Concept
The Plaintiff's Standard of Care
Common-law contributory negligence (complete bar)
The Plaintiff's Standard of Care
The complete bar makes one question decisive: what standard of care must the plaintiff meet? A plaintiff who falls below it loses the whole claim, and a defendant who cannot show the shortfall loses the defense. The Restatement names four possible sources for the standard. The standard of conduct of a reasonable man to which the plaintiff must conform for his own protection may be established by a legislative enactment or administrative regulation that so provides, adopted by a court from an enactment or regulation that does not so provide, established by judicial decision, or applied to the facts by the trial judge or the jury when none of those exists.1
The justifications once offered for so severe a rule are thin. Courts sometimes called the plaintiff's negligence a superseding cause, but another party's negligence is ordinarily treated as foreseeable and therefore not superseding. Others argued that the bar made plaintiffs more careful, but avoiding serious personal injury is incentive enough without it.2 The bar's whole weight therefore rests on the content of the standard, which deserves close attention.
The standard has two layers, and separating them prevents a common confusion. The first layer concerns who the plaintiff is. Unless the plaintiff is a child or an insane person, the measure is a reasonable man under like circumstances, and a child is measured against a reasonable person of like age, intelligence, and experience under like circumstances.3 Both formulas ask what a reasonable person would have done, and neither asks what the plaintiff privately thought safe. The second layer concerns where the yardstick for the situation comes from. Return to the intersection collision from the earlier sections: whether Victoria's glance at her radio fell below the standard has to be answered by something. A traffic statute might answer it in advance, and a court might adopt that statute as the measure of her own conduct. A prior decision might have settled the question for similar facts. Only when no enactment, regulation, or decision speaks does the judge or jury apply the reasonable-person standard directly to what happened.4 The more a legislature or an earlier court has already decided, the less is left to case-by-case judgment. The sections below take the adult measure first, because the child's rule modifies it, and then turn to the sources of the yardstick.
The Adult Standard
An adult plaintiff must meet the standard of a reasonable person under like circumstances. The Restatement states it this way: unless the actor is a child or an insane person, the standard of conduct to which he must conform for his own protection is that of a reasonable man under like circumstances.5 The test is objective. It asks what a reasonably careful person would have done and disregards what this plaintiff believed was safe. It is also one test for both sides of the case. Negligence law requires a defendant to conform to a standard of conduct, for the protection of others, against unreasonable risks of harm, and the plaintiff's duty turns the same yardstick toward his own protection.6 Whether Victoria fell short when she glanced at her radio is therefore the question a court would ask about her care for others if she were the defendant.
The standard is objective because a measure tied to each person's own judgment would be as variable as the length of each person's foot. The law requires instead, in all cases, the caution that a man of ordinary prudence would observe.7 A plaintiff cannot answer the defense by saying that he is impulsive or thinks little of the risk, and the defendant need not prove what the plaintiff privately believed.
Doctrine and practice diverge on one point. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability § 3 reflects the modern view that a plaintiff's contributory negligence is judged by the same standard as a defendant's negligence. Courts and juries have nevertheless tended to be more lenient with plaintiffs: conduct that would make a defendant negligent may be found reasonable, or less culpable, in a plaintiff, and courts more often leave contributory negligence to the jury.8 Apply the stated rule, and expect the leniency to appear in how a jury treats close facts.
Objectivity does not make the test blind to the plaintiff's situation, because the comparison is to a reasonable person under like circumstances. A limitation the plaintiff cannot set aside shapes what care is possible, and the reasonable person to whom the plaintiff is compared shares it.
Victoria's radio glance resembles the second pedestrian's phone. Nothing in her circumstances made looking away from the road reasonable, so a jury could find that her conduct fell below the adult standard. Like circumstances therefore admit facts that shape what care is possible, and they do not admit a plaintiff's habits, haste, or private estimate of the risk.
Circumstances include relationships as well as bodies, and the patient who relies on a physician shows how. Doctors are paid for their expertise, so diagnosis is primarily their responsibility, and in most cases an ordinary patient's failure to report the origin of pain is no evidence of negligence.9 In Weinstock v. Ott the patient did not follow a consultant's advice, checked herself out of the second hospital, and continued to follow her original physician. Nearly four years later the condition was correctly diagnosed at the second hospital, and she died of complications of the advanced disease. The court held that she was not contributorily negligent as a matter of law, because she had been given no further information and so continued to follow the advice of her original physician for the entire period.10
The reliance has limits. In the D.C. Circuit's formulation, contributory negligence applies where a party knows, or by the exercise of ordinary care should know, a particular fact or circumstance and should act on it with reasonable care for his own safety. A North Carolina court has likewise reaffirmed that a plaintiff need not anticipate the defendant's negligence but can still be required to act with due care.11 A patient told to return if the pain intensified may be charged with comparative fault for staying away for an extended period, and a vasectomy patient who ignored post-operative instructions for semen testing was barred by contributory negligence.12 Justified dependence protects the patient who follows the physician's advice. It gives nothing to a patient who disregards it.
Falling short of the standard is not cured by the defendant's fault alone. Last clear chance, taken up later in the chapter, is the exception, and one court refused to give that instruction to a plaintiff who had been driving at 60 m.p.h. in a line of four cars, because he did not show that he was unconscious of his peril.13
The adult formula carves out two exceptions, children and insane persons. The child's rule comes next.
The Child Standard
A child's conduct for his own protection is measured against a reasonable person of like age, intelligence, and experience under like circumstances.15 The adult formula excludes children, and this rule takes its place. The test stays objective, since it asks what a reasonable person would have done. What changes is the imagined person. The adult formula builds in the situation the plaintiff faced, and the child formula adds the plaintiff's developmental stage.
The rule has two features, each with its own reason. The departure from the adult standard rests on capacity: a child is not held to adult standards of comprehending danger and the duty of self-care.16 The measure looks to age, intelligence, and experience, and not to age alone, because those traits differ among children. A ten-year-old who has been taught about a hazard and has met it often understands it better than a classmate who has not, so an older or more experienced child can be held to what a similar child could be expected to do.
Capacity is a separate threshold. The ultimate determination of a child's capacity to be contributorily negligent is generally a question of fact. Some courts hold as a matter of law that children within a certain age group cannot be contributorily negligent, and children over five may or may not be, depending on the circumstances.17 A problem with a young plaintiff therefore raises three questions: whether the child is capable of contributory negligence at all, which standard applies, and whether the child met it.
Between the youngest children and adults lies a range in which a child can be negligent but is judged as a child. A nine-year-old may be capable of contributory negligence but, like a twelve-year-old, is not held to the adult standards of comprehending danger and the duty of self-care. See Outlaw v. Bituminous Ins. Co.18
At the low end of the age range the question never reaches the standard. A toddler runs into the street while his father, who is with him, does nothing to stop him, and a speeding driver strikes the child. In a jurisdiction that holds children of that age incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law, the defense has no conduct of the child's to attach to, and his claim survives even where contributory negligence is a complete bar.19 The father's lapse does not change that result.
The child's own capacity defines the child's negligence, and nothing in the rule charges the child with someone else's. Courts once imputed a parent's negligence to the child, although the child was innocent and incapable of negligence, and those decisions are now almost entirely overruled or obsolete.20 The father's lapse still has consequences in a separate claim: a parent's recovery for injuries to a child caused by the defendant's negligence is reduced by the parent's negligence in protecting or supervising a child too young to be responsible for his own safety.21
Legislative Standards
A legislature that has already prescribed care for a class of people can supply the yardstick for a plaintiff's conduct in two ways. An enactment or regulation that so provides establishes the standard of conduct for the plaintiff's own protection directly.23 One that does not so provide may still be adopted by the court as the standard.24 The first route applies when the enactment itself says that it sets the plaintiff's standard for his own protection. The second applies when the enactment says nothing of the kind, as with a prohibition that mentions no civil suit, and a court adopts its terms as the measure of the plaintiff's care. Either way, a rule already exists in place of an open-ended jury judgment.
Once an enactment supplies the standard, the Restatement states the consequence. The plaintiff's unexcused violation of an enactment or regulation that defines a standard of conduct for his own protection is contributory negligence in itself if it is a legally contributing cause of his harm.25 The words in itself mean that the violation is the shortfall, so the jury is not asked whether a reasonable person might have acted the same way. Two conditions qualify the result. The violation must be unexcused, and it must be a legally contributing cause of the harm, so a violation that played no part in producing the injury bars nothing. The causal condition is developed in the sections on legal cause below.
The Restatement borrows the defendant's tests for the plaintiff. The rules that decide whether an enactment or regulation defines a standard of conduct for the protection of the plaintiff, and when its violation will be excused, are the same as those applied to a defendant.26 The negligence per se analysis studied for defendants therefore carries over without change, and a rule that excused a defendant's violation but not an identical plaintiff's would hold the two parties to different levels of care.
The shoved pedestrian and the driver with the dead taillight escape the bar for different reasons. Excuse removes the fault from the violation, and the absence of causation removes its link to the harm, and the defense needs both the fault and the link.
The defendant's own statutory violation changes none of this. A defendant who breaks a safety statute may be negligent per se, but the Restatement conditions the plaintiff's action on his not having conducted himself so as to disable himself from bringing it.27 Contributory negligence is that disabling conduct, and a defendant may invoke negligence per se to prove that the plaintiff was negligent, just as a plaintiff may use it against the defendant.28
The same pattern appears when the defendant's duty has a statutory source. Because the law expects a tenant to look out for his own safety, most courts allow a landlord to raise contributory negligence and implied assumption of risk even though a housing code governs the landlord. An exception applies to statutes intended to protect the plaintiff against his inability to protect himself, and housing codes usually have not been construed as that kind of protective statute.29 The exception receives its own treatment in the section on protective statutes.
Legislative standards are also often minimums, intended to avoid the most dangerous practices and not to immunize those who do the minimum where more precaution is appropriate. It may be unreasonable to ignore a legislative minimum, but it does not follow that a reasonable person takes only those minimum precautions.30
Judicial and Jury Standards
Where no legislature has fixed the plaintiff's yardstick, the courts supply it in one of two ways. A prior decision may already have declared what a person in the plaintiff's position must do for his own safety, and the standard is then established by judicial decision.32 If there is no enactment, regulation, or decision, the trial judge or the jury applies the reasonable-person standard to the facts of the case.33 The two ways mark the ends of a spectrum. At one end a court has turned a recurring situation into a rule that answers the question before the next plaintiff arrives. At the other end nothing is settled in advance, and the standard takes its content from the evidence in the particular case. Both ends use the reasonable care that negligence law demands of defendants, directed here at the plaintiff's own protection.34
Courts have a reason to move from the jury end toward the rule end. When the same conduct keeps recurring, either the court will find that the fair teaching of experience is that the conduct usually is or is not blameworthy, and therefore, unless explained, is or is not a ground of liability, or it will find the jury oscillating to and fro and will see the necessity of making up its mind for itself.35 Under the complete bar such a ruling is decisive. In Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Goodman the railroad argued that the plaintiff was negligent as a matter of law and that, since contributory negligence was then a complete defense, the case could not go to the jury. The trial court denied the railroad's motion for a directed verdict and submitted the issue to the jury, which found for the plaintiff.36
Pokora v. Wabash Railway Co. later treated the question as one of circumstances. In effect, the Court said that the plaintiff in Goodman may have been contributorily negligent as a matter of law on his particular facts, but that it does not follow that everyone who has not stopped, looked, listened, and, if necessary, gotten out of his car at a railroad crossing is contributorily negligent. That depends on the circumstances. "In default of the guide of customary conduct, what is suitable for the traveler caught in a mesh where the ordinary safeguards fail him is for the judgment of a jury."37
The two decisions show where a judicially announced standard stops. A court's rule describes the care a plaintiff owed only to the extent that it follows customary conduct, and where no custom guides, the standard returns to the jury. The jury end is therefore the working default, and judicial rule-making fits situations in which repeated experience has made the answer clear.
The later section on roles of judge and jury takes up how a trial divides the work between them and when a judge may decide the question alone.