Concept
Indemnity Versus Contribution
Indemnity between the hirer and the contractor
Indemnity Versus Contribution
A hirer that has paid the plaintiff's judgment has two possible claims against the contractor, and they end in very different places: contribution splits the loss, and indemnity moves all of it. Which claim fits depends on why the hirer was liable to begin with.
Section 886B(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states the indemnity rule. If two persons are liable in tort to a third person for the same harm and one of them discharges the liability of both, the payer is entitled to indemnity from the other when the other would be unjustly enriched at the payer's expense by the discharge.1 Unjust enrichment means that one party has received a benefit at another's cost in circumstances where fairness forbids keeping it. A hirer's payment ends the contractor's liability to the plaintiff along with its own, and if the loss belonged to the contractor as between the two, the contractor has been relieved of a debt it owed. The rule is broad. It reaches any two persons liable to the same person for the same harm, whether or not they acted in concert or were joined as defendants, and it covers every basis of tort liability, not only negligence.2
The Restatement's commentary ties indemnity to restitution. Indemnity belongs in any situation in which, as between the parties, it is just and fair for the indemnitor to bear the whole responsibility instead of dividing it proportionally by contribution.3
Contribution is the proportional alternative, and courts treat the two remedies as separate and distinct, as Dixon v. Chicago and North Western Transportation Co. illustrates. Contribution distributes liability for a loss among joint tortfeasors according to each one's percentage of relative fault. Indemnity lets one tortfeasor shift the entire loss to another.4 The difference follows from what each remedy assumes. Contribution assumes that every party before the court did something wrong and owes a portion, so the only open question is the size of each portion. Indemnity assumes that, as between the two, the payer's liability should never have been the payer's burden, so the question is whether the whole loss moves. Implied indemnity rests on restitution: the law implies a contract to indemnify from the indemnitee's legal obligation to satisfy a liability caused by the indemnitor's actions.5 That obligation is a duty in the ordinary legal sense, something owed to another that must be satisfied. Here it is the duty owed to the plaintiff, which the hirer discharged and the contractor's conduct created.6
This division explains why a vicariously liable hirer looks to indemnity and cannot use contribution. Contribution statutes let a tortfeasor who has paid a judgment recover part of it from other tortfeasors, and a party that answers only for someone else's tort stands outside that group because it committed no tort of its own.7 The textbook illustration is an employer held liable for an employee's negligence, but the reasoning carries over to a hirer held liable for a contractor's. The hirer has no fault of its own, so it has no share to be apportioned. What it holds is a payment that, as between the two, discharged the contractor's obligation, and that is the situation indemnity was built for.
Two short scenes show the line between the remedies.
The usual error is reaching for contribution because two defendants were liable on one judgment. That feature appears in both scenes, so it cannot decide the question. What separates them is whether the payer carries fault of its own. A hirer whose own negligence also contributed, for instance in how it chose or supervised the contractor, presents a mixed case, and the fault limits on indemnity taken up later in this chapter govern how much of its payment it can push back.
The remedy runs in only one direction. A contractor who pays the plaintiff has no claim against the hirer for indemnity or for contribution, because the hirer's liability is borrowed from the contractor's tort. Vicarious liability exists to assure that the plaintiff can collect from the hirer, and it does not insulate the actual wrongdoer from the loss.8 The contractor committed the tort, and the hirer answers only because the law attaches that tort to it. A paying contractor has therefore discharged the very loss its own conduct created. The hirer's release is no unjust enrichment, since the debt was the contractor's from the start, and contribution is unavailable because the hirer is not a tortfeasor sharing fault.
The all-or-nothing shape of indemnity has a history. Courts came to see that the bar on contribution among fault-bearing tortfeasors worked injustice in cases where the indemnitee was somewhat at fault but far less culpable than the indemnitor. Some courts responded by expanding indemnity to cases in which the difference in fault was so great that one party's negligence could be called "active" next to the other's "passive" negligence.9 Indemnity thus served as a workaround for a rule that allowed no sharing, which is why it gave one party the entire loss or none of it. Later sections return to that binary quality and to the fault limits that follow from it.