Concept
Knowledge and Appreciation
Implied assumption of risk: knowledge and appreciation of the risk
Knowledge and Appreciation
The Restatement’s statement of implied assumption of risk begins with a plaintiff who “fully understands a risk of harm to himself or his things” caused by the defendant’s conduct or by the condition of the defendant’s land or chattels.1 Understanding comes first in that sentence and first in the analysis, because the defense treats the plaintiff’s conduct as consent, and a person cannot consent to what he does not know or to what is forced upon him.2 The defense therefore requires an encounter with risk that is both informed and voluntary. This unit covers the informed half, and the sections after it take up voluntariness.3
Courts call the informed half “knowledge and appreciation,” and the two ideas travel together. A person cannot truly know a danger without understanding it, and cannot appreciate a danger he does not know. Some courts accordingly define the defense in two elements, knowledge and understanding together, then voluntariness. Others split the first element and count three: knowledge, appreciation, and voluntariness.4 The labels differ, but the defendant’s burden does not. The defendant must show that the plaintiff actually knew, understood, and appreciated the risk.5
Four questions organize the rest of the unit: whose awareness counts, how specific that awareness must be, how well the plaintiff must grasp the danger, and how a defendant proves any of it. Each question concerns one person’s state of mind, which is why the issue ordinarily goes to the jury.6
Actual Subjective Knowledge
The plaintiff’s own awareness is what counts. Implied assumption of risk asks whether the plaintiff actually knew, appreciated, and voluntarily consented to assume a specific risk of injury.7 A lawyer may not argue, and a court may not instruct a jury, that the question is whether the plaintiff “should have known” of the risk. The only proper question is what the plaintiff actually did know.8
Consent explains the rule. A plaintiff who chooses to meet a danger is treated as having agreed to bear it, and he can agree only to a danger that registered with him. The Restatement denies recovery “for harm within that risk” only to a plaintiff who fully understood that risk.9 A should-have-known test would turn inattention into agreement and deny recovery to a plaintiff who merely failed to look.
Contributory negligence uses the opposite yardstick. A California opinion explains that contributory negligence measured the plaintiff’s conduct against the objective standard of a hypothetical reasonable person, while implied assumption of risk “has always depended upon the plaintiff’s subjective mental state.”10California opinion) The essence of contributory negligence is carelessness; the essence of assumption of risk is venturousness. An injured person may have used the utmost care and still have voluntarily assumed a known hazard.11 Contributory negligence, by contrast, can reach a plaintiff who was subjectively unaware of a danger that would have been apparent had he used due care.12
A chair with a broken leg shows both possibilities. A plaintiff who knew the leg was broken may be said to have assumed the risk of that defect, and he may also have been negligent in sitting on it. A plaintiff who did not know of the defect did not consent to that risk, even if a prudent person would have noticed it. Whether he was negligent is a separate question.13 Strict products liability draws the same line. A plaintiff’s failure to discover a defect, or to guard against its possible existence, is no defense, but voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger is.14
Facts that say “a reasonable person would have known” or “the danger was visible” point toward negligence, not assumption. The element is satisfied only by evidence of what this plaintiff perceived.
Young plaintiffs receive the same test. Like adults, young persons may understand and decide voluntarily to encounter hazards, so no child standard of behavior applies as it does in contributory negligence.15 Age and experience matter only as they bear on what the youth actually understood.16 A plaintiff cannot assume risks of which he is ignorant by reason of age, or lack of information, experience, intelligence, or judgment.17
A plaintiff who misses a danger is not necessarily safe from every defense. Inattention may still be contributory negligence if the plaintiff’s conduct fails the community standard of the reasonable person.18 A plaintiff who does know the risk and chooses unreasonably to face it, such as a passenger who rides with a driver he knows to be drunk, presents a different problem. Most comparative-negligence states treat that decision as negligent conduct to be compared with the defendant’s, so a jury finding of 33 percent responsibility reduces damages by 33 percent. A few states still treat the same decision as a full defense analogous to consent.19 Later sections develop those consequences. For now, the complete defense of assumption begins with proof of what the plaintiff actually knew.
Knowledge of the Specific Risk
Awareness that an activity is dangerous in some general way does not satisfy the knowledge element. The plaintiff must be aware of and appreciate a specific risk.21 A driver who knows that careless drivers share every busy highway has not assumed the risk of a traffic accident, and the negligent driver who hits him has no affirmative defense on that account.22
The consent theory explains the demand for specificity. A vague understanding that a product may be dangerous if not carefully used is neither knowledge nor appreciation of a particular risk of harm. A plaintiff who does not know just how a hazard may injure him cannot evaluate how likely or how serious the injury is, and so cannot make an informed decision whether to run the risk.23 His knowledge must therefore reach the particular danger and the magnitude of the risk involved.24
Knowing that something is wrong is not knowing the danger that results. In Gault v. May, the plaintiff knew her roller skate pulled to the left but did not know of the defective wheel that caused her injury.25 A driver in the same position can argue that he realized something was wrong with his brakes but not that they would lock completely, and so did not assume the risk of that failure.26 A symptom reveals that equipment is behaving oddly. It does not reveal whether the danger is a slightly longer stop or a total loss of braking.
Courts agree that generalized knowledge is not enough, but they disagree about how much more is required.27 The strict view holds that the defendant must show the plaintiff knew of the specific defect in the product and was aware of the danger arising from it.28 California applies that view in strict liability. In Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., the court held an instruction erroneous because it told the jury that a plaintiff who “voluntarily and unreasonably proceeded to encounter a known danger” could not recover, without the limit that Luque v. McLean imposes. Under Luque, the defense is available only when the plaintiff proceeded to use the product with knowledge of the specific defect and awareness that the defect would cause injury.29
Most courts read the requirement more loosely. The plaintiff need not understand the precise nature and operation of the mechanical, chemical, or biological mechanisms that may result in harm, nor the precise manner in which a product may be legally “defective.”30 What the plaintiff must know is the danger and how it can cause injury. The looser reading also keeps the defense alive. Applied quite literally, the appreciation-of-specific-risk requirement would swallow the rule and prevent the defense from ever being applied, the apparent “enigma” that Robert Keeton noted in the first article on assumption of risk in products liability.31
A dump-truck case shows the looser reading at work. The decedent was working beneath a raised bed when it descended, and his brother had warned him just before that the bed would crash down if he hit the cable. The plaintiff argued that the decedent knew only generally that working under the truck could be dangerous and knew nothing of the specific defect. The appeals court answered that the specific danger was that hitting the cable would drop the bed, which the decedent knew, and it reversed the judgment for the plaintiff. It added that the defense “is premised upon knowledge of the dangerous condition of a product rather than recognition of its defectiveness.”32 In Heil Co. v. Grant, a Texas court put the point this way: “The assumption of risk defense is based upon the injured person’s awareness of the danger of injury rather than an awareness of the producing causes of the injury.”33
The looser reading still demands a fit between what the plaintiff knew and what happened. In Haugen v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co., the plaintiff knew that small wood particles might be thrown toward his face but believed his glasses would protect his eyes. The appeals court affirmed his judgment and held the assumption-of-risk instruction proper.34 A plaintiff who understands a danger without understanding its mechanism satisfies the element. A plaintiff who believes the danger smaller than it is has not appreciated it. Courts have found the needed understanding even where the mechanism stayed murky. In Bowen v. Cochran, a plaintiff who knew a gas grill might explode if he failed to vent and light it properly was held to appreciate that risk, though he did not know exactly where and how unlit gas might pool.35
The first step does most of the work. Described too broadly (working under a truck is dangerous), the danger lets every plaintiff through and the defense swallows negligence. Described by its engineering cause (a hydraulic valve that releases on contact), it excludes almost every plaintiff. Stating the danger as the event that hurt the plaintiff keeps the element between those two failures. The common exam mistake is to treat awareness that an activity is risky as enough, which skips the second step.
Appreciating the Danger
Knowing the facts that create a danger is not the same as understanding the danger. It is not enough that the plaintiff know the facts that give rise to the risk; he must also understand the danger itself.37 The Restatement’s phrase “fully understands” asks for comprehension, not merely information.38
Appreciation matters for the same reason knowledge does. Consenting to a risk means accepting a chance of harm, and accepting it sensibly requires a judgment about how likely the harm is and how bad it would be. A plaintiff who understands with some particularity how a hazard can cause injury can make that judgment. A plaintiff holding only the raw facts cannot, and his decision cannot fairly be read as agreement to bear the danger.39
The two residents received identical information and reached different places, because comprehension depends on what the plaintiff brings to the facts. Age, experience, and mental capacity are all considered in deciding whether a plaintiff understood the risk, so the test remains, at least in theory, one of subjective intent.40
Two decisions show the element failing even though the plaintiff knew a good deal. In Mussara v. Mega Funworks, Inc., a rider who exceeded the weight limit on a water slide probably appreciated that he could collide with people and objects on the way down. He did not appreciate that his tube would carry him the length of the splash pool, strike the stairs at the far end, and throw him onto the concrete beyond.41 In Patch v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., an 18-year-old pitcher was struck in the head and killed by a ball hit off an aluminum bat. The defense did not bar the claim, because nothing showed that he actually knew he could be seriously injured or killed pitching to a batter using that bat, with its enhanced risks.42 The slide rider understood a milder danger than the one that materialized. The evidence did not show that the pitcher grasped how serious the danger from that particular bat was.
Courts do not require a defendant to prove, hazard by hazard, what each plaintiff understood, because some dangers are ones any reasonable adult is held to understand, such as ice on exterior stairs or water on a waxed floor. To the extent courts apply that standard, the test is better described as objective than subjective.43 A plaintiff is likewise ordinarily charged with matters of common knowledge and with whatever ordinary observation of his surroundings would reveal.44 In C&M Builders, LLC v. Strub, a Maryland decision, the court found assumption of risk as a matter of law where an HVAC contractor fell through an unguarded stairwell opening in a rowhouse. It approved the statement that there are “certain risks which anyone of adult age must be taken to appreciate.”45
The diving cases mark where the line falls. In Sheehan v. North American Marketing Corp., the plaintiff had spent half an hour in an above-ground pool, knew the water was shallow, saw the posted warnings about diving, and dove in anyway. She struck the bottom and was paralyzed, and she argued that she had accepted only the risk of scraping the bottom on a poorly executed dive. Applying Rhode Island law, the court rejected that argument. The risk of a botched dive is part of the risk of diving generally, and certain risks are so self-evident that a person is deemed to have understood them as a matter of law.46 A person presumed to know the risks of dangerous conduct, the court wrote, “is charged with knowing all the ordinary risks associated with that conduct.”47
The character of the risk separates Sheehan from the slide case. Serious injury from diving into shallow water is the ordinary, expected consequence of the very conduct the plaintiff chose, so the law treats her as understanding its seriousness whatever she says she expected. The slide injury came from a sequence peculiar to that ride, which nothing in common experience would convey. A plaintiff’s testimony that she never expected serious injury therefore counts for little when the hazard is a familiar one and for a good deal when the mechanism of harm is unusual.
Proving What Plaintiff Knew
The defendant must prove what the plaintiff knew, and a mental state cannot be observed directly. Implied assumption of risk is an affirmative defense on which the defendant bears the burdens of pleading, production, and proof.49 The earlier sections fixed the standard as actual, subjective knowledge. This section concerns the evidence that satisfies it and the question of who decides whether it does.
The most persuasive proof is an admission. In Vanderlei v. Heideman, a horseshoer kicked by a horse testified that he knew the risk of being kicked because he had been kicked several times before.50 That testimony established actual knowledge directly, because it came from the one person in a position to know what he understood.
Most plaintiffs concede nothing, so most contested cases turn on circumstantial proof. Actual knowledge of the risk may be inferred from the circumstances,51 and where the risk ought to have been obvious, a plaintiff who tries to deny the import of what he saw will probably fail.52 The inference rests on what the activity and the surroundings reveal to anyone who takes part in them.
Because the standard is subjective, the plaintiff’s own account is not conclusive. The jury may weigh his age, experience, and mental capacity, along with the circumstances, in deciding whether he in fact understood the danger.53 It need not accept a denial of knowledge, which is the one item of evidence the injured plaintiff controls and has the strongest motive to shade. Those characteristics are circumstantial evidence of what this plaintiff knew and set no standard that he must meet. The jury charge shows the line. A court may let jurors weigh the plaintiff’s age, experience, and intelligence in deciding what he knew. It may not tell them to find assumption of risk if he should have known of the danger, because the only proper question is what he actually did know.54
Schwilm v. Pennsylvania Sports shows the same hazard producing different answers for two plaintiffs. The court held that the arena breached its duty to the wife by improperly screening the goal area. It held that the arena did not breach its duty to her husband, an experienced hockey fan who knew the danger and assumed the risk of sitting near the goal.55 The hazard was identical, and the difference lay in what each plaintiff brought to it. A subjective test predicts exactly that result. The decision also shows that the baseline shifts over time. The case might come out differently now because hockey has become so widely popular.56
At the far end of the inference sit hazards so widely understood that courts charge every adult with them, such as the slipperiness of ice or a stairwell opening in plain view.57 For those dangers the defendant need not call a witness to show that an adult knows ice is slippery. The subjective standard describes the general rule and bends only in that narrow band.58
Whether the proof suffices is ordinarily a question for the jury. Each aspect of the defense turns on one person’s state of mind, so the issue is peculiarly one of fact, except in “plain, palpable, and indisputable cases” where the facts reveal a risk the plaintiff fully comprehended and freely accepted as a matter of law.59 Weighing credibility and choosing among competing inferences are jury tasks. A court takes the question away only when no reasonable juror could find that the plaintiff failed to understand the danger.
The burden stays with the defendant when the plaintiff cannot testify. If the accident leaves the plaintiff unable to speak, the defendant has no admission to offer and no denial to test, so it must rely entirely on circumstances. A defendant who cannot point to facts from which a jury could infer actual knowledge has not carried the defense.60