Concept
Related Grounds of Liability
Liability for harm caused by another: directing, permitting, ratifying, and agents' conduct
Related Grounds of Liability
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 877 lists five ways to become liable for harm to a third person caused by another's tortious conduct,1 and each finds the defendant's fault in what he did toward the actor. He ordered or induced the conduct;2 he was negligent in employing the actor to aid an activity;3 he let the actor use his premises or instrumentalities, knowing or having reason to know that the actor was or would be acting tortiously;4 he failed to use care in controlling an actor likely to do harm if not controlled;5 or he confided a protective duty to an actor who then failed to perform it.6 Every clause looks to the defendant's dealings with the actor at or before the harm.
Two further grounds fall outside the list. Ratification looks backward: a defendant who did nothing to bring about the act may still answer for it if, after learning of it, he adopts it as his own. Concert and substantial assistance, found in the neighboring § 876, looks to what the defendant does while the tort is under way, when he joins the actor's venture or knowingly helps it along. Neither is a sixth clause of § 877, so an answer that relies on either should name it and meet the requirements that belong to it. Those requirements keep liability from reaching a defendant whose connection to the wrong was too thin to count as fault.
Ratification and Adoption
Ratification does not appear among the five grounds of § 877,7 because every clause there locates the defendant's fault in something done before or while the harm occurred. The common law nonetheless reaches a defendant whose connection begins afterward. In Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, the California Supreme Court quoted Prosser for the rule that those who "ratify and adopt [the wrongdoer's] acts done for their benefit" are equally liable with him.8 Agency law draws the same line for principals. A principal is generally not vicariously liable for the torts of an agent who is not an employee, because such an agent is not part of the principal's enterprise, but the principal is personally liable if he commanded, authorized, or ratified the tortious act.9 Liability then rests on what the principal himself did, so it does not depend on employment or on scope of employment.
To ratify is to confirm an act after it is done, and the plainest way for a principal to do so is to keep what the act produced. Ordering and inducing, the ground in § 877(a), look forward from the defendant's words to the act, so the defendant is part of the reason the act happens.10 Ratification looks backward. The act is finished before the principal does anything, so nothing he does afterward caused it, and liability needs another reason: adoption puts the principal in the position of one who gave the order. If a principal could take the gains of an agent's wrong and disown the wrong in the same breath, he could wait to see whether it pays, keep the profit if it does, and blame the agent if it does not. Treating knowing acceptance of the benefit as adoption closes that option and puts the cost of the wrong on the person who chose to take its fruits.
Adoption also requires that the principal know of the act, because no one can take as his own an act he has not learned of. A parallel rule governs imputed knowledge. When an agent acts adversely to the principal, the agent's knowledge is still imputed to a principal who has ratified or knowingly retained a benefit from the agent's action.11 That rule concerns notice and not tort liability, but it too treats knowing retention of a benefit as adoption.
An employer's response to an employee's misconduct can raise the same issue. Failure to discipline or discharge an employee who has committed a serious wrong can amount to ratification of the tort.12 One California decision, C.R. v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., a sexual harassment case, describes liability on that basis as an alternative to respondeat superior.13 The alternative helps most when the tort looks personal to the employee and the scope-of-employment requirement is hard to meet, because the employer's own reaction to the wrong then becomes the question.
Ratification also appears in the law of punitive damages, where it marks one of the routes by which an employer answers for an employee's wrong. Jurisdictions differ on when a principal answers in punitive damages for an agent's tort.15 Some courts allow punitive liability only for a party's own conduct, others hold the principal liable whenever the agent's act would support an award against the agent, and most take the middle position of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 909.16 Under that majority position, a principal, whether an individual or a corporation, is liable in punitive damages for an agent's act only if one of three grounds is present:
- the principal authorized or ratified the act;
- the principal was reckless in employing or retaining an unfit agent; or
- the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting within the scope of employment.
The restriction follows from what punitive damages are for. Vicarious liability exists largely to give an injured plaintiff a financially responsible defendant,17 and compensatory damages through respondeat superior serve that end. Punitive damages serve punishment and deterrence, and an employer that committed no wrong, or at worst was negligent, has done nothing for retribution to reach. Deterrence likewise requires a wrong that could be deterred, and compensatory damages are ordinarily adequate to deter negligence.18 Each of the three grounds supplies the missing wrong. An employer that authorized or ratified the act chose the conduct or adopted it, one that recklessly kept an unfit agent chose the risk, and a manager's act is attributed to the organization that selected and supervised that manager. The commentary to § 909 ties the last two grounds to incentives: encouraging diligence in selecting and supervising those placed in management and deterring the employment of unfit persons for important positions.19
The managerial ground is the least settled, and maritime law shows why. Admiralty has long allowed punitive damages for deliberate wrongdoing, meaning willful, wanton, grossly negligent, or unconscionable conduct that shows callous disregard for the rights of others,20 so the question of when a shipowner answers for its crew's conduct matters. Courts applying the Restatement formulation have asked whether the wrongdoer was a managerial employee, and the master of a vessel traditionally was not treated as one. Some courts now hold that the term covers any employee delegated supervisory authority who is responsible for managing several others, and they have applied it to a dock foreman, the captain of an oil tanker, and a shipmaster, reasoning that modern communications and conditions make those in charge of a vessel managers.21 The dispute reached the Supreme Court in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, where the Court deadlocked 4-4 on whether the owner was vicariously liable for the tanker captain's conduct. The Ninth Circuit's decision imposing liability therefore stood, and the correct rule remains uncertain.22 Because the split turns on whether a court looks to the wrongdoer's title or to the supervisory authority actually delegated, an answer should identify what authority the actor held before applying the label.
Other jurisdictions confine the doctrine further. Florida requires that the principal actively and knowingly participated in the misconduct or knowingly condoned, ratified, or consented to it, and a few states prohibit vicarious punitive liability altogether.23 The requirements also vary with the claim. In Kolstad v. American Dental Association, the Supreme Court held that punitive damages for employment discrimination are unavailable when managerial agents make employment decisions contrary to the employer's good-faith efforts to comply with Title VII.24
Concert and Substantial Assistance
Section 876, the neighbor of § 877, opens with the same stem but places the defendant's fault elsewhere. As the California Supreme Court set it out in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, one is subject to liability for harm to a third person from another's tortious conduct if he (a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to a common design with him, (b) knows that the other's conduct is a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself, or (c) gives substantial assistance in accomplishing a tortious result and his own conduct, separately considered, is a breach of duty to the third person.26 The three routes are concert, knowing assistance, and assistance joined to the assister's own breach. The clauses of § 877 locate fault in what the defendant did toward the actor before the harm: he ordered the act, chose or kept the actor carelessly, lent the premises, held the reins loosely, or passed along a protective duty.27 Section 876 reaches a defendant who joined the wrong, or helped it along, while it was being done.
The two sections also differ in what the plaintiff must show about the defendant's state of mind. A § 877 defendant may never touch the instrument of harm and may be miles away when it happens, while a § 876 defendant is a participant, either part of the venture or the source of help that carries the wrong forward. Section 877(a) is satisfied by a defendant who knows or should know of circumstances that would make the conduct tortious if it were his own, whereas § 876(b) asks whether the defendant actually knows that the other's conduct breaches a duty.28 The assistance branch has no should-know standard, and the reason appears below.
The first route treats the participants in a joint wrongful venture as answerable for one another's acts. Conspirators, partners, joint enterprisers, and others who act in concert are liable for each other's acts committed as part of their agreed-upon activity, so the result resembles vicarious liability even though it rests on agreement and participation and not on employment.29 Each participant has taken the group's conduct as a means to a shared end. The person who keeps watch and the person who strikes are carrying out one plan, and each makes the other's part easier to perform, so neither can fairly say the blow was someone else's. No express agreement is required. The California court quoted Prosser for the proposition that a tacit understanding is enough,30 a rule that fits how wrongs are planned, since people who plan one seldom announce it.
A tacit understanding is still an understanding, and that requirement separates concert from coincidence. The plaintiff in Sindell alleged that drug manufacturers had collaborated in, relied upon, acquiesced in, and adopted one another's testing, marketing methods, and lack of warnings, and she characterized those allegations as a tacit understanding to commit a tortious act against her.31 The court held there was no concert of action. The complaint did not allege that each defendant knew the others' conduct was tortious toward the plaintiff and that they assisted and encouraged one another, and the court doubted that concert could rest on assistance given pursuant to a tacit understanding to fail to perform an act.32 Alleging that defendants adopted one another's practices did not supply the knowledge and mutual assistance the doctrine demands.
Simultaneous negligence by two people is not concert either, and Summers v. Tice marks the line. Two members of a hunting party negligently fired in the plaintiff's direction at the same time, and a shot from one gun struck the plaintiff, with no satisfactory evidence of which gun it was.33 The California court's reason was that both defendants were wrongdoers who had put the plaintiff in the position of being unable to say which one hurt him, so each had to absolve himself if he could.34 That rule shifts the burden of proof on causation and requires no understanding between the hunters, so the case belongs to the law of causation and not to § 876(a). A defendant answers under § 876 for another's act because of what he shared in or contributed to it, whereas the hunters in Summers answered for their own negligence in a setting where proof of causation was impossible.
The second and third routes explain how a hunter who did not fire the fatal shot can still answer for it. As the Sindell court described Orser v. George, three hunters shot at a mudhen in the direction of the decedent. Two fired alternately with the gun that released the fatal bullet, and the third, using a different gun, fired alternately at the same target along the same line of fire. Summary judgment for the third hunter was reversed because it was possible that he knew the others' conduct was tortious toward the decedent and gave them substantial assistance and encouragement, and also possible that his own conduct, separately considered, breached a duty to the decedent.35 Those two possibilities track § 876(b) and § 876(c), and the reversal left what he knew and how much help he gave to the fact finder. Sindell saw Orser as resembling Agovino v. Kunze, in which liability was imposed on a participant in a drag race, and not the drug-manufacturer allegations before it.36
Each element of § 876(b) has its own job. Knowledge that the other's conduct is a breach of duty converts help into participation, because assisting is ordinarily innocent: people lend tools, sell supplies, and keep books for customers who sometimes turn out to be wrongdoers. If no knowledge were required, every such helper would answer for whatever wrong he unwittingly made possible, and ordinary services would carry the risk of every customer's misconduct. The substantiality requirement works from the other side. Help that is incidental to the wrong does not make the helper a contributor to it, and the Orser reversal left the question of how substantial the third hunter's help was to the fact finder.37
Section 876(c) drops the requirement that the helper know the other's conduct is tortious and substitutes a different safeguard: the helper's own conduct, separately considered, must breach a duty owed to the third person. The defendant must therefore have committed a wrong of his own toward the plaintiff, and his substantial assistance then ties that wrong to the harm the other caused. This is the possibility the court left open for the third hunter in Orser, whose own shots at the same target along the same line of fire might themselves have breached a duty to the decedent.38
All three routes presuppose that the person being helped has committed a tort, because the liability is for harm resulting from the tortious conduct of another. Custodial interference shows how that requirement operates. Most courts allow a custodial parent to sue family members who aid and abet another family member's kidnapping of a child. Some authority reasoned that a third person who helps a joint-custody father hide the children cannot be aiding a tort if it would be no tort for the father to do the same things alone.39 More recent decisions generally support claims against those who help a joint-custody parent abduct a child, because joint custody means that neither parent may act as the sole custodian, so the abduction is itself tortious and there is a tort to assist.40 The helper's liability therefore stands or falls with the character of the assisted conduct.
Courts have applied the assistance branch cautiously, and the Supreme Court said so in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A. The Court described the § 876(b) doctrine as at best uncertain in application.41 Quoting the court of appeals in Halberstam v. Welch, it noted that the leading cases were statutory securities cases and that the common-law precedents were "largely confined to isolated acts of adolescents in rural society"; in some states it was still unclear whether aiding-and-abetting tort liability of the kind in § 876(b) existed at all.42 The caution has an evident source. The rules for deciding who counts as an assister are unclear, and open-ended secondary liability can fall on those who supply ordinary services to a customer who later proves to be a wrongdoer, so courts that recognize the tort hold it to its knowledge and substantiality requirements.
The holding in that case answered a question of statutory construction. The plaintiffs sued a bank only as an aider and abettor of a securities fraud under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act, and they conceded that the bank had committed no manipulative or deceptive act of its own.43 The Court held that a private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and abetting suit under § 10(b), because the statute prohibits only the making of a material misstatement or omission or the commission of a manipulative act, and giving aid to a person who does so falls outside that text.44 It reasoned that Congress knew how to impose aiding and abetting liability when it chose to, as in the general criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2, and in a civil provision of the Packers and Stockyards Act, and that extending liability beyond the conduct the text prohibits departs from settled methodology under § 10(b).45 The Court also declined to infer a private civil action from the criminal aiding and abetting statute alone.46 It acknowledged that aiding and abetting a wrongdoer ought to be actionable in certain instances, citing § 876(b), and framed the issue as whether the statute covers aiders and abettors, which is a different question from whether civil liability for them is good policy.47 Lawyers, accountants, and banks remain liable as primary violators when they themselves make a material misstatement or employ a manipulative device on which a buyer or seller relies.48
Placed beside Orser, the two decisions do not conflict. Orser asked whether, under the common law of torts, a hunter who did not fire the fatal shot could answer for the others' negligence, and the answer turned on his knowledge and his assistance. Central Bank asked whether a federal statute's prohibition on deceptive devices extends to someone who only helps another use one, and the answer turned on the statutory text. The bank escaped liability under § 10(b) for that reason, and the decision leaves the common-law question to tort law. A state tort claim for knowing assistance still depends on § 876 and on whether the jurisdiction recognizes the tort, and § 876(b) cannot supply what § 10(b) omits in a federal securities suit.
The second step does the sorting between participants and bystanders. A shared plan, even an unspoken one, makes the group's acts each member's own, while parallel behavior leaves each actor answerable only for what that actor did.