Concept
Reasonable Parental Response
Duty to control the conduct of another: parent and child
Reasonable Parental Response
Ability, notice, and opportunity establish the parent's duty; they do not establish that the parent breached it. Section 316 asks for reasonable care in controlling the child, so the remaining question is whether this parent did what a reasonably prudent parent would have done with what the parent knew.1
Courts state the breach step in two ways. One insists that the mere fact that the parents failed to control the child is insufficient to prove negligence; they must have failed to act as reasonably prudent parents based on notice of the child's propensity to do harm.2 Another puts “the true test” in two parts: whether the facts raised a duty to anticipate that, without parental supervision, a particular type of injury to another would result, and whether the parent then exercised reasonable care to control and supervise the child to prevent it.3 The second part is breach. It measures the parent's care, not the child's later conduct, because the duty promises care and not results. A child who hurts someone despite sensible parental steps shows only that the steps failed.
Ross v. Souter, which the Alaska Supreme Court discussed in Dinsmore-Poff, shows what a reasonable response looks like. The parents knew their boy tended to fight before his punch ruined another student's orthodontia, and the court affirmed dismissal of the suit against them.4 The principal had testified that the boy's mother helped discipline him for fighting, reprimanded him in the principal's office, and sincerely tried to get him to stop. That was adequate evidence of a reasonable effort to correct or restrain him.5 From cases like it the Alaska court drew a general lesson: a good-faith attempt to correct misconduct as it occurs is enough, and the cases do not call for a searching inquiry into alternative disciplinary regimes.6 A plaintiff therefore cannot carry the breach element by pointing out that the child offended again, or by arguing that stricter punishment or a different program would have worked better. The Alvords, the parents in Dinsmore-Poff, had cooperated actively with their son's probation, enforced household rules he fought, and placed him in the many programs and facilities his mother diligently found. The court said no one could possibly describe them as having done nothing.7
Liability cases tend to fall on the other side of that line. One court, quoting an American Law Reports annotation, stated the rule this way: a parent incurs liability for a child's intentional violence or damage if, knowing of the child's vicious or destructive tendencies or acts, the parent fails to exercise reasonable measures to restrain or discipline the child and thus encourages or acquiesces in the misconduct.8 Dinsmore-Poff surveyed the decisions that affirmed liability or reversed nonsuits on the evidence. Two involved a failure to do anything about recent misconduct, and two involved a failure to control very young children misbehaving in a custodian's immediate presence.9
What counts as a reasonable response also depends on the child. Dinsmore-Poff distinguished Marx, which found a jury question on whether parental efforts to correct a child's violent misconduct had been reasonable and relied partly on the fact that the misconduct continued after those efforts. The Alaska court called Marx readily distinguishable because it involved a young boy and relatively minor, childish misconduct. Making a nine-year-old stop throwing rocks, the court observed, is a much less daunting task than keeping a seventeen-year-old from secretly carrying and using a stolen gun.10 The court treated that difference as a reason not to extend Marx to the Alvords' case, which shows that the child's age and the seriousness of the conduct shape what a court may expect of the parent.
Breach in these cases weighs what the parent did against what the parent knew, and no single fact settles it. Steigman v. Outrigger Enterprises, a premises case, shows the same preference for weighing over bright-line rules in another setting. The Hawaii court held that the known or obvious danger defense is no longer a complete defense and that known or obvious characteristics of the danger belong in the larger comparative negligence analysis, because an all-or-nothing rule was inconsistent with the legislature's adoption of comparative negligence.11 On an exam, therefore, do not stop at the fact that the child offended again. Ask what the parent actually did after learning of the propensity, whether that response fit the child's age and the seriousness of the conduct, and whether it came when the misconduct occurred. A genuine, timely, proportionate effort is the kind of response courts have treated as reasonable, and no response at all is not.