Concept
No Duty to Control Others
Duty to control the conduct of another: parent and child
Parental Duty to Control Children
No Duty to Control Others
A bystander who sees one person about to hurt another usually owes the victim nothing. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315 states that rule and its exceptions. There is no duty to control a third person's conduct so as to prevent physical harm to another unless (a) a special relation between the actor and the third person imposes a duty to control that person, or (b) a special relation between the actor and the victim gives the victim a right to protection.1 Every question in this chapter starts from that baseline, because a parent's duty to control a child is one of its exceptions.
The California Supreme Court described the same structure in Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California. When avoiding a foreseeable harm requires a defendant to control another person, or to warn of that person's conduct, the common law has traditionally imposed liability only if the defendant bears a special relationship to the dangerous person or to the potential victim.2 The pleadings in Tarasoff asserted no special relation between the therapists and Tatiana, the potential victim. They did establish the relation between a patient and his doctor or psychotherapist as between the therapists and Poddar, and the court held that such a relationship may support affirmative duties for the benefit of third persons. Because that relationship met the requirement, the court did not decide whether foreseeability alone would create a duty.3
The baseline rests on a distinction the common law has long drawn between creating a risk of harm and merely failing to prevent it. The Third Restatement states the general principle that an actor has a duty of reasonable care when the actor's conduct creates a risk of physical harm to others. Section 37 supplies the complement: there is no duty of care when another is at risk for reasons other than the actor's conduct, even though the actor may be in a position to help. Like any no-duty rule, it ends the inquiry before negligence is considered, because without a duty the actor cannot be held liable.4 Consider a passenger who realizes the driver is dangerously intoxicated and says nothing. The passenger did not create the risk to the pedestrian the driver later strikes, and has no special relation to either the driver or the pedestrian. Under § 315, the passenger owes no duty to try to control the driver.
The two exceptions in § 315 give the special relationships two directions. Under (b), the defendant's relation runs to the victim. Under (a), it runs to the dangerous person, and that is where the parent's duty sits. One category of special-relationship exceptions imposes a duty to control one person to prevent that person from injuring others. It includes the duty of a parent to control a child in certain circumstances (§ 316) and the duty of an employer to control an employee (§ 317), and the Restatement imposes a similar duty on one who takes charge of another with “dangerous propensities.”5 The parent's duty is therefore an application of the exception, not a freestanding rule of parental liability.
Section 316 states the duty. A parent must exercise reasonable care so to control a minor child as to prevent the child from intentionally harming others, or from so conducting itself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them.6 Two conditions limit it. The parent must know or have reason to know that he has the ability to control the child,7 and must know or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising that control.8 Parental status alone does not trigger the duty, since ability, notice, and opportunity must all be present. The sections that follow take those conditions one at a time.
Finding a duty settles only the threshold question, and other doctrines then shape the claim. One Hawaii court, for example, has held in a premises case that a plaintiff's known or obvious danger is no longer a complete defense but a factor in the comparative negligence analysis.9