Concept
Direct Versus Vicarious Liability
Liability for harm caused by another: directing, permitting, ratifying, and agents' conduct
Liability for Another's Tortious Conduct
Direct Versus Vicarious Liability
A business that delegates work to an agent must ask when it answers for what the agent does.1 Tort law gives two kinds of answer, and the difference governs every ground discussed in this section. One makes the defendant liable because of a relationship. The other makes the defendant liable because of the defendant’s own fault.
Vicarious liability is the first kind. Its principal example is respondeat superior (“let the superior answer”), under which an employer is liable in some circumstances for the torts an employee commits.2 The doctrine has two requirements: the worker must be the employer’s employee, and the tort must fall within the scope of employment.3 Scope marks where the doctrine ends. An employer answers for torts committed on a “mere” detour but not for those committed while the employee is on a “frolic” of his own, because the employer’s capacity to control the employee, and with it the case for strict liability, diminishes as the conduct strays.4 Neither requirement asks whether the employer did anything wrong. Nor does the doctrine release the employee, who stays liable; respondeat superior adds the employer as a second defendant. Because employees as a group are more likely than employers to be judgment-proof, the loss-distribution function of strict liability helps explain the rule.5
Direct liability, the second kind, turns on what the defendant did rather than on who the actor was. An employer whose employee commits a tort may be liable in its own right for negligence in hiring or supervising the employee.6 A business that hires a truck driver with a record of drunk driving, then smells bourbon on him one day and lets him drive anyway, answers along with the driver for its own negligence, and that is not vicarious liability at all.7 A principal likewise answers personally when it commanded, authorized, or ratified an agent’s tortious act, or when it was negligent in selecting, instructing, controlling, or supervising the agent. The agent, for his part, remains personally liable for acts within the scope of the agency.8
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 877 gathers the fault-based grounds under a single stem: “For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he” does one of five things.9 The grounds, taken up in turn below, are ordering or inducing the conduct; negligently employing the other actor; letting the other actor use one’s premises or instrumentalities when one knows or has reason to know the other is acting or will act tortiously; failing to exercise care in controlling the other actor; and confiding to the other actor a duty to protect third persons. The stem has three features worth fixing in mind. The harm must result from someone else’s conduct, so the defendant did not personally inflict the injury. That conduct must itself be tortious. And the stem never mentions employment: each ground asks how the defendant stood toward the actor, not whether the actor worked for the defendant.
A second track is needed because vicarious liability stops where control stops. Agency alone is not enough. A homeowner who lists her house with a broker is the broker’s principal, yet she is not liable when the broker negligently drives a prospective buyer to the house. She has no control over the manner and means of the driving, cannot make it safer by exercising control, and the cost of careless driving belongs on the broker’s business.10 Independent contractors present the same problem in larger form. Employers generally are not liable for a contractor’s torts, even those arising from the work done for the employer (Restatement (Second) of Torts § 409), and owners sometimes hire contractors rather than employees simply to insulate themselves. The contractor knows he is assuming the liability and builds the cost of insuring against it into the price of the work.11 The rule of nonliability has nonetheless been ravaged by exceptions, to the point that it is “now primarily important as a preamble to the catalog of its exceptions.” Those in §§ 410–415 rest on the hirer’s own fault, so they belong to the direct-liability track even though they limit the contractor rule.12 Contract cannot always buy the insulation, either: a party cannot contract away liability for failing to comply with a duty that a safety statute imposes.13
Agency law draws the same line. The Restatement (Second) of Agency, as the Court reviewed it in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, provides that a master is not liable for the torts of servants acting outside the scope of employment unless, among other exceptions, the master intended the conduct or the consequences, was negligent or reckless, or violated a non-delegable duty.14 The first two exceptions turn on the master’s own intent and care. The third turns on a duty the master cannot hand off to anyone else.