Concept
Negligent Entrustment
Direct negligence in using or permitting an incompetent agent, and the employer's duty to the employee
Negligent Entrustment
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 308 makes it negligence to permit a third person to use a thing, or to engage in an activity, that is under the actor's control, if the actor knows or should know that the person intends or is likely to use the thing, or to conduct himself in the activity, in a way that creates an unreasonable risk of harm to others.1 Because the section reaches activities as well as objects, it covers an actor who hands over a physical thing and an actor who lets another carry on an undertaking that only the actor can authorize.
Section 308 is the entrustment counterpart of the incompetent-agent rule in the preceding section, and the two divide by who does the using. Under § 307, the actor itself puts the unfit instrumentality to work, as when an employer sends out a driver it knows to be unsafe.2 Under § 308 the actor stays out of the use and lets someone else make it. Fault stays with the actor all the same, because the third person can act only if the actor consents, and a refusal is the simplest way to prevent the harm.
Two conditions keep the liability tied to that fault. Control confines the duty to people in a position to say no; knowledge confines it to people who could see the danger before it arrived. The cases therefore ask whether the defendant controlled the use of the thing or activity and whether the defendant knew or had reason to know that the user was unfit. The claim rests on the supplier's own negligence in supplying, which places it with the other direct theories in this chapter: the user's carelessness is never imputed to the supplier, so a plaintiff must prove the supplier's own failure of care even though someone else inflicted the harm. Control comes first.
Control of the Thing or Activity
Section 308 reaches only a thing or activity "which is under the control of the actor," so every entrustment case begins by asking whether the defendant held that control.3 The condition does real work because the wrong is the act of permitting, and a defendant who could not decide whether the third person used the thing has permitted nothing. The same question governs activities: the actor must be able to decide whether the third person may undertake them. Most courts accordingly require the ability to control the chattel rather than mere ownership, in line with § 308.4 The usual authorities for that reading include Tissicino v. Peterson, an Arizona Court of Appeals decision that cites cases from many jurisdictions, and DeWester v. Watkins, from Nebraska.5
The reason lies in what a § 308 duty asks of a defendant, which is a refusal. The defendant must withhold the keys, decline the request, or shut the activity down, and only someone able to refuse can do any of those things. A person who holds the keys, or the right to exclude others from the thing, can prevent a dangerous use by withholding access, and that is the cheapest point at which to stop the harm. An owner on paper who cannot affect who uses the item can prevent nothing. A duty laid on that owner would impose liability for holding title, which contributes nothing to the harm, and would cut the tort loose from the fault that justifies it. Placing the duty where the power to avert the harm actually sits solves the problem, and the tie runs in both directions: ownership does not guarantee control, and a person who owns nothing can still have it.
The reverse direction appears in Ransom v. City of Garden City. An officer there arrested a car's owner and took the keys, and the court held that the officer was then under a duty not to make the keys available to other dangerous drivers.6 The officer owned no part of the car, which belonged to the arrestee. He held the keys, so he alone decided who could get behind the wheel, and § 308 follows that ability. In the collected authority, Ransom appears with a but-cf. signal after Olguin v. City of Burley, which marks it as the contrasting decision; its facts show why, since taking the keys gave the officer custody of the means of use.7
A related theory attaches liability to ownership itself and should not be confused with § 308. Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine, applied in Rippy v. Shepard to a farm tractor, makes the owner of a motor vehicle vicariously liable when the owner entrusts it to another person whose negligent operation harms the plaintiff.8 Because that doctrine is vicarious, the owner answers without regard to the owner's own care. Section 308 is a direct theory resting on the actor's own negligence in permitting the use, and on that theory title alone does not carry the duty. When a fact pattern stresses who owns the instrument, the useful question is therefore whether the defendant could decide who used it at the moment the user took it.
Title fails in the first scene, and the second shows what replaces it: the practical power to say yes or no. Whether that power comes from holding the keys, holding the right to exclude, or taking custody as the officer did in Ransom, it is what the control condition measures.
Knowledge of Unfitness
Knowledge is the second condition: § 308 imposes liability only if the actor knows or should know that the person intends or is likely to use the thing, or to conduct himself in the activity, so as to create an unreasonable risk of harm to others.10 Control shows that the actor was able to refuse; knowledge shows that the actor had reason to. The inquiry is predictive and aimed at one person. When the thing changed hands, what did the supplier know, or what would a reasonable supplier have noticed, about whether this user was likely to cause harm with it? Because the standard includes what the supplier should have known, a supplier who ignores obvious warning signs fares no better than one who saw them.
Knowledge is what makes the handover careless in the first place. A supplier who can see that the user is unfit can foresee the misuse, and refusing costs the supplier almost nothing, so supplying anyway is an unreasonable choice made by the supplier. A supplier with no reason to suspect anything has made no such choice. Scienter, meaning the supplier's actual knowledge or reason to know of the user's incompetence, is therefore a necessary element of the tort.11 The tort is also not one of imputed negligence: the user's carelessness is never charged to the supplier, whose own negligence lies in giving a chattel to a person incompetent to use it.12 A plaintiff who proves only that the user drove badly has proved the user's fault and has not yet reached the supplier's.
The unfitness that recurs in the cases is something a supplier can observe or look up when the thing changes hands. Incompetence may come from youth, inexperience, or feebleness of mind or body, and the familiar setting is supplying a car to an incompetent driver.13 In Ardinger v. Hummell the thing entrusted was a car and the entrustee was a 15-year-old without a license, two facts that make careless driving foreseeable to anyone who looks.14 A known bad driving record works the same way, as in Swicegood v. Cooper, and Sanders v. Walden paired a bad driving record with a driver who could not reach the brake pedals.15 Intoxication supplies the other familiar example. In Kitchen v. K-Mart Corp. the court held that the seller of a firearm to an intoxicated buyer may be liable to a woman the buyer shot, and in Bernethy v. Walt Failor's Inc. a gun dealer let an intoxicated man walk off with a rifle.16 Courts have carried the theory beyond cars and guns, to a pit bull entrusted to a child in Moore v. Myers and to hazardous substances entrusted to a hauler in Hickle v. Whitney Farms, Inc.17
Each scene ends with an injured cyclist, so the accident cannot be what separates them. The difference is the information in the supplier's hands when the keys left it, and the knowledge condition looks at nothing else.
Courts do not agree on how much a plaintiff must show about that information. The § 308 formulation is the ordinary negligence standard, under which constructive knowledge suffices. Departing from ordinary negligence rules, some courts require that the defendant have actual knowledge of the entrustee's intoxication or other disability at the time of the entrustment.18 Under the stricter view, a supplier that should have noticed the signs but did not escapes liability, and so does one who learns of the problem only after the thing is gone, because the plaintiff must prove what the supplier actually knew at the moment of handing over. When an exam stem says which rule governs, apply it; when the stem is silent, apply the should-know standard of § 308 and note that some courts demand actual knowledge.
Knowledge must also attach to a particular entrustee, which is the line the New York court drew in Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp. Handgun manufacturers there were sued on the theory that they marketed their products so as to facilitate illegal use. The court refused to apply negligent entrustment because the manufacturers had not entrusted guns to specific individuals known to be dangerous, only to a class of people who were perhaps dangerous as a class.19 Kitchen and Bernethy show the other side of the line: each supplier faced one identifiable buyer who was intoxicated when the weapon changed hands, while the manufacturers in Hamilton had entrusted nothing to any individual they knew to be dangerous. The line protects the rule from its own breadth. If a dangerous class were enough, every sale of a product that someone might misuse would amount to entrustment to a person likely to misuse it, and the knowledge element would screen out nothing.
A federal statute preserves the individual-entrustee claim where other suits against gun sellers fail. The statute giving many gun sellers and manufacturers immunity when a plaintiff is harmed by a criminal's use of a gun contains an express exception for negligent entrustment claims, 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(ii).20 The knowledge-based theory therefore remains available against a gun seller even where the statute shields it from other claims.
The usual exam error is to reason backward from the crash. The user's negligence in driving, shooting, or handling the thing is never what the plaintiff must prove against the supplier. The analysis starts with the person the supplier dealt with and the unfitness that was visible or discoverable at that moment, such as youth, inexperience, intoxication, or a bad record. A supplier that had no such information is not liable for the user's misuse, however badly the user behaved.