Concept
Proof and Decision-Making
Common-law contributory negligence (complete bar)
Proof and Decision-Making
Contributory negligence is a defense, and a defense that can end a claim raises two procedural questions apart from its substance: who must prove it, and who decides whether it has been proved. The Restatement answers both by sending the reader back to the ordinary negligence case. The defendant must establish the plaintiff's contributory negligence,1 and court and jury perform the same functions in deciding the plaintiff's negligence and its causal link to the harm that they perform in deciding a defendant's negligence and its causal link.2
The second answer completes a symmetry that runs through the whole defense. Apart from children and insane persons, the plaintiff's standard of conduct is that of a reasonable person under like circumstances,3 and the rules that connect the plaintiff's negligence to his harm are the rules that connect a defendant's negligence to harm to others.4 A defense that borrows the defendant's standard and the defendant's causation rules borrows the defendant's allocation of decision-making as well. A student who knows how an ordinary negligence question travels from evidence to verdict already knows the outline of how this one does.
The allocation matters most where the bar is complete. Contributory negligence remains a complete bar to recovery in only four states (Alabama, Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina) and the District of Columbia, while 46 states have adopted comparative negligence or comparative fault in some form for some actions.5 Where the bar survives, a finding for the defendant defeats a claim the plaintiff has otherwise proved. Which party bears the cost of a gap in the evidence about the plaintiff's own care, and whether a judge or a jury makes the finding, then decide whether the plaintiff recovers at all. The burden comes first, because any decision about the plaintiff's negligence presupposes evidence offered to establish it.
Defendant's Burden of Proof
The burden of establishing the plaintiff's contributory negligence rests upon the defendant.6 Courts express the same allocation by calling contributory negligence an affirmative defense that the defendant must plead and prove, and the Third Restatement states it in those terms.7 Alabama, one of the four states that retain the complete bar,8 follows the same approach in Brown v. Piggly-Wiggly Stores.
The reason lies in what the plaintiff's own case contains. A plaintiff who proves duty, breach, causation, and damages has completed his claim, and nothing in it asks him to prove that he was careful. Contributory negligence adds a separate fact, the plaintiff's own lapse, and the party who invokes a fact to defeat an otherwise complete claim must prove it. If the defendant offers no evidence of the lapse, the defense fails without any response from the plaintiff.
Proof of the lapse is only half of what the defendant owes. Contributory negligence is conduct that falls below the standard the plaintiff should meet for his own protection and that is a legally contributing cause, co-operating with the defendant's negligence, in bringing about the harm.9 The defendant must therefore prove both that the plaintiff breached a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect himself and that the breach was both a cause in fact and a proximate cause of his harm.10 The causation doctrines covered earlier in this chapter, substantial factor and scope of the hazard, govern that second part, because the rules for the plaintiff's negligence are the same as the rules for the defendant's.11
The third scene catches the step students skip most often. Proof that the plaintiff was careless feels like the whole defense, yet the defendant also owes the causal connection, and a defendant who proves only one of the two parts has not carried the burden, however plain the plaintiff's inattention. Whether proof of both parts is enough to reach a verdict, and who decides that, is the subject of the next subsection.
Roles of Judge and Jury
The Restatement resolves who decides by borrowing the allocation from the defendant's side of the case. The functions of court and jury in determining the plaintiff's negligence, and the causal relation between it and the harm necessary to bar recovery, are the same as in determining the negligence of an actor's conduct toward another and the causal relation necessary to make him liable for a harm the other has sustained.13 Those two determinations are the two parts of the defense, so it needs no procedure of its own. It travels from evidence to verdict the way any negligence question does.
The ordinary allocation is familiar. Contributory negligence is a question for the jury, but when the evidence admits but one reasonable inference, it becomes a matter of law for the court.14 The jury resolves conflicting accounts and decides whether the plaintiff's conduct measured up to the reasonable-person standard, while the court guards the outer edge by asking whether the evidence leaves room for more than one conclusion. Courts more often have found that questions of contributory negligence are for the jury, and the Third Restatement reflects the modern view that the plaintiff's contributory negligence is judged by the same standard as the defendant's negligence.15
A ruling of law stays tied to its facts. The Supreme Court made the point when it returned to its railroad-crossing decision in Goodman: the plaintiff there may have been contributorily negligent as a matter of law on the particular facts of his case, but it does not follow that everyone who has not stopped, looked, listened, and (if necessary) gotten out of his car at a crossing is contributorily negligent, because that depends on the circumstances.16
Two cases mark the ends of the range. In Urban v. Wait's Supermarket, Inc. a shopper tripped over a watermelon lying in a store aisle, and her contributory negligence went to the jury, because reasonable jurors could differ on whether she should have seen it.17 How noticeable a melon is on the floor, and what a shopper expects to find underfoot, are questions on which ordinary people answer differently. Burleson v. RSR Group Florida, Inc. came out the other way. The plaintiff was placing a holstered handgun on a rack with a live round in the chamber and the manual safety not engaged, and the gun fell from the holster to a desk and discharged. The court held him contributorily negligent as a matter of law, because no reasonable jury could find that this handling met the standard for self-protection.18 The difference lies in how much room the facts leave. The gun's condition was within the plaintiff's control and admits only one characterization, while the melon's visibility invites disagreement. In Lazar v. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. the plaintiff grabbed an uninsulated high-tension wire, and the case shows how strong the default toward the jury is, since even facts that sound careless are treated as questions courts hesitate to take from the jury.19
The test cuts both ways. The court takes the question when the evidence admits but one reasonable inference, and that inference may favor either party. Because the defense has two parts, a ruling for the defendant requires that both the lapse and its causal link be beyond reasonable dispute, while a genuine dispute on either part keeps the defense with the jury.
The common error is to decide the plaintiff's care from the bench because the facts feel one-sided. The contrast between the melon and the gun shows the actual test: whether the evidence permits only one view of the plaintiff's conduct, and not whether that conduct looks bad.