, so consent in the theoretical sense is present, but the jury has found her conduct reasonable, so she is not contributorily negligent. Whether consent alone defeats her claim depends on the jurisdiction.15
Reasonableness narrows the implied defense further. Ordinarily only the conscious taking of an unreasonable risk is a defense. A pedestrian who walks carefully down the street, knowing that some people drive negligently, has not assumed the risk of a driver who negligently mounts the sidewalk, because walking there was entirely reasonable.16
The overlap also complicates jury instructions. Listing assumption of risk separately may suggest that a non-negligent assumption of risk is a defense to a negligence claim. One cure is to describe assumption as one of two kinds of contributory negligence, unreasonable careless risk-taking and unreasonable conscious risk-taking. The cure is imperfect, because no technical term exists for the careless kind, and the technical-sounding phrase “assumption of risk” may still stand out in the jury’s mind as something separate.17 Some courts still send both questions to the jury. In Thomas v. Panco Management of Maryland, LLC, a slip on black ice on a sidewalk, the court noted that the jury should consider whether the plaintiff had assumed the risk and, separately, whether she was contributorily negligent.18
Merger Into Comparative Fault
At common law the two defenses produced the same result, because either one barred the plaintiff completely.20 Comparative negligence breaks that symmetry. Under most comparative negligence regimes, a plaintiff’s unreasonable decision to encounter a known risk is treated as negligent conduct and compared with the defendant’s negligence in assessing liability.21 The jury assigns the choice a percentage of negligence, and the plaintiff’s recovery falls by that percentage.22 Had the jury in the ladder case found Priya 40 percent at fault for climbing a rung she knew was cracked, she would recover 60 percent of her damages, where the common law would have left her with nothing.23
Statutes and courts have reached this result by different roads. Some comparative negligence statutes specifically require it, and in other states judicial interpretation has produced the same result, as in Blackburn v. Dorta.24 In states that treat a plaintiff’s deliberate choice to engage in the risk as comparative negligence, the separate defense of assumption of the risk is abolished; Massachusetts did so by statute.25 The jury in such a state is told nothing about secondary assumption, and an unreasonable choice reaches it as negligence.26
Comparative fault asks a jury to weigh the plaintiff’s conduct, but a statute can keep some conduct away from the jury altogether. In Estep v. Mike Ferrell Ford Lincoln-Mercury, a West Virginia court relied on the clear language of a statute in refusing to let a car maker introduce evidence that the plaintiff had not used a seatbelt in a case about an air bag that failed to deploy.27 Arkansas’s statute likewise provides that an occupant’s failure to wear a properly adjusted and fastened seat belt “shall not be admissible into evidence in a civil action,” while allowing the defense in some products liability cases.28
Merger reaches only the defense that depends on the plaintiff’s choice. A plaintiff hurt by an operator who was not negligent cannot recover, with or without a comparative fault statute. Courts may still declare in such cases that the “plaintiff assumed the risk” of injury, but the real basis for rejecting the claim is that the operator was not negligent.29 The baseball-spectator decisions, among them Cincinnati Baseball Club Co. v. Eno, are the familiar illustration. A spectator who knowingly takes an unscreened seat and is hit by a foul ball at a game the stadium conducted with due care loses completely, because there is no negligence for the jury to compare.
A few jurisdictions go the other way. Some states continue to treat conscious assumption of the risk as a separate and complete defense to a negligence action even though they otherwise apply comparative negligence to the plaintiff’s own negligence. Rhode Island is one, as Kennedy v. Providence Hockey Club, Inc. shows. The position is clearly a minority one, but the strong trend toward comparative negligence has not abolished the separate defense everywhere.30 In those states the knowing encounter bars recovery even when the choice was reasonable.31 Jurisdictions that still apply contributory negligence may likewise keep secondary implied assumption as a complete defense; see, e.g., Morgan State University v. Walker (Md. 2007).32
The hardest question concerns the plaintiff who knows the danger and meets it for good reason. Reasonable conduct is not negligence, so a rule that reduces recovery only for negligence has nothing to reduce. Most states accordingly conclude that reasonable secondary assumption of the risk should neither reduce nor bar the claim, and the plaintiff recovers fully.33 A few argue the opposite. Comparative negligence statutes address only the effect of the plaintiff’s fault, but the rationale for assumption of risk as a defense is knowing consent to take a risk, not fault, so a statute that modifies the effect of negligence arguably should not disturb the defense of reasonable assumption.34 Courts have not agreed. Compare Rini v. Oaklawn Jockey Club (applying Arkansas law), with Siglow v. Smart (Ohio Ct. App.) (cited for the argument that a comparative negligence statute leaves the defense of reasonable assumption in place).35