Concept
Premises Open to the Public
Nondelegable duties and inherently dangerous work exceptions
Premises Open to the Public
A shopper slips on a wet patch that an overnight cleaning crew left on a store's floor. The store never touched the mop, never told the crew how to clean, and chose the crew with care. The general insulation rule that opens this chapter would shield the store. Section 415 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts removes that shield once the land is open to the public.
The rule itself is compact. A possessor of land who holds it open to the public for any purpose is subject to liability to members of the public entering for that purpose for physical harm caused to them by the possessor's failure to exercise reasonable care to protect them against unreasonably dangerous activities of, or unreasonably dangerous conditions created by, an independent contractor or concessionaire employed or permitted to do work or carry on an activity on the land.1 The rule belongs to the special tort rules for land, which reflect how heavily the law has weighed the rights of ownership, possession, and use against competing interests.2
Courts describe the consequence as a nondelegable duty. An owner has a nondelegable duty to keep business premises safe for invitees, and one court applied the same policy to the owner and operator of an airport terminal, who could not delegate the duty to keep the facility safe.3 A retail store likewise remains liable for damage caused by negligently conducted repairs, even though it hired an independent contractor to do them.4 The grocery-store floor in Rodriguez v. Kroger Co. shows the principle at work: the store answered for the wet spot its overnight cleaning crew left. An answer that applies the insulation rule to the crew and stops there has missed the section.
The policy behind the rule is stated plainly. Tort law does not allow an entity to shift by contract its responsibility for keeping an area used by the public in a safe condition, so a contract between the possessor and the contractor cannot move the duty off the possessor.5 The same policy keeps a government from delegating its responsibility to maintain safe roads and similar public places. The duties that owners and possessors of land owe to business visitors also sit on a long list of nondelegable duties that share a substantial underlying safety purpose.6
The first two questions seldom cause trouble. A store or terminal controls its land and has invited people onto it, and because the text says for any purpose, the kind of invitation does not matter. The third question is where claims fail, since the protection runs only to entrants who come for the purpose for which the possessor opened the land.7 What does a patron have under this section who leaves the open floor and is hurt in a place the possessor never opened to anyone but employees?
The cable is exactly the kind of hazard the section addresses, a condition an independent contractor created on the land, so the entry element alone decides the case. The text protects members of the public entering for the purpose for which the land is open. A plaintiff who goes beyond that invitation must find a claim under some other rule.
The fourth question reaches beyond the possessor's own hires. The text covers a contractor or concessionaire who is either employed or merely permitted to do work or carry on an activity on the land, so the possessor's liability does not depend on having hired the actor.8 The visitor's danger is the same either way: once a possessor lets an activity operate on land held open to the public, visitors meet that activity as part of the premises. The actor's status still matters, because the rule speaks of independent contractors and concessionaires. A hirer's general policies and standards do not amount to the supervision, dominion, and control over day-to-day activities that would make the actor its servant.9
The company cannot answer that it never hired the vendor. It also cannot answer that it chose the vendor carefully, because the duty stays with the possessor and hiring someone else does not discharge it.10 A possessor that did choose carelessly faces a separate claim for its own negligence, as a homeowner does who hires an incompetent plumber, and that claim exists whether or not § 415 applies.11 Section 415 does its work where the hiring was careful, because it reaches the possessor that did everything right in selecting a contractor and still answers for what the contractor left behind.
Step four also turns on what the contractor actually did wrong, so locate the negligent act itself. A contractor who responds reasonably to a sudden gust of wind may still be negligent for starting the job on a windy day without more precautions, or for using inadequate cable in the first place.12 The initial act is the dangerous activity the plaintiff must tie to the harm.
The section stops short of making the possessor an insurer. The danger must be an unreasonably dangerous activity or condition of the contractor or concessionaire, and the plaintiff's physical harm must come from it.13 The activity must also be one the contractor carries on, or the condition one it creates, on the land, and the protected plaintiff is an entrant on that land. A pedestrian struck by a plumber's truck on the way to a supply house is not an entrant, and the next section takes up the broader limit on what a nondelegable duty covers.
The boundaries of the exceptions to the insulation rule vary by jurisdiction, so check how the governing law frames this one. The Restatement (Third), for example, hinges direct liability on retained control and keeps vicarious liability for hirers in eight situations, among them activity posing a peculiar risk.14 Section 415 asks a different question from the peculiar-risk rules earlier in the chapter. It asks whether the contractor's activity or condition was unreasonably dangerous to entrants, not whether the work posed a peculiar risk, so ordinary work such as repairs can fall within it.15
A related rule governs landlords. A lessor generally cannot escape responsibility by delegating the work to an independent contractor, and the lessor is liable for the contractor's negligence to the same extent as if the contractor were an employee.16