Concept
The Public Policy Limit
Implied assumption of risk: knowledge and appreciation of the risk
The Public Policy Limit
Implied assumption of risk is unavailable in any situation in which an express agreement to accept the risk would be invalid as contrary to public policy.1 The limit works as a gate behind the elements. Assumption of risk is an affirmative defense that the defendant must plead and prove, and when it is available it can defeat or reduce liability even though the defendant owed a duty and was negligent.2 A defendant who has proved knowledge, voluntary choice, and conduct showing willingness has established only the factual half of that defense. The legal half asks a hypothetical question about the same relationship: had the plaintiff written the consent down and signed it, would a court have enforced the paper? If the answer is no, the inferred version of the consent fails with it.
The gate keeps the implied route from becoming a detour around the policy that voids a release. Courts refuse to enforce advance releases of negligence liability when one party is at such an obvious disadvantage in bargaining power that she is placed at the mercy of the other's negligence, or when some other strong overriding public policy is operative.3 A defendant who could answer a void release by arguing that the plaintiff's continued presence implied the same consent would defeat that refusal. The elements make the detour tempting, because voluntariness may be inferred from conduct in entering or remaining in the zone of danger, even reluctantly or under protest.4 Yet a plaintiff who keeps working, or keeps using an essential service, may simply be doing what the plaintiff must, and the gate exists for those cases.
Settings Where Releases Fail
The general rule is that parties may agree to disclaim liability for negligence, and the public policy limit borrows every exception to that rule. Parties cannot disclaim liability for intentional torts or for willful, wanton, and reckless conduct. They cannot disclaim it where their bargaining power is grossly unequal, and they cannot disclaim it when the transaction involves a matter of public interest.5 Common carriers such as planes, boats, and trains are among the defendants who cannot disclaim negligence liability.6
Courts have likewise refused to enforce releases in favor of employers, public utilities and others engaged in public callings or public service activities, public bailees, carriers, and in some cases landlords, where some strong public interest disfavors immunity.7 Employment shows how far the principle reaches. Assumption of risk developed in the employment context, yet it is now generally held that the inequality of bargaining power inherent in employment bars express assumption of the risk by employees.8
Tunkl v. Regents of the University of California supplies the leading test for when a release harms the public interest. An exculpatory agreement, a contract by which one party gives up in advance any claim for the other's negligence, is invalid when it affects the public interest adversely, and Tunkl lists the factors that signal that effect.9 The factors fall into three groups. The first concerns the service: the business is of a type suitable for public regulation, the service is of great importance to the public and often a practical necessity, and the provider holds itself out as willing to serve anyone who meets its standards. The second concerns the bargain: the provider's essential service gives it a decisive bargaining advantage, and it confronts the public with a standardized form that offers no way to buy protection against its negligence. The third concerns control: the customer's person or property ends up in the provider's hands, exposed to its carelessness.10 The list guides the inquiry without confining it, because an exculpatory agreement may affect the public interest adversely even when some of the factors are missing.11
Each group explains why consent inferred from conduct is unreliable in that setting. A person who depends on an essential service has no practical alternative, so continued use shows necessity and not choice. A standardized form leaves no room to bargain, and a customer in the provider's hands cannot guard against the provider's carelessness. Suppose a stem has already given the plaintiff full knowledge, a free choice, and willing conduct. What remains is to classify the relationship and ask whether a signed release would hold.
Protective Safety Statutes
A second group of cases arises when the defendant's negligence consists of violating a safety statute. The clearest case for closing the defense is a statute written to protect people who cannot protect themselves. The dissent in Knight v. Jewett developed the point under the voluntariness requirement. It explained that the requirement bars the defense for a defendant whose negligence violates a safety statute or ordinance designed to protect a class of persons unable to provide for their own safety, whether from unequal bargaining power or lack of knowledge, and it offered the example of a worker who keeps working in the face of safety violations to avoid losing a livelihood.12 Among its authorities was Fonseca v. County of Orange, which involved a safety order requiring scaffolding and railings at a bridge construction site.13 In such cases, the dissent reasoned, the implied agreement upon which the defense is based is contrary to public policy and unenforceable.14 Because that opinion is a dissent, it shows the reasoning without stating the Court's holding, but the reasoning is the gate applied to statutory duties.
Housing codes fall on the other side of the line. They usually have not been construed as protective statutes of this type, so a landlord may avail himself or herself of the defenses of implied assumption of risk and contributory negligence despite a code violation.15 A federal court forecasting Virginia law took that view in O'Neil v. Windshire-Copeland Associates, predicting that the Virginia Supreme Court would not bar the defenses because the defendant was negligent per se in violating the applicable building codes.16 A tenant who sees such a hazard is the second kind of implied-assumption plaintiff: one who knows of a danger created by the defendant's negligence and nonetheless voluntarily encounters it.17 The difference between the worker and the tenant lies in what the statute is for. A safety order aimed at workers who cannot protect themselves would lose its force if their continued exposure counted as consent, whereas a housing code usually is not read that way.
Legislatures can also close a plaintiff-conduct defense directly. Seatbelt statutes illustrate the technique, though they concern evidence of nonuse and not assumption of risk as such. In Estep v. Mike Ferrell Ford Lincoln-Mercury, the West Virginia court, relying on the clear language of a statute, refused to let a car maker introduce evidence that the plaintiff had not used a seatbelt in a case about an air bag that failed to deploy. Arkansas makes seatbelt nonuse inadmissible in civil actions while allowing the defense in some products liability cases.18 A statute's own terms may therefore settle the question before the common-law gate comes into play.
The second step governs claims against employers, carriers, utilities, and providers of essential services, and the third governs negligence founded on a safety statute. An answer that stops after the first step treats the defense as won while skipping the question that decides whether the defense exists at all.