Concept
Other Intangible Injuries
Damages for mental distress and other intangible injuries
Other Intangible Injuries
A person can be wronged in dignity, in reputation, and in rights the Constitution secures without suffering any bodily injury, and the damages rules for those wrongs turn on one question: how much does proof of the wrong itself tell the factfinder about what the plaintiff lost? The Restatement (Second) of Torts entitles one whose interests of personality have been tortiously invaded to recover for past or prospective bodily harm and emotional distress, for loss or impairment of earning capacity, for reasonable medical and other expenses, and for harm to property or business caused by the invasion.1 It also allows compensatory damages for bodily harm and for emotional distress without proof of pecuniary loss.2 Its rule on interest lists injury to reputation next to bodily harm and emotional distress, which places reputation among the intangible harms.3
Earlier sections dealt with plaintiffs whose bodies were hurt, or whose feelings were hurt by a wrong the law already recognizes, so a physical injury or an independently actionable tort stood behind the distress and vouched for it. In the categories below there may be no bodily harm at all, and the wrong itself is an affront or a deprivation. Each category first raises the threshold question whether the harm claimed is legally compensable,4 and only then what this plaintiff has proved and what it is worth. From one category to the next, the difference is how far proof of the wrong supports an inference of harm. Where the wrong makes suffering the natural consequence, a jury may infer the harm, and where the link weakens, the plaintiff must supply evidence. Dignitary torts come first, then defamation, then constitutional violations.
Dignitary Torts
The torts in this family protect dignity and peace of mind, so mental suffering is often the main thing the plaintiff lost. A dignitary tort is a wrong whose gist, its essential substance, is an affront to the plaintiff's dignity or peace of mind and not a physical injury or an economic loss. Battery, assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and invasion of privacy all fit that description. Elsewhere in this chapter, distress rides into a verdict on a broken bone or another recognized tort that vouches for the suffering. In a dignitary tort the host and the suffering are nearly the same thing, because the affront defines the tort. A rule that paid for mental suffering only alongside physical injury would therefore withhold compensation for the one harm these torts exist to redress, and compensatory damages for emotional distress need no proof of pecuniary loss.5
Battery shows the pattern most clearly. The tort redresses an intentional and unpermitted physical contact, protecting the basic right to have one's body left alone and deterring relatively minor but offensive contacts that can provoke breaches of the peace. The tort is the contact itself, so the plaintiff need not have been aware of it when it happened, and the plaintiff's person reaches beyond the skin to clothing, to an object held in the hand, and to anything so closely connected to the body that a normal person would deem a contact with it an offense against the person.6 Casebook notes probe the boundary with a grab at the front of a coat, a spit in the face, and the forcible removal of a hat.7
Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc. puts the point to work. A mathematician attending a conference lunch at the defendant's hotel was standing in a buffet line when an employee snatched the plate from his hand and shouted that he could not be served because of his race. The employee never touched him, and he feared no physical injury, but he was humiliated in front of his colleagues, and the jury awarded $400 for the embarrassment and indignity. The Texas Supreme Court held that the snatching was a battery, because an object held in the hand is so closely connected with the body that it shares the body's inviolability, and that he could recover for mental suffering although no physical injury occurred. The court's explanation describes the whole category: personal indignity is the essence of the wrong, and mental suffering is the harm to be compensated.
That reasoning also explains why a battery plaintiff clears none of the gates that guard a stand-alone distress claim. Those gates, extreme and outrageous conduct and a severe emotional response, exist because courts are unwilling to redress minor psychic harm.8 In a battery, the defendant's deliberate offensive contact stands behind the feeling. The plaintiff proves the snatching or the touching with ordinary evidence, and a jury may infer from the circumstances that a person treated that way was humiliated. Nothing calls for proof of a second, independent harm.
Exam questions often keep the insult and remove the tort, and the answer changes with it.
What remains for the guest is a negligence theory for distress alone, and negligence generally imposes no independent duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid causing another person emotional distress. The traditional exceptions are narrow: the negligent mishandling of a loved one's corpse, and the negligent sending of a telegram that wrongly announces a death.9 Liability for independently causing distress through negligence is rare. The guest's embarrassment may be as real as Fisher's, so the feeling does not separate the two plaintiffs. Fisher had a dignitary tort to which the feeling could attach, and the guest has none.
Assault protects a narrower interest. Tort law has historically refused relief for insult, and for disturbing a plaintiff's peace of mind through distasteful behavior or the voicing of unpopular opinions, so assault is not a general remedy for interference with mental tranquility. It guards against one narrow type of mental distress, the apprehension of immediate physical aggression.10 A person threatened with an imminent blow recovers for the fear because the defendant's own act created it, while a person who is merely insulted has no assault claim. Some courts have recently begun to redress limited forms of psychic injury through intentional infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy, and both are taken up next.
Intentional infliction of emotional distress is the clearest recovery for distress alone, and the severity of the claim polices it. Because courts are unwilling to redress minor psychic harm, the defendant's conduct must be extreme and outrageous and the plaintiff's emotional response severe. A plaintiff who merely becomes unhappy, humiliated, or mildly despondent for a short time, and spends a sleepless night or two, cannot recover. If the anguish is great, and especially if it is prolonged, most courts allow the action whether or not there is any physical manifestation or resulting bodily harm, although a few jurisdictions may still require such harm.11 The elements belong to other readings, and the damages point is the contrast with battery. A battery plaintiff such as Fisher recovers for humiliation once the offensive contact is shown, while the same humiliation standing alone does not clear the gate here.
Invasion of privacy extends dignitary protection to a different set of affronts. The conventional analysis recognizes four wrongs: appropriation of the plaintiff's name or likeness, intrusion on the plaintiff's private affairs, public disclosure of private facts, and placing the plaintiff in a false light. The plaintiff may recover for harm to the interest in privacy, for mental distress of a kind that normally results from such an invasion, and for special damages.12 What links the four wrongs is a concern for personal dignity, so none requires proof of out-of-pocket damages. Damages are not presumed, as they are in common law libel and slander per se, but the plaintiff recovers for the abstract non-monetary harm to dignity along with the resulting distress, and the conduct often warrants punitive damages as well.13
Whether a tort that touches a person produces distress damages depends on the right invaded. A remedy should reflect the right, or the policy behind it, as precisely as possible, so an intangible right of dignity carries an intangible remedy.14 Lawyer malpractice sits at the opposite pole. It is largely an economic rather than a personal tort, although substantial personal elements, and the emotional distress that goes with them, can appear where malpractice leads to imprisonment.15 Whether the law also presumes damages varies by tort. Privacy damages are not presumed, while common law libel and slander per se presume them, and defamation is where the Constitution limits that presumption.
Two opposite errors recur on exams. One imports the severity requirement of intentional infliction, or a demand for physical symptoms, into a battery or assault claim, which is wrong because the contact or the threat is itself the tort. The other treats every insult or upsetting remark as a dignitary tort, which overlooks that the law redresses only specific affronts: unpermitted contact, apprehension of immediate contact, the recognized privacy invasions, and extreme and outrageous conduct. A bare insult or a negligent remark reaches none of them. The first question for any distress claim is whether a dignitary tort is present, because the answer determines whether the plaintiff must clear any further gate.
Defamation Damages
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. held that a state's interest in compensating a private individual for injury to reputation extends no further than compensation for actual injury, so the states may not permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages, at least when liability is not based on a showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.17 Gertz, a prominent civil rights attorney, had sued the publisher of American Opinion, the outlet of the John Birch Society, over statements claiming he had communist connections.18 The case belongs in this chapter because reputation is an intangible interest, and the dignitary torts show how readily the law lets a jury pay for intangible harm without receipts. Defamation is where the Constitution narrows that generosity, because speech inflicts the injury and a large award that nobody has to justify can punish the speaker more than it compensates the plaintiff.
Damages in a defamation action fall into five categories, and the constitutional limit reaches some of them while leaving others alone.19
- Nominal damages are a token sum awarded when liability is established but no loss is shown.
- General damages, usually called presumed damages, compensate harm to reputation that a jury may assume from the publication itself, without proof that the harm occurred.
- Special damages are the proved economic losses caused by the harm to the plaintiff's reputation.
- Emotional distress damages, with damages for any resulting bodily harm, are available once liability is established.
- Punitive damages punish the defendant's conduct and go beyond compensation.
The common law presumed damages because of how reputational harm happens. A false statement injures a person through the reactions of those who hear it, who may deal with the plaintiff a little differently afterward, and the only witnesses able to establish that causal connection are those same listeners, who may be reluctant to say the statement affected them.20 Proof of the harm is therefore unusually hard to assemble. The traditional rules answered by presuming injury from the fact of publication, so a jury could award substantial sums for supposed damage to reputation without any proof that the damage occurred.21
Gertz accepted that proof is difficult and still rejected the presumption for most plaintiffs, and its reasons run in a chain. Presumed damages give jurors largely uncontrolled discretion to award money where there may be no loss at all, and that discretion unnecessarily compounds the tendency of liability for defamatory falsehood to inhibit the vigorous exercise of First Amendment freedoms. The doctrine also invites juries to punish unpopular opinion instead of compensating injury from a false statement of fact. A state's legitimate interest is compensation, so an award beyond actual injury serves no interest the state can claim.22 The bar lifts when the plaintiff proves knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth, the actual malice standard.23
Otherwise the plaintiff may recover compensation for actual injury, and that category is broad. Actual injury is not limited to out-of-pocket loss, and its customary forms include impairment of reputation and standing in the community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering. Two limits keep the category tied to reality: juries must be limited by appropriate instructions, and every award must rest on competent evidence concerning the injury, although no evidence need assign a dollar value to it.24 The division is the one drawn in the discussion of evidence of distress. The plaintiff proves that the harm exists, through the circumstances, personal testimony, and witnesses who saw the effects, and the jury supplies the amount. Because mental anguish counts, a libel plaintiff can probably recover for distress even if it is not shown to flow from reputational harm, and the loose boundary of actual injury invites awards for embarrassment and humiliation that work much like presumed damages under another name.25 A student who defines actual injury as proof of pecuniary loss has misread the standard, and so has one who thinks the constitutional limit ends recovery for mental anguish.
The same falsehood and the same honest error produced two different outcomes, and proof of actual injury accounts for the difference. Had the paper known the audit story was false, or published it with reckless disregard for its truth, the constitutional bar would no longer apply, and the second bookkeeper's state could permit presumed and punitive damages without proof of loss.26 The common exam error is to treat the falsity of the statement as enough to produce a damages award. Falsity establishes the wrong, and the fault showing and the proof of injury decide what money follows.
The Court recognized an exception to this limit in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., holding that a state could choose to award presumed damages when the plaintiff was a private figure and the speech did not involve any issue of public interest or concern.27 Both conditions must be present. The demand for proof of actual injury applies where the libel involves speech of public concern, even when the plaintiff is a private person, so a private figure suing over a public-issue story is still limited to actual injury.28 When the speech is purely private, the choice whether to presume damages falls back to the state, and some states have moved away from presumptive damages in private-party suits.29 A student who treats every private-figure plaintiff as entitled to presumed damages has skipped the second condition, and one who reads the Gertz limit as barring presumed damages in every case has overlooked that proof of knowledge or reckless disregard lifts it.
The remaining categories follow the common law structure. Special damages, the economic losses that result from the defamation, may always be recovered, and in slander per quod, and in some jurisdictions libel per quod, they are a prerequisite to liability.30 Where special damages are required to make out the claim they must be pecuniary, so a plaintiff who shows acute mental distress and serious illness from such a statement, with no financial loss, has no claim. Once the claim is made out, either because the statement is actionable per se or because pecuniary special damages are proved, the plaintiff may add damages for mental distress, wounded feelings, and humiliation.31 Distress here is an item of damages that rides on an established claim, the host-tort logic from the discussion of distress without physical harm, and a claim built on distress alone does not qualify.
Step two does the most work, since it separates a plaintiff who may recover without proving loss from one who must prove it. The distress award at step five does not substitute for a missing pecuniary showing where special damages are required to make out the claim. The next subsection turns to constitutional violations, where the same insistence on proof of actual injury appears outside defamation.
Constitutional Violations
Carey v. Piphus held that distress caused by the denial of procedural due process itself is compensable under § 1983, but that neither the likelihood of such distress nor the difficulty of proving it justifies compensatory damages without proof that the distress was actually caused.33 Two students had been suspended from school without the safeguards due process requires, and the Court of Appeals noted that the record contained no proof of individualized injury, such as mental distress.34 The students argued that a court may presume anyone denied a fair process feels distress at being treated unfairly, and the Supreme Court found that assumption unwarranted.35 The result differs from the dignitary torts. In a constitutional claim, proof of the violation establishes liability, and the plaintiff must still prove what the violation cost.
The presumption fails because the violation and the distress do not always occur together. A person may not even know of the procedural irregularity, in which case the irregularity cannot have caused any distress. A person who does feel distress may be reacting to a deprivation that was in fact justified, and a plaintiff who would have received the same sanction after a fair hearing cannot recover compensation for the sanction itself.36 A presumption would therefore pay plaintiffs who never learned of the defect and plaintiffs who would have lost anyway, for injuries that never occurred. The same reasoning tells the plaintiff what must be proved: the injury caused by the lack of process, as distinct from the injury caused by the outcome. A prisoner placed in segregation after a flawed disciplinary hearing cannot recover for the confinement if a proper hearing would have produced the same sanction, but can recover for any distress the flawed process itself caused, provided the prisoner proves that causation.37
The proof required is the kind this chapter has already described for distress. Distress is a personal injury familiar to the law, customarily proved by showing the nature and circumstances of the wrong and its effect on the plaintiff, and the Court foresaw no particular difficulty in producing such evidence.38 The plaintiff need not prove the dollar value of the injury with exactitude, because plaintiffs ordinarily are not required to do that for intangible harm, although the Court left open how much proof an award needs once actual injury is shown.39 The division of labor is the familiar one: the plaintiff proves that the distress exists, and the jury prices it.
A plaintiff who proves no actual injury is not left with nothing. Common-law courts traditionally vindicated deprivations of certain absolute rights that were not shown to have caused actual injury by awarding a nominal sum, and the Court treated procedural due process the same way.40 Nominal damages, in an amount not to exceed one dollar, are therefore available even if the suspensions were justified and the students suffered no other injury. The remedy rests on two commitments held together. The law recognizes the importance to organized society that such rights be scrupulously observed, and it also remains true to the principle that substantial damages compensate actual injury or, as punitive damages, deter and punish malicious deprivations of rights.41 Nominal damages remain open to any plaintiff who proves a constitutional violation but not actual injury.42 Punitive damages are a separate inquiry into the defendant's state of mind. The defendant need not have acted with malicious intent to harm, and reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others is enough.43
A student who proves that the lack of a hearing itself caused real distress recovers compensatory damages for that distress. A student who would have been suspended after a proper hearing and who proves no distress from the lack of process recovers at most one dollar. Carey was also careful about how far it reached. It observed that the elements and prerequisites for damages for deprivation of one constitutional right are not necessarily appropriate for another, and that many of the discrimination, voting, and Fourth Amendment cases the students cited held or implied that some actual, if intangible, injury must be proved before compensatory damages may be recovered.44 An answer about a different right should therefore treat proof of actual injury as the working default and should not assume presumed damages.
Incarcerated plaintiffs face one more limit on the distress item. The Prison Litigation Reform Act bars an incarcerated person, including a pretrial detainee, from bringing a federal civil suit for mental or emotional injury sustained in confinement unless the person also shows a physical injury or a sexual act.45 Courts disagree about how far that requirement reaches. Some apply it to constitutional claims, such as those under the First Amendment, procedural due process, or equal protection, that rarely cause physical injury, which forecloses compensatory damages for those claims. Others hold that the requirement bars only compensation for emotional or mental harm and leaves the plaintiff free to recover for other injuries.46 In Cassidy v. Indiana Department of Corrections, the plaintiff was barred from recovering for mental or emotional injury yet could pursue compensation for lost freedom of movement, lost social contact, and a reduced chance of early release.
The usual error on this subject is to treat the violation as proof of the injury, so that an unconstitutional process is assumed to have caused distress and the only open question is how much. The first question is what the plaintiff has shown the violation caused. A plaintiff who shows nothing recovers nominal damages and may seek punitive damages if the defendant's conduct warrants them.