Concept
Other Routes to Liability
Duty to control the conduct of another: parent and child
Other Routes to Liability
Section 316 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts supplies the standard route against a parent: a duty to use reasonable care to control a minor child so as to keep the child from intentionally harming others or from creating an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them.1 The duty attaches only if the parent knows or has reason to know that he can control the child,2 and knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising that control.3 A § 316 claim therefore centers on an omission: the parent failed to restrain a child whose dangerous tendencies the parent knew or should have known about.
Two other routes place the parent's fault elsewhere. The common law does not hold a parent answerable merely because the wrongdoer is the parent's child, so every successful claim needs a source of responsibility independent of the relationship.4 On the first route, that source is the parent's own act of putting something dangerous within the child's reach. On the second, it is a legislature's decision to make parents responsible for a defined harm. A plaintiff who cannot prove the notice that § 316 requires may still have a claim on either route.
The first question on any parent-liability problem is what the parent did or failed to do. A child who injures someone and a parent who could have done more invite the answer "§ 316," but the facts may point elsewhere, as when a loaded firearm sits where the child can find it. Each route below has its own elements.
Dangerous Instrumentalities
Section 316 faults a parent for failing to restrain a child whose tendency toward the harm the parent knew or should have known about.5 A second route moves the fault earlier, to what the parent put within the child's reach. The Georgia decisions gathered in Boston v. Athearn recognize both routes: parents may be liable when they have entrusted a dangerous instrumentality to their children, and when they have failed to restrain children they know to have dangerous tendencies.6 An instrumentality is an object or device that a person can use to do harm, and entrustment is the handing over, or leaving available, of such an object for someone else's use.
The two routes demand different proof because they locate the fault differently. Under § 316 the fault is an omission, so the plaintiff must prove what the parent knew. Under entrustment the fault is an act. A person who entrusts another with a dangerous instrument under circumstances he has reason to know are likely to produce injury is liable for the consequences, and recovery against a parent is permitted where, through the parent's negligence, a child is allowed access to an instrumentality that is foreseeably likely to injure a third person if not properly used.7 The question becomes whether the parent acted reasonably in allowing access, given what the object can do. For an instrument that is dangerous in itself, the object supplies the reason to anticipate harm, so the plaintiff needs no history of misconduct by the child. The parent also controls who has the object, which is why the law asks what the parent did with it.
The rule stops at objects that do not carry that danger. Handing a child an ordinary object is not itself negligent, and the plaintiff is left with the propensity route. There the decisions state the standard as whether the parent knew of the child's proclivity or propensity for the specific dangerous activity that caused the injury, and they deny recovery where the parent knew of no dangerous proclivity and had no reason to anticipate the injury that occurred.8 The wording is not uniform, because some opinions state the propensity standard even for claims framed around access to an instrumentality. Classify the object first: the less dangerous the object in proper use, the more the plaintiff must rely on what the parent knew about the child.9
Danielle A. v. Christopher P. shows the act-based fault at work. The parents knew their thirteen-year-old shot a paintball gun from a roof, permitted it, and helped him buy ammunition; when he hit a neighbor child in the eye, they were liable for negligently entrusting a dangerous instrument to him.10 The fault lay in the parents' own decision to permit and equip the activity. A parent who negligently leaves firearms within a child's reach, or hands the child a weapon, raises the same kind of question about the parent's own act, and that question differs from the § 316 inquiry.11 Courts have applied the same reasoning to vehicles, as with the car entrusted to an unlicensed fifteen-year-old in Ardinger v. Hummell.12
The same eye injury therefore lands in different doctrines depending on the object. A paintball gun makes the handing-over the fault, while a tennis ball sends the plaintiff to the propensity route, where the parent's knowledge of the specific tendency does the work. The object usually decides which route a stem is testing. Ask first whether the child was given or left with something likely to cause serious injury if misused, such as a gun, a vehicle, or a paintball gun. If so, the question is whether the parent acted reasonably in allowing that access, and the child's record carries less weight. If the object was ordinary, the analysis returns to § 316 and the specific-propensity notice taught above, followed by opportunity and a reasonable response.
Statutory Parental Liability
The common law holds a parent liable for a child's tort only on proof of the parent's own fault, and a legislature can replace that requirement for particular harms. Weisbart v. Flohr shows both rules in one opinion. The court reversed the judgment for the minor defendant, who had seriously and permanently injured a little girl, but upheld the jury's verdict for his parents under the general rule.14 That rule requires evidence that the parents, as reasonable persons, previously became aware of habits or tendencies that made misbehavior likely, so that they had a duty to restrain the child from using the implements in question.15 The court set that rule against two others of a different kind. Under French law, parents are financially responsible for damage their infant children cause in circumstances like those before the court, and the legislature of the court's own state had adopted a similar rule for damage to school property.16
A statute is needed to reach that result because of what the common-law elements do. Ability to control, notice of the need, and an opportunity to act are the facts that make a child's injury the parent's own doing, so a court applying the common law cannot dispense with them without abandoning the principle that a parent answers for the parent's own fault.17 A legislature faces no such constraint. It can single out a category of harm, such as damage to school property, and make parents responsible for it directly, so that the injured party never has to prove what the parent knew or could have done. The statute then governs on its own terms: its text sets the conditions for liability, and those conditions replace the § 316 conditions for the harm the statute covers. The opinion describes only the subject matter of the state's rule, so a problem that turns on a statute's details will state them, and an answer should not assume that a statute aimed at one kind of harm reaches another.
The Flohr case falls on both sides of that boundary. The injury there was to a child, which the school-property rule did not cover, so the court tested the parents under the fault-based rule and the verdict for them stood. Had the child damaged school property instead, the statute would have been the starting point, and the parents' ignorance of any propensity would not by itself have settled the claim.
The order of analysis follows. Identify the kind of harm and look for a statute covering it before running the § 316 analysis. A stem that mentions a statute aimed at a particular harm signals that the common-law elements may be beside the point for that harm, while a stem that mentions none leaves the fault-based analysis in place.