Concept
Failure to Discover
Indemnity between the hirer and the contractor
Failure to Discover
The defective-work ground and the dangerous-condition ground in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 886B(2) close on the same condition: the indemnitee must have "innocently or negligently failed to discover the defect."1 The rest of each ground describes what the contractor did. This phrase describes the hirer, and it fixes how large a lapse by the hirer the grounds will absorb. A missed inspection fits inside it. A danger the hirer actually found does not, and neither does a hazard the hirer helped to produce.
The phrase covers two kinds of ignorance, and the difference between them is the care the hirer took. An innocent failure means that nothing the hirer reasonably could have done would have revealed the problem. A negligent failure means that a closer look would have revealed it and the hirer did not take one. The clause treats the two alike, so a careless inspection does not by itself forfeit the claim.
Courts give two reasons, and the first is reliance. A hirer retains a contractor for its skill, and a hirer that trusts the skill it retained is not heavily at fault. East Penn Mfg. Co. v. Pineda posed the point in a seller-and-manufacturer setting. The question was whether the manufacturer of a defective product owes the seller an implied duty to indemnify when the seller reasonably relied on the manufacturer's knowledge and skill and its own negligence was at most a failure to discover the defect. The court answered yes and sustained the order of indemnity.2 A hirer relying on a contractor's skill stands where that seller stood.
The second reason is a comparison of wrongs. Otero v. Jordon Restaurant Enterprises drew on the Supreme Court's Amrep decision, which treats creating a dangerous condition as active negligence and failing to discover and remedy it as passive. The party that failed to discover may therefore recover from the party that created the condition, because as between the two the far greater responsibility is the creator's.3 Peters v. Lyons puts the same idea in moral terms. Indemnity protects one who is legally liable but morally innocent against one whose wrongful conduct or omission caused the liability, and among the situations it lists is liability incurred merely because of a failure, even a negligent failure, to discover or prevent the other's misconduct.4
The tolerance also keeps two questions apart. Whether the hirer was careless toward the injured plaintiff decides its joint liability to that plaintiff. Who bears the loss as between hirer and contractor is a separate matter. The dissent in Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc. draws the line on these facts: a manufacturer promised an elbow with a 35-degree angle and delivered one with a 47-degree angle, and an experienced installer perhaps should have recognized the danger of the greater angle. That inference, the dissent said, justified only a finding of the installer's negligence and its joint and several liability to the plaintiff. It did not justify denying the installer indemnity from the manufacturer.5 As between installer and supplier, the supplier's duty is to supply the correct part. The installer may rely on that duty where the part fits and appears correct in all respects, and in that situation it should be entitled to indemnity.6 The passage is a dissent, so read it as one side of a live argument. It does match the clause's own words.
The tolerance stops where knowledge begins. The restitution formulation quoted in Tolbert gives recovery to a party liable for negligently failing to make safe a dangerous condition that the other created, or that as between the two was the other's duty to make safe, "unless after discovery of the danger, he acquiesced in the continuation of the condition."7 A hirer that has found a hazard faces a choice. If it leaves the hazard in place, part of the injury traces to its own decision, and it is no longer the morally innocent party the doctrine shelters. The active-passive test draws the same line. Conduct is active when the indemnitee personally took part in an affirmative act of negligence, was connected with negligent acts or omissions by knowledge or acquiescence, or failed to perform a precise duty. Conduct is passive when the indemnitee fails to discover and remedy a dangerous situation created by another's negligence or wrongdoing.8 Careless ignorance falls on the passive side. Knowledge falls on the other.
Change one fact and the result changes with it. Suppose the superintendent walked the stairs the day the contractor finished, saw a landing that looked sound, and approved it. If the same collapse followed, the owner would have a failure to discover at worst, and the claim would fit the ground.
A hirer's own contribution to the hazard falls outside the clause for a different reason. It is something the hirer did, not something it failed to discover. Otero shows what a passive hirer looks like by listing what the city did not do. The city's only fault lay in affording the contractor the opportunity to do the work. It had no part in performing the work or in inspecting it afterward, and there was no proof that it had information that the contractor had done shoddy work before. On those facts the court held the city's negligence, if any, entirely passive and minimal in degree.9 The court added that information about the contractor's past shoddy work would undeniably have raised the city's degree of fault somewhat.10 A hirer that took part in the work, or went ahead knowing the contractor's record was poor, no longer fits the picture of an innocent hirer who merely missed what someone else made. The word "somewhat" also implies a gradient, in which each added fact moves the hirer further from passive.
Courts do not weigh a careless miss uniformly. The clause tolerates it, yet Peters quotes Iowa authority treating failure to warn and failure to inspect as primary acts of negligence, so that a party defending its own primary negligence has no common-law right to recover expenses and attorney's fees from a co-defendant. The passage adds that a party might recover common-law indemnity and still not recover attorney's fees.11 The next sections take up how courts handle that gradient, whether by sorting the hirer into active or passive or by reducing its recovery in proportion to its fault.