Concept
Direct Versus Vicarious Liability
Direct negligence in using or permitting an incompetent agent, and the employer's duty to the employee
Direct Negligence and Employer Duties
Direct Versus Vicarious Liability
A worker who injures a stranger exposes the employer to two kinds of claim, and each demands different proof. On the first, the employer pays because of who the worker was and what the worker was doing. On the second, the employer pays because of what the employer itself did or failed to do. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219(2) contains both ideas: a master is not liable for the torts of servants who act outside the scope of their employment unless, among other exceptions, the master was itself negligent or reckless.1 Behind that exception stands the general rule that a master is liable when a servant commits a tort within the scope of employment.2 The first kind of claim is vicarious liability, and the second is direct liability. The later sections of this chapter develop the second.
Vicarious Liability Without Fault
Respondeat superior holds an employer liable for a worker's tort when two conditions are met: the worker is an employee, and the tort occurred within the scope of employment.3 Control draws the employee line. An employer has the right to control the details of how the job is done, so a person hired to serve tables in a restaurant is an employee and the restaurant owner is her employer.4 A principal is generally not vicariously liable for the torts of agents who are not employees, even when the agent acts within the scope of the agency, because such agents are not part of the principal's enterprise and the most important justifications for vicarious liability do not reach them.5
The scope condition confines the employer to harms fairly considered a risk of its business, and therefore within its control. Courts apply it through two labels. A worker who commits the tort during business hours while doing something only for her own benefit may be on a “frolic,” and the employer is not liable. A worker who commits it during a minor deviation from the job may be on a “detour,” and the employer is liable. The line between the two is often hazy.6
Neither condition asks whether the employer was careful. Liability flows automatically from the employee's tort, even when the employer took stringent measures to prevent accidents and regardless of the care it used in selecting or supervising the employee.7 The doctrine rests on policy rather than fault: a business enterprise should not be able to disclaim responsibility for actions fairly characteristic of its own activities.8 It also serves compensation. The injured plaintiff may be ruined without recovery, the person who injured him is likely unable to pay, and the employer stands in a relation to the wrongdoer that makes it not unreasonable to place the responsibility on it, and it is more likely to be able to pay.9
The no-fault rule helps a plaintiff only when both conditions are satisfied. If the worker was on a frolic, or was an independent contractor, the vicarious theory yields nothing, however carelessly the employer may have behaved. Direct liability fills that gap.
Direct Liability for Own Carelessness
Direct liability asks whether the employer itself failed to use reasonable care. A principal may be personally, not vicariously, liable for its negligence in selecting, instructing, controlling, or supervising an agent, and for commanding, authorizing, or ratifying the agent's tortious act.11 An employer is likewise liable for its own negligence when it knew or should have known about harmful conduct and failed to stop it.12 The claim rests on the employer's conduct, so it requires neither employee status nor scope of employment: a negligent master answers even for the torts of servants acting outside the scope of their employment.13
The same logic reaches the hirer of an independent contractor. The hirer is not vicariously liable merely for having hired the contractor, but it must exercise reasonable care to select a reasonably competent, experienced, careful, and properly equipped one. When the work creates a foreseeable danger to third persons, ordinary care may require the hirer to insist, in the contract or otherwise, that the contractor take the necessary safety precautions, and then to see that the contractor does so.14 Some relationships raise the standard of care itself. A common carrier must use extraordinary care and diligence to protect its passengers in transit from violence or injury by third persons, a duty one court states as the highest degree of care in anticipating and preventing violence from the carrier's employees, other passengers, and even strangers.15
Plaintiffs plead the direct theory because it reaches what respondeat superior cannot: the employee on a personal errand, and the contractor or other agent who is not an employee. In both settings the employer's own carelessness may be the only link between it and the harm. The price is a heavier burden, because the direct claim succeeds only when the employer's own conduct fell short. The careful company in the first illustration escapes it, and the company that skipped the record check does not. What an employer must have known, and how its failure must connect to the harm, varies with the theory, and the sections ahead take each in turn.
Pleading Both Theories
A plaintiff may plead both theories against the same employer but recovers only once.17 The theories are alternative routes to a single loss, so proving liability twice does not double the award. Jurisdictions divide, however, over whether the direct claim survives when the employer concedes the vicarious one. Under the line of authority that began with McHaffie v. Bunch, an employer's admission that its employee acted within the course and scope of employment bars a negligent hiring claim. Colorado, Indiana, and Wyoming courts have adopted that rule, as has California in Diaz v. Carcamo.18
The reasoning is that an employer who has already agreed to answer for the employee's tort leaves the direct claim with nothing to add, because the plaintiff's compensation is secured either way. Oklahoma goes the other way for negligent entrustment: in Fox v. Mize the court held that an employer's stipulation that the accident occurred during the course and scope of employment does not bar a negligent entrustment claim.19
Because the rule varies by jurisdiction, a fact pattern that states the governing rule controls the answer. Without such a statement, present both theories and note that some courts end the direct claim once the employer admits vicarious liability. The admission rule helps only an employer that concedes scope. Where the employer denies scope, as in the Saturday errand above, the direct claim is the plaintiff's route to the employer.