Concept
Negligent Selection of a Contractor
General rule of non-liability and the employer's own negligence
Negligent Selection of a Contractor
An employer who chooses a contractor carelessly answers for its own fault. Section 411 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts makes an employer liable for physical harm to third persons caused by its failure to exercise reasonable care to employ a competent and careful contractor, and it names two settings in which that duty arises: work that will involve a risk of physical harm unless it is skillfully and carefully done, and the performance of any duty the employer owes to third persons.1
The liability is direct. Like negligent orders, negligent selection is the hirer's own fault, and it combines with the contractor's carelessness to cause a single injury. The two are concurrent wrongdoers: this is “not vicarious liability at all, but ordinary concurrent negligence.”2 Liability “stems directly from the lack of care, not vicariously from the relationship.”3 A plaintiff must therefore prove two things about the hirer: that it failed to use reasonable care in choosing, and that the failure caused the harm. Proof that the contractor worked carelessly establishes neither. Decisions frame the question as whether the employer knew or reasonably should have known that the contractor was not competent, and whether that incompetence proximately caused the injury.4
Selection matters because even a hirer that cannot supervise the details still decides whom to hire. A hirer seldom has the means to protect itself by exerting detailed control over a contractor's work,5 but it chooses the contractor. Three questions organize the rest of this section: which work triggers the duty, whose duty the contractor is performing, and how much checking reasonable care requires. A different rule governs a hirer that keeps supervisory control, such as the power to direct the order of the work or to forbid dangerous methods. That hirer may be liable if it exercises the control without reasonable care, and the exception has its own section below.6
Work Posing a Risk of Harm
Clause (a) applies to work that will involve a risk of physical harm unless it is skillfully and carefully done.7 The test looks at the work and not at the contractor's résumé. Careless excavation, demolition, or wiring can injure people outside the contract, as can plumbing that floods a neighbor's basement.8 Work that endangers no one even when badly done leaves nothing for a careless choice to cause.
As quoted in Mavrikidis v. Petullo, comment a to § 411 defines a competent and careful contractor as one who has the “knowledge, skill, experience, and available equipment” that a reasonable person would realize a contractor must have to do the work “without creating unreasonable risk of injury to others.”9 The measure is relative to the job. A first-rate finish carpenter may be an unreasonable choice for removing a load-bearing wall, so the hirer's question is whether this contractor has what this work requires. Another formulation asks the hirer to select a reasonably competent, experienced, careful, and properly equipped contractor. It adds that, where the work creates a foreseeable danger to third persons, ordinary care may extend to insisting, in the contract or otherwise, that the contractor take the necessary safety precautions, and then seeing that it does.10
The care that counts as reasonable rises with the danger of the work: “The more dangerous the activity, the more care must be taken.”11 The general negligence factors show why. The primary factors in judging whether conduct lacks reasonable care are the foreseeable likelihood of harm, its foreseeable severity, and the burden of precautions.12 For dangerous work the first two weigh heavily, while a check of licensing and past projects costs little by comparison. A homeowner who hires a plumber illustrates the point. If she fails to use reasonable care in selecting an incompetent plumber, and his botched connection floods the neighbors' basements, the neighbors probably can recover from her for her own negligence in choosing him.13
A bad result does not prove a careless choice. Judge Posner recognized that a principal may be held liable for failing to select a competent contractor, yet the principal in Hixon v. Sherwin-Williams Co. had no such failing to answer for. The contractor had a good reputation, which the principal knew. The principal did not know that the contractor lacked experience with plywood flooring, and it “had no duty to quiz him concerning the details of his experience.”14 Selection is judged by what the hirer knew or should have known when it chose, and the Hixon principal had no notice of the gap.
The store owner and the Hixon principal both hired for risky work, and in both a contractor's work caused harm. The difference lies in what a reasonable hirer would have learned: the store owner's records held the warning and went unread, while the Hixon principal's information held none.
The hirer's responsibility ends where the reason for its careless choice ends. Mavrikidis states the prevailing rule of comment b to § 411: the employer of a negligently selected contractor answers for the contractor's negligent acts that are related to the reasons why the hiring was improper.15 The opinion calls this liability vicarious, but as shown above it is the hirer's own negligence, and the label does not change the limit. Without the limit, one lapse in screening would make the hirer answerable for anything the contractor later did wrong, and the duty to choose carefully would become strict liability for the act of hiring. A parallel limit runs through the exceptions to non-liability generally. The employer's liability extends to the particular risks that give rise to the exception and excludes collateral ones, so a brick dropped on a passerby or a wall built badly falls inside it, while a negligent drive to the brickyard falls outside.16
Duties Owed to Third Persons
Clause (b) turns from the work to the duty. An employer is liable for physical harm to third persons caused by its failure to use reasonable care to employ a competent and careful contractor “to perform any duty which the employer owes to third persons.”18 Clause (a) asked what kind of work was being done; clause (b) asks whose duty is being performed. When the duty is the hirer's own, as when a possessor of land owes visitors reasonably safe premises, the hirer who hands the task to a contractor must choose that contractor with care, whether the task is cleaning a lobby or repairing an elevator.
The standard and the theory of liability match those of clause (a). The hirer must use reasonable care in selecting, scaled to the danger, and liability stems directly from the lack of that care.19 The decisions collected in Mavrikidis treat the claim as ordinary negligence.20 A plaintiff relying on clause (b) therefore proves that the hirer owed the duty, that it chose without reasonable care, and that the careless choice connects to the injury. The contractor's error supplies only the last link, and as under clause (a), the hirer answers for harm related to the reason the choice was careless.
The same direct-negligence idea appears outside construction. A majority of jurisdictions let a patient sue a hospital for negligent credentialing, meaning negligence in granting hospital privileges to independent physicians, though Kentucky has declined on public-policy grounds.21 Courts once reasoned that hospitals could not legally practice medicine and therefore could not control physicians, so some older cases denied hospitals vicarious liability even for physicians they employed. That view has changed radically but not universally.22 A credentialing claim needs none of that reasoning, because it rests on the hospital's own choice and not on its control of the physician.
Both customers were hurt by a contractor's error in the same duty-bearing setting, so the error cannot explain the different outcomes. The difference lies in the quality of each owner's selection. Elevator work may also qualify under clause (a), which would supply a second route to the same result. Clause (b) stands on its own, though, and would apply equally to a duty performed through work that carries little risk.
Clause (b) is easily confused with the doctrine of nondelegable duty. Under that doctrine the hirer answers for the contractor's negligence even when the hirer chose with care, so the liability is vicarious. The concept carries a danger if applied broadly: it could swallow the principle of non-liability for independent contractors. A homeowner who hired a professional tree service would then be vicariously liable when the service's tree trimmer dropped a limb on a neighbor's car, although she had no means to protect herself by exerting detailed control over the work.23 Clause (b) never reaches that far, because it asks only whether the hirer was careless in choosing.
A stem in which a possessor hires a contractor to carry out safety work for visitors therefore calls for two questions in order. First, did the possessor choose with reasonable care, given what it knew or should have known? That is the clause (b) inquiry. Second, and only if the first does not resolve the case, is the duty one the law treats as nondelegable? That is a vicarious-liability inquiry under a different rule. A favorable answer to the first question ends the clause (b) analysis and leaves the second open.
How Much Inquiry Is Required
Section 411 requires reasonable care in choosing a contractor, but its text does not say how much checking that takes.25 Two questions divide the cases: how deeply a hirer must probe a contractor's experience, and whether a contractor's financial weakness, such as thin insurance, makes it an incompetent choice.
Hixon gives the first question a short answer. A hirer that knows a contractor's good reputation and has no notice of a gap in its experience need not investigate further. The Hixon principal “had no duty to quiz him concerning the details of his experience,” and the commentary draws the lesson that a principal has little obligation to conduct due diligence when hiring a contractor.26
That rule fits the four attributes in comment a. They tell the hirer what to look for, and Hixon tells how deep the look must go. A hirer need not confirm knowledge, skill, experience, and equipment item by item on every job. It must act reasonably on what it knows or should know, and the care that counts as reasonable rises with the danger of the work.27
One general statement of the rule says that a person hiring a non-agent contractor does not need to inquire into the contractor's solvency or insurance coverage, or into the adequacy of its equipment or personnel.28 That statement sits beside comment a, which counts available equipment among the marks of competence, and beside the formulation that asks for a properly equipped contractor.29 The two fit together if “in general” marks a default. Absent warning signs, a hirer need not audit equipment or personnel, but where the work is dangerous or the hirer knows of a deficiency, reasonable care includes acting on it.
Warning signs like these move a hirer from reliance on reputation to a duty to investigate or refuse, and they are what the Hixon principal lacked.
Financial weakness is the harder question. Whether hiring a financially irresponsible contractor, one without adequate insurance for example, is tantamount to hiring an incompetent one is the subject of considerable dispute.30 Comment a's definition of competence speaks of knowledge, skill, experience, and equipment and does not mention money, which gives opponents of liability a textual argument.
Becker v. Interstate Properties was a diversity case applying New Jersey law, and it treated a financially incompetent contractor as falling within the incompetent-contractor exception. Dicta in an older New Jersey Supreme Court opinion, Majestic Realty Associates v. Toti Contracting Co., had pointed the same way.31
The extension did not hold. After Becker, two intermediate New Jersey appellate courts rejected the Majestic Realty dicta and declined to extend the exception to financial incompetence. A later Third Circuit opinion, Robinson v. Jiffy Executive Limousine Co., rejected Becker's reading. Under Becker, the court said, anyone who contracted for transportation service, from taxis, buses, and limousines to movers and delivery services, would have to make a diligent and continuing inquiry into the contractor's financial qualifications. Such a duty would be “unprecedented” and would impose “prohibitive obligations” on employers of independent contractors beyond what the court was prepared to predict the New Jersey Supreme Court would adopt.32
A commentator suggests that both Third Circuit opinions may have erred in seeking a hard-and-fast rule. Case-by-case analysis has appeal because a principal can sometimes confirm adequate insurance and a good credit rating at low cost, and given the ready availability of credit data, it is probably easier to investigate a contractor's finances than its competence. A hard-and-fast rule, on the other hand, has the advantage of certainty.33
Because the scope of the inquiry is a negligence question, a hirer problem turns on what the hirer knew or should have learned, how much harm careless performance could do, and how cheaply the hirer could have found out. A reputable contractor and no warning sign point to Hixon and no breach. A known red flag about skill, safety record, or equipment points toward breach. When a stem raises only the contractor's thin insurance or lack of assets, the better answer says that authority divides, develops both lines of reasoning, and lets the governing jurisdiction decide.
Taken together, the three parts of this section yield a sequence for testing a selection claim:
The third step decides most cases, because a plaintiff can usually show after the accident that the contractor was unqualified, while the claim turns on what the hirer could have discovered at the time of hiring. A student who sees that the contractor's act was the immediate cause of the injury may reach for vicarious liability. The better move is to ask what the hirer itself did and whether that conduct was careless and connected to the harm.