Concept
The General Rule
General rule and express assumption of risk
Assumption of Risk and Express Waivers
The General Rule
Tanaka sees that Quentin is obviously drunk, accepts a ride anyway, and is hurt when Quentin drives negligently. Under the traditional rule, most courts barred a plaintiff who recognized a risk and deliberately chose to encounter it, even when the defendant was negligent in creating the risk, so Tanaka recovers nothing.1
That bar is the rule of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 496A: a plaintiff who voluntarily assumes a risk of harm arising from the negligent or reckless conduct of the defendant cannot recover for that harm.2 Two phrases carry the rule. "Voluntarily assumes" describes the plaintiff, who accepted the risk by choice. "Negligent or reckless conduct of the defendant" describes the defendant, whose own lack of care created the risk.
Consent explains the bar. In negligence and strict liability, consent goes by the name assumption of risk, and the law ordinarily has no interest in compensating someone who validly, knowingly, and freely agreed in advance to the very invasion that later injured her.3 The maxim volenti non fit injuria, a person is not wronged by that to which she consents, states the idea compactly.4 Policy reinforces the logic. Our culture continues to honor such choices even where accepting the risk gains little social value, and letting participants agree in advance to bear the risks of a high-risk activity keeps exciting and varied opportunities available by insulating providers from the high cost of injuries.5 As Thomas v. Holliday put it, "The touchstone of the assumption-of-risk defense is consent to harm and not heedlessness or indifference."6
Consent reaches the court by one of two routes. The plaintiff may agree expressly, usually by contract, as when a student signs a release before a parachute lesson. Express waivers remain a viable defense that courts usually honor, subject to the limits taught in the sections that follow.7 Alternatively, the plaintiff's words or conduct may imply consent, so that going forward in the face of a known danger is treated as the same acceptance an express agreement would have supplied.8
The implied route is where the doctrine went wrong. Courts tended to equate confrontation of a known risk with a manifestation of consent.9 A plaintiff who voluntarily encounters a known danger, however, does not necessarily consent to the defendant's future negligence.10 A pedestrian walking carefully along a sidewalk who is struck by a driver negligently veering onto it may know that some people drive carelessly, but she has not assumed that risk. Her walking was reasonable, and the driver is liable.11 The same is true of a motorist hit on a busy highway, because the defense requires awareness and appreciation of a specific risk, and knowing that careless drivers exist does not supply it.12 Tanaka, by contrast, faced one particular and obvious risk, an intoxicated driver at the wheel, and chose it.
The rule also reaches only defendants who were negligent or reckless. In general, a participant takes on the ordinary foreseeable hazards of an activity, but as to those hazards the defendant was not negligent, so there is no assumption of the risk of negligent harm. Calling that result "assumption of risk" is a misleading misnomer. Some courts call it the "primary" sense of the term and reserve the "secondary" sense for cases in which the defendant owed a duty of care and breached it.13 Comment c to § 496A draws the line at a ballpark: a spectator may be regarded as consenting that the players proceed with the game without precautions against the ball, but not as consenting that the bleachers be negligently built.14 Ice skating divides the same way. Henne accepts that other skaters may hit her, an obvious danger inherent in the sport that no reasonable cost could eliminate, but she does not accept a dangerous condition in the ice or a broken handrail, which are dangers created by negligent operation of the rink.15 A fan struck by a foul ball when the operator took ordinary precautions therefore loses for want of negligence, and the operator has won no assumption-of-risk defense at all. A fan hurt when negligently built bleachers collapse has met a risk he never accepted.
When the defense is available, the defendant must carry it. Assumption of risk, like contributory and comparative negligence, is an affirmative defense: the defendant pleads and proves the facts that support it. In the typical case each side then tries to prove what amounts to a full tort claim against the other.16
Some limits on recovery come from legislatures and courts rather than from the plaintiff's consent. Statutes or court decisions in some jurisdictions limit liability for injuries to participants in certain sports.17 Recreational-use immunity statutes show how narrowly courts read such protection: one decision applied the immunity to a lake but not to the dam that created it.18
Courts have used the phrase "assumption of risk" for several different things, which is why students find the doctrine confusing. Rini v. Oaklawn Jockey Club counted four types, and one of them reflects a label lent to contract waiver law: the employee who expressly contracted to relieve the employer of liability for injuries caused by a certain risk.19 The express form alone rests on an actual advance agreement, and it is the form this reading develops in depth. The implied forms, with their questions of knowledge, voluntariness, and the primary and secondary vocabulary, are developed separately.
Comparative negligence has changed the consequence of an assumed risk. In many states with comparative negligence regimes, a plaintiff's conscious choice to encounter a risk is treated as a form of negligent conduct. The jury assigns the plaintiff a percentage of fault, just as for other plaintiff negligence, and assumption of risk becomes a partial defense rather than a complete bar.20 The last section of this chapter returns to that development.