Concept
Fault Versus Avoidable Consequences
Comparative negligence (modern apportionment)
Fault Versus Avoidable Consequences
A plaintiff’s carelessness can reduce a recovery in two different ways, and courts keep the two ways apart. Contributory negligence works on carelessness that occurs before the defendant’s wrong or concurrently with it, and it can bar recovery altogether.1 It follows the plaintiff even into a case built on the defendant’s statutory violation, unless the statute places the entire responsibility for the harm on the defendant.2 Avoidable consequences works on carelessness that comes after the wrong has caused harm. Its premise is that the plaintiff should not recover for what he could have avoided or mitigated, although recovery need not be totally barred.3 Last clear chance rests on a similar assumption, that the plaintiff had some opportunity to avoid the injury, and it has been called a transitional doctrine, a way station on the road to comparative negligence.4
Comparative fault measures conduct. The trier of fact assesses the seriousness of each actor’s negligence and divides damages in proportion to that fault.5 Fault remains the most common basis of tort liability, and this method carries that basis over to the plaintiff’s side of the case.6 Because the measure is conduct, the injury need not be divisible. A speeding driver hits a pedestrian who was not watching the road, and the pedestrian suffers a single broken leg. No part of that leg can be assigned to one party rather than the other, yet a jury can still compare the two parties’ carelessness and reduce the recovery to match. When a plaintiff suffers one harm, or several harms that cannot be separated, any apportionment must rest on fault.7
Avoidable consequences measures causation. It looks for discrete, identifiable items of loss that trace to the plaintiff’s own conduct and removes them from the recovery, exactly as if a court had held the plaintiff’s fault the sole proximate cause of that item.8 Suppose a man resolves never to accept a blood transfusion. A defendant negligently injures him, he refuses a transfusion, and he dies, although the blood would have saved his life. A comparative fault analysis of the refusal might charge him with some percentage of the total fault, high or low, and reduce the damages recoverable for his wrongful death by that share without barring them. The avoidable consequences rule, where it applies, bars the entire wrongful death recovery.9 The same refusal thus produces a partial reduction under one system and a complete denial under the other.
The choice between the two systems arises only when discrete, identifiable harms can be traced to the plaintiff’s conduct. If the plaintiff suffers one harm, or several that cannot be separated, apportionment rests on fault rather than causation, and that is true even when the plaintiff’s fault comes after the defendant’s negligence.10 Timing therefore signals which doctrine is in play without settling it.
Seat belt cases show the systems side by side. Where the avoidable consequences rule governs, the failure to buckle is not counted in deciding who caused the accident. It matters only to the damages that result from not wearing the belt, and those damages are excluded.11 A court can also combine the two systems, fixing the plaintiff’s fault for not buckling at a percentage and then applying that percentage only to the harm the missing belt produced.12
The three results differ by as much as $19,000 on identical facts, so a court has to choose the measure before it does the arithmetic.
The classification matters most where a modified bar exists. A seriously at-fault plaintiff whose conduct is counted as comparative fault can be barred outright, but the same conduct treated as avoidable consequences costs the plaintiff only the damages it aggravated.13 The court in Ostrowski built a rule around that risk. It held that the jury should arrive at two percentages to measure the plaintiff’s fault, reasoning that it would be "the bitterest irony" if comparative negligence, designed to ameliorate the harshness of contributory negligence, shut out a plaintiff who would otherwise have recovered under the law of contributory negligence merely because her conduct bore on avoidable consequences rather than on contributory negligence.14 The two-percentage approach keeps conduct that bears only on avoidable consequences from triggering the bar.
Conduct that merely creates the occasion for the defendant’s services belongs to neither doctrine. The Ostrowski court held that a plaintiff’s conduct before treatment began was irrelevant to both comparative fault and avoidable consequences, under the rule that a defendant takes the plaintiff as he finds him. That conduct still mattered to causation, because some of the damage might have come from the plaintiff’s pre-treatment condition rather than from the defendant’s negligence.15 Numerous jurisdictions, Cavens v. Zaberdac among them, agree that when a patient seeks treatment for a condition that may have arisen from the patient’s own negligence, that negligence is no defense to a claim of malpractice in the subsequent treatment.16 A patient who negligently injures himself in an accident and then receives negligent treatment that aggravates the injury can sue the physician without any reduction for the earlier carelessness, because a person who has negligently injured himself is still entitled to non-negligent medical care.17
Even within comparative fault, courts disagree about what the percentages measure. Fault may be apportioned by the nature of the parties’ conduct (whose conduct was worse), by the closeness of the causal link between conduct and injury (whose conduct contributed more), or by some mix of the two. Sanders v. Frank, for example, looked to the relative degree to which each party’s conduct proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries rather than to the comparative reasonableness of their conduct, and Eaton v. McLain catalogues the approaches of various jurisdictions.18 A jurisdiction’s choice of measure is worth checking before assuming that the two doctrines stay cleanly apart.
The common mistake is to apply a comparative percentage to a post-injury loss that avoidable consequences would remove item by item. The opposite mistake hunts for a separable item when the plaintiff suffered one indivisible injury, where only fault can be apportioned.19