Concept
Circumstances That Affect Reasonableness
Common-law contributory negligence (complete bar)
Circumstances That Affect Reasonableness
Contributory negligence is measured against a reasonable person under like circumstances, and four circumstances recur often enough to have rules of their own.1 A sudden emergency, an earlier lapse by the plaintiff himself, a risk that escape would shift onto a bystander, and a purpose of rescue each change what a reasonable person would have done. None is a defense. Each supplies a fact the jury weighs in deciding whether the plaintiff’s conduct fell below the standard for his own protection, and the stakes are high, because under the complete bar a plaintiff found contributorily negligent recovers nothing.2
Three of the rules give the plaintiff room: the emergency rule allows for lack of time, the third-person rule for lack of safe choices, and the rescue rule for a purpose worth some risk. The fourth rule confines the first, because it keeps an emergency from excusing the carelessness that produced it. Sudden emergency comes first because the other three either limit it or apply the same weighing to different pressures.
Sudden Emergency
The Restatement makes a sudden emergency that requires rapid decision a factor in deciding whether the plaintiff’s conduct was reasonable.3 The word factor does the work. The emergency creates no separate excuse and no exception to the bar. It is one of the “like circumstances” in which the reasonable person is imagined, so the jury compares the plaintiff with someone who also had a moment to choose, not with someone who had a quiet minute to think.
Both qualifiers matter. When trouble develops slowly, the plaintiff has time to slow down, plan, or choose another route, and the rule adds nothing. It applies when the danger arrives without warning and a decision must be made at once. The rule also guards against hindsight. A jury deciding the case months later has unlimited time and knows how the accident ended, so the safer path looks obvious, and the rule keeps it from charging the plaintiff with a foresight that no reasonable person in his place had.
The standard itself stays objective. Only a child or an insane person is measured by anything other than a reasonable person under like circumstances, so a plaintiff who panics beyond what a reasonable person would in that moment earns no discount for his own fear.4 The emergency changes the circumstances and leaves the standard alone.
The two drivers differ in one respect. The speed of events forced the first driver’s choice, while the second driver made her risky choice with time to spare, so the factor changes nothing for her. A problem that says only that the plaintiff was in a hurry, or that the danger was visible well ahead, supplies no sudden emergency. Even a genuine emergency only adds a circumstance to the jury’s weighing, and a plaintiff whose choice would have been unreasonable under that pressure can still be found contributorily negligent.
The comparison must also be with a real alternative. In RGR LLC v. Settle, the Virginia Supreme Court found no contributory negligence as a matter of law where the course the defendant said the plaintiff should have taken, stopping on railroad tracks to look and listen for a train, would have put the plaintiff in greater peril. A defendant who says the plaintiff should have acted differently must name a course that was safe, or at least safer, in the circumstances the plaintiff faced, because a reasonable person under pressure does not choose the more dangerous of two roads. When no reasonable jury could find the alternative reasonable, the court can resolve the question itself, a point taken up in the later section on the roles of judge and jury.
One limit on the factor remains, and the next section develops it: careful conduct after the emergency arises does not erase fault that came before it.5
Prior Fault Not Excused
An emergency does not excuse the carelessness that caused it. The Restatement says so directly: a plaintiff’s freedom from negligence after the emergency has arisen does not preclude his earlier contributory negligence from barring recovery.7 The emergency factor judges the choice the plaintiff made once the danger was upon him, and it does not reach what he did before. His conduct therefore divides into two moments, the time before the emergency and the time inside it, and the jury judges each separately. A flawless reaction in the second leaves the first where it was.
Four points explain the rule. Contributory negligence is conduct below the standard for the plaintiff’s own protection that is a legally contributing cause of the harm, and nothing in that definition limits the inquiry to his last act.8 The timing rule already makes the plaintiff’s negligence a bar whether it comes before, after, or at the same moment as the defendant’s, so a lapse loses no force because other events followed it.9 The emergency factor rests on compressed time, and an earlier lapse was made with time to think, so the factor’s reason does not reach it. And the contrary rule would reward the wrong behavior: a plaintiff could create the hazard through his own carelessness and then escape the bar by reacting well to it.
The common error is to treat the reasonable reaction as the end of the analysis. A problem that says the plaintiff did everything a reasonable person could in the second available has described only the choice inside the emergency, and the open question is what he did before the emergency existed. The inquiries run in sequence. The jury first asks whether the plaintiff was at fault before the emergency arose and, if so, whether that fault was a legally contributing cause of the harm. His conduct inside the emergency matters afterward only if the defendant alleges a further lapse there.
The two drivers reacted identically, so the difference lies in what each did before the emergency. Haddad’s stop in the lane fell below the standard for self-protection, and the harm that followed, a collision with a vehicle coming around the curve, is the very hazard that made stopping there negligent.10 The lapse is therefore a legally contributing cause, and the bar applies in full unless the defendant had the last clear chance.11 Last clear chance, which jurisdictions define in different ways,12 does not help Haddad on these facts, because a driver rounding a blind curve has no opportunity to discover a stopped car and avoid it. Brennan’s emergency was created entirely by the defendant, so her reasonable response needs no excuse: there is no earlier fault to excuse.
The rule has limits of its own. The earlier lapse must still satisfy the definition of contributory negligence, which means it must contribute to the harm through a hazard that made it negligent. A plaintiff who drove with an expired registration has a lapse unrelated to how the collision happened, and that lapse bars nothing, however he behaved in the emergency.13
Risk to Third Persons
A plaintiff whose only alternative to a risky course would endanger a third person is judged with that fact in view: the Restatement makes it a factor in deciding whether the plaintiff’s conduct amounts to contributory negligence.15 Like the sudden-emergency factor, the rule adds a circumstance to the jury’s weighing and creates no separate defense. The pressure differs, though. In an emergency the plaintiff lacks time, while here he lacks choices, because the only way to escape the danger the defendant created would pass it to someone who has done nothing wrong.
The rule follows from how reasonableness is measured. A reasonable person counts harm to an innocent bystander as a real cost of any course that threatens one, so a plaintiff who accepts the danger the defendant created rather than shift it onto a bystander has made a choice that most people would call sound. Without the rule, a defendant could argue that the plaintiff should have taken the only other path, and the complete bar would strip the plaintiff of the whole claim for declining to endanger someone else. Restatement (Third) of Torts § 3 takes the same broad view, that all risks belong in the assessment, though little case law addresses the point.16
The two scenes differ only in whether the alternative would have put anyone else at risk. In the first, the alternative carried a cost the plaintiff could not fairly be expected to impose on a bystander, and that cost is the factor the rule tells the jury to weigh. In the second, there was no such cost, and the plaintiff’s choice is measured by the ordinary standard alone.
The rule makes the third person’s risk a factor and stops short of a complete excuse. Its weight depends on how likely and how serious the harm to the third person would have been, compared with the danger the plaintiff chose to bear. A plaintiff who accepted a grave and certain injury to avoid a slight and unlikely risk to a bystander has not necessarily acted reasonably, and a jury can still find contributory negligence. Many contributory negligence cases involve no third person at all, as when someone uses a defective chain saw unsafely with no one foreseeably nearby, and the factor matters only where the plaintiff’s choice moves risk onto another.17 A plaintiff who runs a risk to save a third person from harm, rather than to avoid imposing risk on one, is judged under the rescue rule that follows.
Rescue and Protective Efforts
A plaintiff who enters danger to save something is protected: exposing oneself to danger in an effort to save oneself, a third person, or the land or chattels of either is not contributory negligence, unless the effort itself is unreasonable or the plaintiff acts unreasonably in the course of it.19 The third-person factor above covers a plaintiff who would rather bear a danger than pass it on. This rule covers a plaintiff who takes on danger deliberately because something worth protecting is at stake, and it treats that purpose as part of the circumstances against which the conduct is judged. Protection is the default, and the bar applies only if one of the two qualifications is met: the effort was unreasonable, or the plaintiff carried it out unreasonably.
A rescuer usually knows of the danger, so the facts resemble the first of two kinds of contributory negligence the Restatement describes, an intentional and unreasonable exposure to a danger the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of.20 The word unreasonable separates the two. Whether an exposure is reasonable depends on what it is for. Driving a car with bad brakes may be reasonable to get a heart attack victim to the hospital but not to reach a poker game on time, and a rescuer’s decision to save a child from a fire is eminently reasonable even though it knowingly risks injury.21 Knowledge of the danger therefore proves nothing against a rescuer, because the question is whether the effort was worth the risk.
The rule also removes a perverse incentive. A bystander who sees someone in peril must decide at once whether to act. If entering the danger counted as fault, staying back would cost nothing while helping could cost the entire claim, since the complete bar leaves a contributorily negligent plaintiff with nothing. In the typical case the defendant’s negligence created the peril, so a defendant who could answer an injured rescuer by pointing to the rescuer’s awareness of the risk would escape liability to the very person his negligence drew into harm. The rule avoids both results by judging the rescuer as a reasonable person who accepts real risk when something important is at stake. When the decision must be made quickly, the sudden-emergency factor applies as well.22
The rule reaches well beyond the rescue of a life. By its terms it covers efforts to save oneself, a third person, or the land or chattels of either, so a plaintiff who leaps from a window to escape a fire the defendant started, a stranger who pulls a child from a burning house, and an owner who wades into floodwater to move a neighbor’s livestock all begin inside the protection.23 They differ in the weight on the scale. Because the first qualification asks whether the effort itself was reasonable, the value of what is being saved bears on how much danger the effort can accept: a life supports great risk, and a trivial object supports almost none. The rule also protects the effort and not the plaintiff’s earlier conduct, so where the plaintiff’s own carelessness created the emergency, the prior-fault rule still applies.24 In a problem where a plaintiff is hurt while moving toward a danger the defendant created, two questions follow: whether what was at stake justified the risk, and whether the plaintiff carried out the effort sensibly.
The first scene fails the first qualification, because a paperback cannot justify walking into a fire, and a defendant who proves as much has the complete bar available. The second scene meets the first qualification and fails the second, because the decision to save the child was beyond criticism while the method was not. The rescue rule protects the decision to enter danger for a worthwhile purpose, and it gives no cover to a method that piles avoidable danger on top of the unavoidable kind.
The second qualification separates the decision from its execution, and a sound decision can still be carried out badly. A secondary source states the protection more generously: a rescuer cannot be charged with contributory fault for conduct during the rescue attempt unless he or she acted recklessly.25 The Restatement’s wording asks whether the plaintiff acted unreasonably, so a problem governed by it is analyzed in those terms, but the recklessness formulation shows how much room a rescuer gets. The qualification reaches choices such as ignoring an obviously safer route. As with every form of contributory negligence, an unreasonable effort or an unreasonable manner bars recovery only if it is also a legally contributing cause of the plaintiff’s harm.26