Concept
Interest and Delay
Damages for mental distress and other intangible injuries
Interest and Delay
Injury cases rarely reach a verdict quickly, and the harm the jury prices has usually been sitting for years. The Restatement (Second) of Torts treats that gap differently depending on the loss. Interest is not allowed on an amount found due for bodily harm, for emotional distress, or for injury to reputation, but the time that has elapsed between the harm and the trial can be considered in determining the amount of damages.1 Delay therefore stays in the case, but it travels through the size of the award instead of through a separate charge added on top.
Property losses work the other way. A plaintiff whose land, chattels, or other property was taken, detained, or destroyed is entitled to interest on the amount found due when the valuation can be ascertained from established market prices. The interest runs from the time adopted for valuation to the time of judgment.2 The one exception is the plaintiff who elects the restitutionary measure of recovery. For other harms to pecuniary interests, interest runs from the time the cause of action accrued to the time of judgment, if payment of interest is required to avoid an injustice, and that clause is itself subject to the exception in subsection (2).3
The Restatement does not say why it draws the line there, but the line tracks a practical difference. Interest needs a sum that can be named on an earlier date and a date from which to count. A destroyed delivery van supplies both, because its market value on the day of the loss is a number that exists independently of the trial, and the defendant has held that value ever since. A year of chronic pain supplies neither. No figure existed on the day of the injury; the figure comes into being when the jury names it, and in naming it the jury may already weigh how long the plaintiff suffered. Adding interest from the date of injury would force the court to invent an earlier number and then grow it, and it would risk charging the defendant twice for the same years.
The two rules often meet in a single verdict, so the useful habit is to sort the award item by item.
Two opposite mistakes are common. The first is to attach interest to a whole verdict because the case is old, when the right move is to ask of each item whether an outside measure fixed its value on an earlier date. The second is to read the rule as making delay irrelevant to intangible harm, which overlooks that elapsed time remains a proper consideration in setting the amount. Nor does the rule mean that interest has no place in injury litigation. Standard lists of what a personal injury plaintiff may recover include pre-judgment and post-judgment interest as a separate item, alongside wage loss, medical expenses, and pain and suffering.4 The question is therefore which components of a verdict carry interest, and the Restatement answers that the intangible ones do not.