Concept
Where the Bar Survives
Common-law contributory negligence (complete bar)
Where the Bar Survives
The complete bar taught in this chapter still decides cases in only four states and the District of Columbia. Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia, along with the District, continue to treat the plaintiff's contributory negligence as a complete bar to recovery.1 The rule is the one the Restatement (Second) states: except where the defendant has the last clear chance, the plaintiff's contributory negligence bars recovery against a defendant whose negligence would otherwise make him liable.2 The other forty-six states have adopted comparative negligence in one form or another, for some actions, by statute or judicial decision.3
Most of those forty-six states acted through legislation. Only about a dozen acted through judicial decision, and in some states whose courts moved first, the legislature has since enacted a comprehensive scheme.4 Courts could act because contributory negligence is a judicial doctrine, and some were willing to abandon it.5
Juries had been doing informally what the reformers later did by rule. The bar's foundations were shaky, and juries often defied the court's instructions by awarding a contributorily negligent plaintiff some damages, though less than a faultless plaintiff would have received.6 Early proportional systems had shown that the rule was not immutable, but the trickle of reform became a flood only around 1965.7
The holdouts kept the bar by choice. In Coleman v. Soccer Ass'n of Columbia, Maryland's court declined to abandon it and left the change to the legislature. Abandoning the bar answers only the first of many questions. A court or legislature that adopts comparative negligence must pick a type of comparative negligence; settle the fate of ameliorating doctrines such as last clear chance; say whether the jury compares the plaintiff's fault with each defendant's or with all defendants' combined; decide whether joint and several liability survives and whether the fault of a nonparty counts; and fix what the jury is told about the effect of its allocation.8
Even where comparative negligence governs, the bar can survive in part. Thirty-three states, three by judicial decision and thirty by statute, use a modified form: if the plaintiff is found more negligent than the defendant (in some versions, as negligent), comparative negligence does not apply and contributory negligence is a complete bar.9 Only the effect of the plaintiff's negligence has changed, and a plaintiff whose share of fault is large enough can still recover nothing.10
The concept of contributory negligence remains the reference point for the modern reforms, and apart from the shift from a total bar to a damage-reducing factor, virtually all of its characteristics are as they were.11 Four parts of the chapter therefore carry over unchanged:
- The plaintiff must meet the reasonable person's standard for his own protection, and that standard still comes from an enactment or regulation, from a court's adoption of one, from judicial decision, or from the judge or jury applying it when none exists.12
- Fault still means an intentional and unreasonable exposure to a danger the defendant's negligence created, of which the plaintiff knows or has reason to know, or other conduct that falls short of the reasonable person's standard of self-protection.13
- The plaintiff's negligence must still be a substantial factor in the harm, and the harm must still result from one of the hazards that made the conduct negligent.14
- The defendant must still plead and prove contributory negligence as an affirmative defense.15
Of the chapter's limits on the bar, last clear chance is the one that comparative fault makes least necessary. Where comparative fault is the rule the doctrine is no longer needed, and almost every jurisdiction has abandoned it. It remains available in the few jurisdictions that have not adopted comparative fault, and perhaps in some situations elsewhere where the plaintiff's fault would be a complete bar. Even where the doctrine is gone, the defendant's last chance to avoid the injury bears on the parties' relative fault.16
The regimes differ only in what they do with the jury's findings. Suppose Paine and Burke are each half at fault for a collision that costs Paine $60,000, and the jury finds that Paine fell below the standard for his own protection and that his lapse was a legal cause of the harm. The result then depends on the state:
- Where contributory negligence is a complete bar, Paine recovers nothing, unless last clear chance or another limit applies.17
- In a modified state that bars a plaintiff whose fault equals the defendant's, Paine again recovers nothing.18
- In a modified state that bars the plaintiff only when his fault is greater than the defendant's, Paine recovers $30,000, his damages reduced by his 50 percent share.19
- In a pure comparative negligence state, Paine also recovers $30,000.20
The same finding that ends the claim in one state discounts it in the next, and in a modified state it does one or the other depending on the version.
A fact pattern that names its rule, whether by invoking a comparative fault statute or by calling contributory negligence a complete defense, is answered under that rule. A silent pattern leaves the regime open. Because the elements are the same everywhere and only the consequence differs, the sound response is to discuss both results: nothing under the complete bar and a proportional reduction under comparative fault, with a note that a modified system turns on its threshold.