Concept
Ability to Control the Child
Duty to control the conduct of another: parent and child
Ability to Control the Child
A parent owes a duty to control his child only if he knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to do so.1 That is the first of § 316's conditions, and it asks a narrow question about the parent's own power: could this parent, with this child, actually have directed the child's conduct? The duty goes no further than the answer. As courts quote the Restatement's commentary, the parent's duty is only to exercise such ability to control the child as he in fact has at the time he has the opportunity to exercise it and knows the necessity of doing so.2 One court, though unwilling to adopt the Restatement's version of parental liability, found it helpful and summarized it in two parts: the parent must actually be capable of controlling the child, and must also be aware of a specific need to do so.3 This section takes up the first part. The next takes up the second.
A duty to control another person presupposes the power to do the controlling. A rule that ignored that limit would make parents insurers of their children's conduct, and they are not insurers. They can be held liable for their omissions when they fail to exercise a reasonable degree of supervision.4 The ability element keeps that supervision tied to what the parent could actually do. Age changes the answer in both directions. A young child's dependence puts the parent in real command, and an older child's growing independence takes it away.
At the young end of the scale, ability is seldom in doubt. The commentary observes that the very youth of a child is likely to give the parent more effective ability to control the child's actions, and to make exercising that ability necessary more often.5 A toddler depends on the parent for where he goes and what he can reach, so the parent controls the child's surroundings as well as the child. The expectation is that the parent will keep the child in hand, and no one would think it reasonable for a parent to knowingly permit a toddler to wander the streets at will.6
As the child matures, the expected degree of supervision lessens but does not cease. Parents are still expected to see that their children attend school, obey statutory curfews, and stay out of trouble.7 Older children, however, can be more dangerous and are harder to control, and courts have shown a strong disinclination to impose liability for their conduct.8
Dinsmore-Poff v. Alvord shows both halves of the age principle at work. The court noted that stopping a nine-year-old from throwing rocks is a much less daunting task than controlling a near-adult. Youth gives parents more effective ability to control, and the corollary is that near-adult children are harder to control.9
The same case also shows what the element does not require. Parents need not be physically present for liability to attach. Section 316 requires them to exercise the ability to control that they have at the time of the tort, and only when they should know of a specific need and opportunity to act. That moment need not be the precise instant of the tort.10
At the far end of the scale, the element usually defeats the claim. A parent of a dangerous adult child is unlikely to be held responsible for the child's misconduct unless some unusual element of control is present, and financial support alone is probably insufficient.11 The reason follows from the premise of the duty. A parent's authority over a minor supports a duty to direct the minor's conduct, but a parent who merely pays an adult son's bills has a relationship with him and no right to direct how he lives.
An added fact that supplies control changes the analysis. In Courtney v. Courtney, a mother who gave her grown, married son drugs and alcohol, knowing they made him violent, was held subject to liability to his abused wife.12 By supplying the substances that triggered the violence, she exercised the kind of control that distinguishes her from a parent who only supports an adult child. The control came from her conduct, not from parenthood.