Concept
Using an Incompetent Agent
Direct negligence in using or permitting an incompetent agent, and the employer's duty to the employee
Using an Incompetent Agent
An employer that puts an unfit worker on the job answers for its own carelessness in doing so. The governing norm is Restatement (Second) of Torts § 307: it is negligence to use an instrumentality, whether a human being or a thing, that the actor knows or should know to be so incompetent, inappropriate, or defective that its use involves an unreasonable risk of harm to others.1
Three features of the rule do the work. “Instrumentality” sweeps people and objects into one standard, so a truck with failing brakes and a driver who cannot be trusted with the truck are measured alike. “Knows or should know” ties liability to what the actor had in hand or a reasonable inquiry would have revealed, which keeps the tort fault-based. And the risk must be unreasonable and must fall on others, so the inquiry looks outward to the people the instrumentality can hurt.
The rule takes this shape because the actor who selects an instrumentality controls the one decision that can prevent the harm: whether to use it at all. When the instrumentality is a worker, the job often supplies access a stranger would lack, such as keys, customers, or entry to premises, so a careless choice creates a risk that the injured person could neither detect nor avoid. Courts treat the employment relationship as a basis for a duty to take reasonable steps against the danger a worker poses, even where the employer cannot literally custody or control everything the worker does.2 A practical pressure also runs beneath these doctrines. The injured plaintiff may be left without compensation, the wrongdoer is unlikely to be able to pay, and another party stands in such a relation to the wrongdoer that it is not unreasonable to make that party responsible, and that party is more likely to be able to pay.3 The duty is still one of reasonable care, so it calls for investigation and control proportioned to the risk. It does not make the employer an insurer of every worker it engages.
The subsections below trace § 307 through the decisions an employer makes about the people it puts to work: hiring a worker, keeping one after trouble appears, training and supervising, controlling a worker whose misconduct falls outside the job, and choosing and directing an independent contractor. As the previous section showed, direct liability rests on the employer’s own conduct, so none of these claims depends on the conditions for respondeat superior. Each turns on the same two questions: what the employer knew or should have known about the risk, and whether it responded with reasonable care.
Negligent Hiring
Hiring is the first point at which § 307 reaches an employer’s dealings with a worker. A human being is an instrumentality under the rule, so an employer commits negligence when it puts to work someone it knows or should know to be so unfit that the job creates an unreasonable risk of harm to others.4 Courts frame the claim as a duty to use care in hiring a dangerous person whose job puts that person in a position to harm others, and the duty holds even when the harm occurs outside the scope of employment.5 The claim rests on the employer’s own choice, so a worker’s frolic or detour may defeat respondeat superior and still leave the hiring claim intact.
Each question has a reason behind it. The first ties the tort to fault: the employer answers for a risk it knew about or would have found through a reasonable inquiry, and the should-have-known language lets a plaintiff argue that a skipped reference check or criminal-history search was itself the negligence. The second explains why the employer’s choice matters to the victim. The injured person never selected the worker and usually could not have detected the danger, while the employer alone controlled the screening, the cheapest point at which to keep a dangerous worker out. The third keeps the duty from growing without limit. If any unfitness the employer might have found made it answerable for every later misdeed, hiring negligence would become insurance against a worker’s misconduct, so liability stays confined to the risk that made the hiring careless.
How much investigation reasonable care demands grows with what the job exposes others to. A position that hands the worker keys to people’s homes, entry to private premises, or regular contact with the public leaves victims no chance to evaluate the worker beforehand, so reasonable care calls for real inquiry before hire, such as checking references and criminal history. A position with none of those features exposes strangers to little beyond what any member of the public does, and the inquiry it justifies is modest. The duty remains one of reasonable care, which by definition cannot be an undue burden, so an employer that makes the inquiry the job justifies has generally met it even if the worker proves dangerous.6
In Easley v. Apollo Detective Agency, a security agency for an apartment building hired a guard with a violent record, and the guard used a passkey to enter a tenant’s apartment and assault the tenant.7 Courts cite the case for what a third party’s crime does to causation, but it also shows every hiring element at once. The agency knew or should have known of the guard’s violence, the job supplied the passkey that gave him access a stranger would lack, and the assault was the danger his record signaled. Easley is one of the recurring situations in which an intervening crime leaves the defendant liable: the defendant brings into association with the plaintiff a person it knows or should know to be peculiarly likely to commit crime, under circumstances creating a recognizable unreasonable risk that he will do so.8
McGuire v. Curry sits at the other pole. The court found no duty to run a background check before hiring an employee whose position did not require frequent contact with the public.9 What separates the two cases is the job. The guard’s position gave him a passkey to the homes of the people he endangered, while the position in McGuire created no comparable opening. For that kind of job, a mandatory background check would burden every employer with an exhaustive inquiry and protect no one in particular, so the law does not require it.
A hirer that carelessly selects an independent contractor can incur liability of the same kind, and the last subsection below takes up that variant. For employees, the portable analysis is the three-question sequence above, with the scope of the pre-hire inquiry scaled to how much the job exposes others to the worker.
Negligent Retention
An employer that keeps a worker on the job after learning of a danger is still using that worker as an instrumentality, so § 307 reaches the continuing decision as well as the original one.11 Courts require employers to use care in retaining a dangerous person whose job puts that person in a position to harm others, and the duty exists even when the harm occurs outside the scope of employment.12 As with hiring, the claim rests on the employer’s own choice, so a frolic that would defeat respondeat superior leaves it untouched.
Timing separates retention from hiring. A hiring claim looks to what the employer knew or should have known at engagement, so an employer that screened with reasonable care and found nothing has a complete answer to it. Retention begins where that answer ends. If information surfaces after employment starts, such as a coworker’s report, a customer’s complaint, or an earlier incident on the job, the employer is on notice, and the question becomes what it does next. A reasonable hire can thus become an unreasonable one to keep. The should-know language of § 307 applies here as well, so an employer cannot escape notice by ignoring complaints that reasonable attention would have turned into a clear picture of the danger.
Notice matters because it shifts the power to prevent the harm. Before the employer knows anything, it cannot remove a danger it has no reason to see. Afterward it alone can act, since the customer, patron, or coworker who will later be hurt has no say over who works the floor and usually no warning. Keeping a known-dangerous worker in the same post is then a fresh choice to continue the exposure, and the law treats the resulting harm as the employer’s own fault. The employer’s available responses are discipline, reassignment, and discharge, and because the duty is one of reasonable care, which cannot be an undue burden, the response must fit the danger.13 A warning may answer a minor, isolated complaint, while a report of violence from a worker whose job puts him among patrons calls for taking him out of that post.
Freeman v. Bell shows the claim at full strength. A discotheque kept on an employee who had previously shot a patron, and when he later shot another patron the employer was held liable because it knew of his propensity for violence. The notice arrived before the second shooting, the job kept the employee among patrons, the harm was the same kind of violence the first shooting had signaled, and the employer kept him on rather than discharging or reassigning him. The sequence that governs hiring therefore carries over with one change: the knowledge question asks what the employer learned, or should have learned, after employment began, while the opportunity and fit questions stay as they were.
Knowledge is the fact that moves the answer. Had the clerk’s file held two written complaints that the clerk threatened customers, a manager who filed them without a word to the clerk would have committed the very failure the claim targets, whereas an empty file leaves the employer nothing to respond to. The notice requirement is also the limiting principle of the duty. Without it, every truly unforeseeable misdeed by any employee would become the employer’s liability, and retention would operate as insurance against all misconduct on the payroll. A plaintiff whose facts show that the employer ignored a serious complaint can also plead the failure to discipline or discharge as ratification of the tort, an alternative to respondeat superior.14
Negligent Supervision and Training
Negligent supervision and failure to train apply § 307 inside the working relationship, after the hire and while the work is under way.16 Hiring asks whom the employer chose, and retention asks what it did once it learned a worker was dangerous. Supervision and training ask whether, in running the work from day to day, the employer supplied the rules, instruction, and watchfulness the work’s risks called for. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 213 lists the ways a principal can be negligent in its own right, and the court in Foradori v. Harris relied on it to treat negligent supervision and failure to train as direct theories of employer liability.17 Because the plaintiff targets the employer’s own conduct, the employee and scope-of-employment conditions of respondeat superior do not apply.
The reach of the theory shows in Tillman, the decision Foradori described. A swimmer was injured by a negligent powerboat driver, and the court held that the swimmer was entitled to a jury instruction under § 213 on whether the boat owner, who was aboard at the time, had negligently supervised the driver.18 The owner was also the driver’s employer, but the two were on a weekend outing unrelated to work. That fact detaches the claim from working hours: the theory ties to the owner’s authority over the driver and the activity, not to the clock. Foradori noted that Tillman approved § 213 only as the basis for an instruction on supervising an activity, but reasoned that the court had embraced all of § 213 and that its other negligence principles are closely analogous, so the court would apply them in an appropriate case.19
The comments to § 213 give the theory its content. A master is negligent if it fails to use care to provide the regulations reasonably necessary to prevent undue risk of harm to third persons or to other servants from the conduct of those working under it. One who engages in an enterprise must anticipate and guard against the human traits of its employees that are likely to harm others unless regulated, and must make the reasonable regulations that the size or complexity of the business requires.20 The reasoning follows who controls the work. The employer writes the rules, decides what training a new worker receives, and sets how closely anyone watches, so it alone can foresee predictable failings, such as haste or carelessness around machinery, and build a safeguard before anyone is hurt. The customer or passerby later injured had no voice in any of those decisions. Training is the same obligation in another form, since an instruction the employer never gave cannot be supplied by the worker’s instincts.
Foradori also pointed out that, before Tillman, the court had already approved recovery for an employer’s negligent failure to train or regulate its employees. In Gamble v. Dollar General Corp. the employer could show no training for its employee beyond handing her a manual, and the court held it proper to let the jury consider whether that failure was negligent.21 Gamble sends the question to the jury without deciding the verdict. A manual handed over without explanation or follow-up is a thin answer to a claim that the employer failed to regulate how its people do dangerous work.
A third strand reaches the employer that sees the danger and says nothing. A principal in control of premises, and of the people acting on them by virtue of being their principal, may be liable for conduct that it knows or should know creates an unreasonable risk of harm to others if it consents to the conduct’s continuance by not objecting. Failure to prevent negligent conduct does not, by itself, make the possessor responsible.22 What turns silence into fault is the combination of authority and knowledge: a principal who can stop dangerous conduct and lets it go on is aiding it, because workers read tolerance from the person in charge as permission. Acquiescence resembles retention in requiring notice, but it concerns a practice rather than one worker’s continued employment, so an employer can acquiesce in a dangerous habit without ever deciding anything about a particular worker. Foradori also observed that these Agency principles and Restatement (Second) of Torts § 317 are similar and interrelated.23 Section 317, which governs a master’s duty to control a servant acting outside the scope of employment, is the subject of the next subsection.
The standard throughout is reasonable care, and that standard is where these cases are decided. A duty of reasonable care by definition cannot be an undue burden, and liability does not follow merely because a court recognizes a duty to supervise. A hospital that reviews each staff physician’s performance once a year, with no reason to suspect a problem, may have met its duty with that modest review.24 Gamble and the annual review mark the two poles. An employer that can show no instruction at all lets a jury find negligence, while an employer with a regular, modest process suited to the risk has a strong answer. The usual mistake is to treat the existence of a duty to supervise as proof of breach, when the law asks only for oversight proportioned to the danger of the work and to the size and complexity of the business.
Control Beyond Scope of Employment
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 317 gives its most precise form to an idea that runs through the hiring, retention, and supervision claims: an employer’s own negligence can reach a worker’s conduct outside the scope of employment. The section requires a master to use reasonable care to control a servant acting outside the scope of employment, so as to prevent the servant from intentionally harming others or from creating an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them. The duty attaches only when the servant is on premises in the master’s possession (or premises the servant may enter only as the master’s servant) or is using the master’s chattel, and the master knows or has reason to know that it can control the servant and knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity to do so.26 Rausch v. Pocatello Lumber Co. sets out that text as the definition of the cause of action, and Foradori quoted it when observing that § 317 and the Agency § 213 principles are similar and interrelated.27
Read beside the hiring and retention claims, § 317 shows two kinds of direct liability. Hiring and retention ask whether the employer chose or kept a worker it should have known was dangerous, so the fault lies in a selection decision. Section 317 asks whether, when the harm occurred, the employer was positioned to restrain the worker, so the fault lies in failing to use a power the employer’s own property gave it. Both reach conduct outside the scope of employment because neither makes the employer answer for the worker’s act as such; each rests on the employer’s own failure.
Section 317 does not make an employer responsible for everything its workers do away from work. A duty to control a worker is generally explained by the benefit the employer derives from the worker’s activities and by the employer’s frequently unique position to prevent the harm.28 The section’s conditions turn the second explanation into a test: the duty arises only where the employer’s own premises or equipment supplied the setting or the tool for the harm and the employer could realistically have stopped it.
Each condition does separate work. The premises-or-chattel condition ties the duty to property the employer owns or controls, which is where its authority over the worker is real: a worker on the employer’s loading dock or at the wheel of its truck can be ordered off the dock or relieved of the keys. Away from that property, the employer’s only leverage is the paycheck, and a duty to police behavior there would make the employer responsible for the worker’s private life. The ability condition keeps the law from demanding what the employer cannot do. The necessity-and-opportunity condition is a notice requirement, playing the role that knowledge played in negligent retention. An employer surprised by a sudden outburst had no earlier moment at which reasonable care would have changed the outcome.
The weekend outing in Tillman, which Foradori described, satisfies the conditions even though no work was being done. The boat owner and the driver, who was also the owner’s employee, were on a trip unrelated to work, yet the driver was operating the owner’s boat with the owner aboard. The owner therefore had the chattel, the ability to give orders to the driver, and the opportunity to object to careless handling as it happened. The court held that the swimmer was entitled to a jury instruction on whether the owner negligently supervised the driver.29 Leaving the workday behind did not dissolve the owner’s authority, since the boat remained the owner’s and the driver remained the owner’s employee.
Cases of fatigued employees, in which a worker who has put in long hours causes a crash on the drive home, are commonly analyzed under § 317; Barclay v. Briscoe and Nabors Drilling, U.S.A., Inc. v. Escoto are examples.30 The section’s text shows why plaintiffs find it a hard fit. The crash occurs on a public road, in the worker’s own vehicle, after the shift has ended, so the worker is neither on the employer’s premises nor using its chattel when the harm occurs. Where an employer affirmatively encouraged an intoxicated employee to drive home, courts have found liability, as in Otis Engineering Corp. v. Clark, but those cases may be better analyzed as affirmative creation of risk, which makes the control question largely irrelevant.31 The two theories ask for different showings. Section 317 asks whether the employer failed to use a power its property gave it, and an affirmative-risk theory asks whether the employer’s own act made the danger greater.
A common error is to read the statement that hiring and supervision duties exist outside the scope of employment as a general duty to control off-duty workers. The duty attaches only through premises or a chattel plus the employer’s knowledge of ability, necessity, and opportunity. A fact pattern that supplies none of those leaves the plaintiff with respondeat superior, which fails outside the scope of employment, and with whatever hiring or retention claim the employer’s notice supports.
Contractors and Retained Control
A hirer ordinarily is not vicariously liable for the torts of an independent contractor, because a hirer with no control over the details of the work cannot effectively increase the care taken during it.33 What remains is liability for the hirer’s own negligence, and a hirer can be negligent about a contractor in two places: in choosing the contractor and in the control it keeps over the work.34 Section 307 supplies the norm for the first.35
Delegating the work does not shelter a hirer from its own carelessness at either point. An owner who engages a clearly unfit contractor, fails to supervise, fails to require necessary safety precautions, or neglects to inspect work over which it kept control answers for its own conduct.36 A plaintiff often pleads those claims beside a vicarious theory, and the two must be kept apart, because even where there is no basis for vicarious liability, the owner must still answer for its own conduct in connection with the work.37
Negligent selection comes first. The hirer must use reasonable care to choose a contractor who is competent, experienced, careful, and properly equipped, and the care required rises with the danger of the work.38 The scaling follows from what an unfit contractor can do. Someone hired to repaint a fence can injure almost no one by being unskilled, while someone hired to demolish a building or to excavate beside a public road can hurt strangers who had no voice in the choice. Where the work creates a foreseeable danger to third persons, ordinary care may therefore extend to insisting that the contractor take the necessary safety precautions and seeing that it does, and reasonable care may also call for inspecting completed work.39
The duty stops short of an exhaustive investigation. A person who hires a carpenter or a plumber may assume that a tradesperson of good reputation can do the work safely, and need not take great pains to learn whether the reputation is deserved, unless the hirer knows the reputation is bad or knows facts that should lead it to realize the contractor is not competent.40 A hirer likewise generally need not inquire into the contractor’s solvency or insurance coverage.41 The tort protects against physical harm from incompetent work, and a contractor’s bank balance does not make the work any safer; whether an injured person can collect is a separate question that the selection duty was not built to answer.
The warning-sign exception is where these cases are decided. In Puckrein v. ATI Transport, Inc. the hirer retained a contractor that lacked the permits needed to perform the job legally, and the decision is cited for liability resting on that choice.42 Madison ex rel. Bryant v. Babcock Center, Inc. carries the point past the moment of hiring, recognizing liability both for negligence in choosing the contractor and for failing to deal with the contractor once the danger it created was discovered.43
The second direct theory arises after the choice is made, when the hirer keeps a hand on the work. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414 provides that one who entrusts work to an independent contractor but retains control of any part of it is subject to liability for physical harm to others, to whom the employer owes a duty of reasonable care, caused by its failure to exercise that control with reasonable care.45 The liability attaches to the aspect of the work over which the hirer kept control, because only that part is something the hirer could have made safer. Retained control comes in degrees. A hirer may keep so much control over operative details that the contractor’s workers become its servants, and agency principles then apply. A hirer may instead keep less, only the power to direct the order in which the work is done or to forbid its being done in a dangerous manner. That control may not make the hirer a master, but the hirer is still liable under § 414 unless it exercises the supervisory power with reasonable care to keep the work from injuring others.46
Courts set the threshold above minimal oversight. A general right to order the work stopped or resumed, to inspect its progress or receive reports, to make suggestions or recommendations that need not be followed, or to prescribe alterations is not enough. There must be such a retention of a right of supervision that the contractor is “not entirely free to do the work in his own way.”47 Another formulation ties the point to purpose: powers that relate solely to the quality of the work and its compliance with the plans do not suffice, and the control must reach the manner of performing the details or otherwise affect the work’s safety, so that the hirer could have acted with respect to the danger.48 The height of the threshold protects owners who monitor. Courts have said, in the related setting of employment status, that an owner who undertakes to see that a contractor operates safely ought not to be penalized for it.49 A rule that penalized inspection would reward owners who looked away from the work, and safety would suffer.
The clearest case of control is the owner who actively directs a contractor’s dangerous construction work on its own land. That owner may be held liable for its own negligence, quite apart from any vicarious liability or nondelegable duty.50
What moved the answer was what each owner’s rights reached. Reading reports, walking the site, and offering suggestions leave the contractor in charge of method, while directing the sequence of work and ruling out unsafe positions place part of the work in the owner’s hands.
Two other routes to a hirer often appear in the same fact patterns but rest on a different footing. Work that is inherently dangerous, meaning work that will create a peculiar risk of injury to others unless special precautions are taken, as with excavation in or near a public highway, makes the hirer vicariously liable for the contractor’s negligence.52 And where the safe performance of a duty is important enough to the community that the law will not let the obligor shift it, a hirer that delegates the duty to a contractor is vicariously liable for the contractor’s negligence even though the hirer itself was without fault.53 Neither route asks whether the hirer was careful. A plaintiff who proves that the contractor was negligent and that the work or duty falls within one of these categories recovers from the hirer however carefully the hirer chose and watched the contractor, whereas a plaintiff relying on selection or retained control must prove the hirer’s own breach. The nondelegable-duty exception has a limit that follows from the control rationale. Read broadly, it would swallow the rule of nonliability, so that a homeowner who hired a professional tree service would answer for a trimmer’s dropping a limb on a neighbor’s car, although the homeowner had no means of protecting anyone through detailed control.54