Concept
Contractor's Failure Under Section 416
Nondelegable duties and inherently dangerous work exceptions
Contractor's Failure Under Section 416
Section 416 holds the hirer liable even when the hirer did everything right about the precautions. It starts from the same kind of work as § 413: an employer hires an independent contractor to do work that the employer should recognize as likely to create, during its progress, a peculiar risk of physical harm to others unless special precautions are taken. The employer then answers for physical harm caused to those others by “the failure of the contractor to exercise reasonable care to take such precautions, even though the employer has provided for such precautions in the contract or otherwise.”1 The work must first meet the peculiar-risk trigger defined earlier in this chapter. If it does not, nothing else in the section matters.
The final clause is what separates § 416 from § 413. Section 413 puts the wrong in the hirer's own omission: the hirer failed to provide in the contract for the precautions, or failed to exercise reasonable care to provide for them in some other manner.2 A hirer that writes the precautions into the contract and follows through with reasonable care has therefore met § 413. Section 416 puts the wrong in the contractor's lapse, and the same careful hirer remains liable when the contractor then fails to exercise reasonable care to take the precautions. The words “or otherwise” carry the rule past the contract itself, so a provision for the precautions by any other means is no defense either.3 Drafting and follow-through thus protect a hirer against a § 413 claim and give no protection against a § 416 claim.
The two sections express one idea. The Restatement treats them as different formulations of the same principle: the employer remains liable for injuries resulting from dangers it should have anticipated when it entered the contract.4 Section 416 adds that a hirer cannot discharge that responsibility with a promise on paper. If delegating could end the hirer's liability, the hirer would have an enormous incentive to hire an insolvent contractor, and the injured person would be left with a claim against someone who cannot pay.5 The hirer is also well placed to prevent the harm. A principal can require precautions by agreement and penalize their omission, and enforcement costs little when the precautions are cheap to observe.6 The evident rationale is that a hirer should be aware that special precautions are necessary and should either assure that they are taken or answer when they are not.7 That is the sense in which the duty is nondelegable: the hirer may hand over the work but not the liability.
Carelessness by the contractor does not by itself bring § 416 into play, because the peculiar-risk trigger must be met first. A court deciding a logging case accepted the Restatement's suggestion that malfunctioning brakes pose an ordinary risk against which a hirer has no duty to provide. It then held that overloading a logging truck is not a peculiar risk of logging. The overload would not arise but for the contractor's negligence, can be avoided by the ordinary precaution of not overloading, and is a risk a hirer may presume a careful contractor will not create. The duty, the court said, rests solely on the contractor.8 Contractor negligence alone is not enough; what is missing in such a case is the peculiar risk.
High-voltage electrical work lies on the other side of that line. Installing electricity is not so irreducibly dangerous as to be abnormally dangerous, but it does involve unusual risk.9
Because the hirer's care drops out of the analysis, § 416 can be run as a short sequence of questions about the work, the contractor, and the harm.
Courts do not all state what the plaintiff must show in the same way. In Saiz v. Belen School Dist., the court rejected any requirement apparent from § 416 that the hirer's liability depend on the contractor's failure to exercise reasonable care. It looked instead to the presence or absence of a precaution that one with knowledge of all the circumstances would deem reasonably necessary. Whether the contractor's omission might be excused under a reasonably prudent person standard does not matter, and liability depends on neither the contractor's lack of care nor the hirer's lack of care in seeing that precautions are taken.10 A separate opinion in Pusey v. Bator, citing Saiz, frames the point differently. The hirer's liability depends not on the contractor's care in performing the work generally but on the contractor's failure to take a reasonable precaution against the special danger or peculiar risk the hirer should have recognized. The hirer in that case could be held liable only if the trier of fact found that the contractor failed to take reasonable precautions against that danger.11 The two formulations differ on one point: Saiz drops the inquiry into whether the omission was reasonable, and the separate opinion keeps it. Raise either variation when an exam names the jurisdiction or invites the argument, and treat the Restatement's requirement of a contractor's failure to use reasonable care as the baseline.
Courts also apply § 427, the related special-danger rule, alongside § 416. One court observed that § 427 is closely related to § 416 and to a considerable extent duplicates it.12 Section 427 is also the source of the phrasing the Pusey opinion uses, the contractor's failure to take reasonable precautions against the special danger, and a court has used § 416 to explain what “special danger” means, since § 416 represents a different form of the same general principle.13