Concept
Collateral Negligence Limit
Nondelegable duties and inherently dangerous work exceptions
Collateral Negligence Limit
The hirer answers only for the particular risk that gave rise to the exception, whichever exception supplies liability. The Restatement Third alone retains vicarious liability in eight situations, among them abnormally dangerous activities, peculiar-risk work, and precautions required by statute or regulation.1 In each, the employer is not liable where the contractor’s negligence pertains to or creates a risk that is collateral, one not inherent and foreseeable in the dangerous activity.2 Section 427 draws the same boundary: it does not apply “where the negligence of the contractor creates a new risk, not inherent in the work itself or in the ordinary or prescribed way of doing it, and not reasonably to be contemplated by the employer.”3 The black-letter rules are worded to match. The peculiar-risk rule reaches harm caused by the contractor’s failure to take the special precautions the risk calls for,4 and the public-place rule reaches harm caused by a negligent act or omission that makes the place dangerous for public use.5
Courts call the excluded negligence collateral and define it by how far the contractor strayed from the job as the hirer would have pictured it. Negligence is collateral when it occurs after the contractor has departed from the ordinary or prescribed way of doing the work, when the hirer could not reasonably have contemplated the departure, and when the negligence would not have occurred but for it. If the departure is itself a negligent act or omission, that too is collateral.6 Either way, the negligence is something the hirer could not reasonably have contemplated, as opposed to a recognizable risk of the ordinary or prescribed way of doing the work under the circumstances.7 A second formulation divides the doctrine into three parts: the contractor’s negligence consists solely of the improper manner of performing the work, the risk created is not normal to the work, and the hirer had no reason to contemplate the negligence when the contract was made.8 Put practically, negligence is collateral when it was not recognizable in advance as particularly likely to occur or as calling for special precaution.9
The limit keeps the exceptions from consuming the general rule. Sawing two-by-fours is dangerous if the saw’s safety guard is not lowered, but nearly any activity other than bookkeeping or playing chess carries some risk of injury when done carelessly. If a duty were nondelegable whenever some appropriate precaution was omitted, the hirer would answer whenever its contractor was negligent, and the exception would swallow the rule that the contractor, not the owner, is liable for the contractor’s torts.10
The quickest way to find the line is to ask what hurt the plaintiff. A building owner who hires a contractor to demolish a skyscraper takes on a nondelegable duty because falling debris endangers people nearby. If the contractor sends an employee to the hardware store and she has an accident on the way, the contractor is liable but the owner is not. The duty exists for the debris risk and not for driving, an ordinary activity that may take place in any kind of work.11 The same reasoning governs overhead construction above a sidewalk, where the nondelegable risk is falling objects. An obstruction negligently left on the sidewalk is a hazard that could arise on any construction job, so the contractor answers for the passerby’s injury and the owner does not.12 Bricklaying runs the same way. The hirer may face vicarious liability when the bricklayer negligently drops a brick onto a passerby or negligently builds a wall, but not when the bricklayer negligently drives a truck to the brickyard.13 In every pair the lapse is the same kind of ordinary carelessness; what differs is whether the harm came from the danger that made the work special.
The inherent-danger cases state the point from the other side. Work is inherently dangerous when it can be carried on safely only with special skill and care and involves grave risk if negligently done, and the danger inheres in the activity itself at all times, so as to require special precautions. That means more than “simply danger arising from the casual or collateral negligence of persons engaged in it under particular circumstances.”14 Comment b to § 426 excludes the same ground from the hirer’s liability: the employer is not liable for “abnormal or unusual kinds of negligence on the part of the contractor, or negligence in the performance of operative details of the work which ordinarily may be expected to be carried out with proper care.”15 A lapse in routine detail work thus looks more like collateral negligence than a lapse in the special precaution the danger demanded.
The same limit shapes the land-based rules. The open-premises rule protects members of the public who enter for the land’s purpose against unreasonably dangerous activities of, or unreasonably dangerous conditions created by, an independent contractor or concessionaire working on the land.18 A dangerous condition the contractor creates there fits that description. A driving accident on a public road does not: it harms people who never entered the land, and it arises from a risk that any work carries.19
Whether negligence was collateral is generally a question for the trier of fact, just as whether the work involved a peculiar risk is.20 An exam answer should therefore name the danger that justified the exception, set it beside the particular lapse, and argue the comparison from the facts rather than attach the label by reflex. Facts showing that the lapse was an ordinary way for this kind of dangerous work to go wrong favor liability, and facts showing a risk that any job carries, such as driving or an obstruction on a sidewalk, favor the hirer. The limit confines only vicarious liability. A hirer that was itself careless in selecting the contractor, in giving directions or equipment, or in failing to stop unreasonably dangerous practices that came to its attention answers separately for its own negligence.21