Concept
Measuring Awards
Damages for mental distress and other intangible injuries
Measuring Awards
The Restatement (Second) of Torts recognizes that compensatory damages may be awarded without proof of pecuniary loss for bodily harm and for emotional distress.1 That freedom has a price. A medical bill or a payroll record gives the jury a number to start from and gives the defendant and the judge a number to check. Pain, fright, and lost enjoyment arrive with no invoice and no market price, yet compensation remains one of the goals of tort law,2 so someone must still convert experience into dollars. These damages are of necessity not subject to precise measurement, and they depend on the evidence presented in the particular case.3
The law leaves that conversion to the jury and surrounds it with three controls, each operating at a different moment. Instructions and rules on argument work before the verdict, shaping what jurors hear about value. Review works after the verdict, when a judge tests the figure against other awards and against the evidence. Caps work before any suit is filed, when a legislature sets a dollar limit that no verdict may exceed. Each answers a weakness in the one before it: guidance to jurors stays thin, review can act only after the jury has spoken, and a statutory limit reaches every case by treating injuries alike. When an exam fact pattern calls a distress award too large or too small, the first task is to decide which of the three controls the facts invite.
Jury Discretion and Instructions
A typical pattern instruction gives jurors almost nothing to work with. It tells them that the law prescribes no definite standard or method of calculation for fixing reasonable compensation for pain and suffering, and that no witness’s opinion on the amount is required. In optional bracketed language it adds that counsel’s argument about the amount is not evidence. It then directs jurors to exercise their authority with “calm and reasonable judgment” and to fix damages that are “just and reasonable in the light of the evidence.”4
The instruction supplies a temperament and an anchor and withholds the rest. Jurors get no multiple of the medical bills and no table of values for particular injuries, and they need no expert to tell them what suffering is worth. A formula would invite arbitrariness, because pain has no market price; it would replace a judgment about one plaintiff’s experience with arithmetic that has no principled tie to that experience. The law therefore tells jurors how to approach the question and leaves the number to them.
Discretion over the amount does not include discretion to award nothing. In an intentional tort suit such as assault or battery, the plaintiff may seek compensatory damages for medical expenses, lost wages, and pain and suffering, and once liability is found the jury must award compensatory damages in an amount appropriate to the loss.5 Some courts go further and require an award for pain once the jury finds that physical injury was inflicted. A zero verdict for pain, paired with a verdict for medical expenses, is often regarded as insupportable or inadequate, because the medical award reflects a finding that there was also pain for which at least some compensation is due.6
Because the instruction names no figure, the only number a jury hears usually comes from counsel. The basis for general damages is the effect of the injury over the plaintiff’s life expectancy, so plaintiffs’ lawyers often make a “unit of time” or per diem argument, proposing $1.00 per hour for the rest of the plaintiff’s life expectancy, for example.7 The argument turns an abstraction into a small, familiar sum and lets multiplication supply the total. That appeal is also the objection to it.
Courts divide over how to handle that risk. Many refuse to allow the per diem argument, reasoning that it enhances the effects of sympathy and lends a spurious sense of accuracy to what is fundamentally speculation; the alternative they leave open is to confine counsel to suggesting a lump sum.8 Courts that allow the argument pair it with a cautionary instruction that any unit of time is only advisory, not binding. Without that instruction, the argument may create an illusion in the jury’s mind that pain and suffering damages can and perhaps should be measured by simple multiplication rather than through a jury’s sound discretion.9
The two responses protect the same thing and differ only in where they draw the line. The bar removes the multiplication argument, and the cautionary instruction tells jurors it carries no force. Either way, the amount remains the product of the jury’s own judgment. An exam answer should therefore avoid announcing a single national rule. A student who calls every unit-of-time argument improper has described only the jurisdictions that bar it, and a student who treats the argument as harmless because counsel’s argument is not evidence has overlooked the cautionary instruction that courts allowing it attach.
This control is procedural. It regulates how a figure may be presented to jurors and does not fix what the figure should be, so a defendant who objects to a per diem argument attacks the manner of presentation, and neither the existence of the harm nor the plaintiff’s credibility. Instructions cannot guarantee a reasonable verdict, because the jury stays free to return a figure that is high or low. The next subsection turns to how courts check such a figure once it is returned.
Comparison and Review
A jury’s figure for pain and distress is its first word on the amount, and a judge may review it after the verdict. The amount belongs to the jury, but there is “an upper limit, and whether that has been surpassed is not a question of fact with respect to which reasonable [persons] may differ, but a question of law.”11 A court may also grant a new trial on the ground that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, as when a trial judge thinks a $1.6 million award excessive in light of evidence that the plaintiff’s leg throbbed.12
Review matters because everything before the verdict leaves the figure unanchored. Jurors receive an instruction to use calm and reasonable judgment and no formula, and the rules on argument can only keep counsel from suggesting false arithmetic. The post-verdict stage is the first point at which a figure meets something outside the jury room: the awards other courts have accepted and the evidence in the record. Review must also stay restrained, because the amount belongs to the jury, and the traditional remedies are ad hoc approaches that many courts are reluctant to apply except in the most egregious cases of seeming jury error.13
The first check is comparison. To decide whether an award is excessive, a court may examine awards in similar cases, looking to the particular facts and circumstances of those cases and comparing them with the one before it. The question is whether the award falls “within reasonable range,” and the court does not simply balance the number of high and low awards and reject the verdict because the lower ones are more numerous.14
The second check is the evidence. A court should ask whether the record adequately supports the distress award, and it may reduce an award that rests on “sparse evidence with respect to the magnitude and duration of emotional injury or mental distress,” in order to guard against awards based on speculation.15 Strong evidence of duration and awareness can carry a large figure. In Maracallo v. Board of Education of City of New York, a fourteen-year-old drowned in a waterpark wave pool during a school trip. The court found that he was conscious for six to seven minutes, aware of impending death, and found evidence supporting an award of not less than $2,000,000 for his pain and suffering. It reasoned that in many cases the “pre-impact terror” a victim experiences is measured in seconds, whereas this boy fought for multiple minutes against currents that terrified him.16 Appellate review of a distress award is illustrated in Wagenmann v. Adams.
When review finds the award out of range, the court has a graded set of responses. Under remittitur, when a jury award exceeds what a reasonable jury could award in light of all the evidence, the trial court gives the plaintiff a choice between a new trial and acceptance of a specified reduction. Additur is the matching practice for an award that is unduly low.17 Where a court orders a new trial as the alternative to remittitur, it must also decide whether to retry every issue or only damages. A partial retrial is proper only if the issue to be retried is distinct and separable from the others, and it is more problematic when the same jury heard both liability and damages.18
A defendant who calls a distress verdict far too large is therefore asking for post-verdict review, and the remedy to name is remittitur or a new trial; the court offers the plaintiff a choice and does not simply impose its own figure. The argument differs from an attack on the plaintiff’s credibility, which belongs to the jury, and from an objection that the law does not compensate the category of harm, which belongs to the judge before the case reaches the jury.
One further caution applies to large distress awards. In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, the Court observed that compensatory damages already contain a punitive element, quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908, comment c: when compensatory damages include an amount for emotional distress, such as humiliation or indignation aroused by the defendant’s act, there is no clear line between punishment and compensation, and a verdict for a specified amount frequently includes elements of both.19 Two consequences follow. A distress figure that looks inflated may reflect anger at the defendant as much as the plaintiff’s own suffering, which is another reason to test the number against evidence of the harm. And a court reviewing punitive damages should remember that the compensatory award may already have done some of the punishing.
Caps and Reform Proposals
Legislatures answer the variability of pain and suffering awards most directly with caps. The inherently imprecise nature of valuing such items, and the occasionally very large awards for them, make noneconomic damages a target for critics of the tort system, and many state legislatures have limited them to a designated amount, for example $300,000.22 Caps grew out of the tort reform movement of the 1980s, a large, systematic, and sustained effort that renewed and broadened an earlier push to limit medical malpractice liability. Its proponents argued that claims had grown in volume and amount, that insurance costs were excessive as a result, that insurance was unavailable in some instances, and that valuable goods and services were being driven from the market; they expected reduced liability to mean reduced premiums.23 By 1990 some kind of direct cap existed in at least half the states, although some of those statutes have been held unconstitutional.24
The same unpredictability troubles anyone who must decide in advance how much safety is worth. If the law supplies “no definite standard” for pain and suffering, one commentator asks, how can a manufacturer determine the monetary magnitude of these injuries when the risk-utility test requires safety decisions? The suggested answer starts from the nature of the duty: a seller must provide a product that satisfies the reasonable safety expectations of the ordinary consumer, and those expectations can inform the amount of damages.25 A cap answers the same difficulty by a different route, handing the defendant an upper bound to plan around.
Statutes that impose direct caps differ in how much of the plaintiff’s recovery they touch and in whom they reach.
- Some statutes apply to personal injury cases generally, subject sometimes to narrow exceptions, and they often cap only noneconomic damages, leaving pecuniary recovery intact.26
- Other statutes go further and limit pecuniary or economic harm as well as intangible harm, many setting a total cap for all harm resulting from the injury; these absolute limits usually apply only to a specified group of defendants, such as health care providers.27
- Still others apply a cap to specified claims, most commonly claims against health care providers, governmental entities, and alcohol providers, groups that the common law had generally favored with limited-duty rules or immunities.28
- Indirect caps shunt certain cases out of the tort system altogether, much as workers’ compensation does, or set up a public compensation system to handle larger claims.29
Whether a statutory limit reaches a given defendant depends on the statute’s terms, and courts read those terms closely. In Stone v. York Haven Power Co., the court treated a statutory immunity as inapplicable to highly developed recreational areas, and it applied the immunity to a lake but not to the dam that created it.30 See also Anderson v. City of Springfield (Mass. 1990); Ballard v. Ypsilanti Township (Mich. 1998).31
A cap and a remittitur can both shrink a verdict, but they work differently. Remittitur applies when an award exceeds what a reasonable jury could award in light of all the evidence, and it gives the plaintiff the choice of a new trial or a specified reduction.32 A cap applies to any award above the ceiling, whatever the evidence shows, because the legislative trend has been to set rigid, across-the-board dollar limits on noneconomic damages regardless of the nature of the injury.33 A ceiling therefore cannot tell a runaway verdict from a well-founded one.
Whether a cap is a good design turns on a trade-off between predictability and fairness. Anyone who would control pain and suffering awards more systematically must find standards that are both fair and workable; it is easy to satisfy one criterion at a time and very hard to satisfy both. About half the states have placed absolute dollar ceilings on pain and suffering, sometimes as low as $250,000.34 A ceiling buys predictability by cutting only the awards a jury would set above the line, so the sacrifice falls on the most seriously injured. Those plaintiffs are disproportionately young, because young, seriously injured victims have the life expectancies and injuries most likely to involve long-term, severe pain, while a plaintiff whose pain the jury values below the ceiling gives up nothing and is compensated for all of it.35
The alternatives spread the burden more evenly and pay for that fairness in workability.
- A schedule would exact some sacrifice from every category of victim, however modest the suffering, by fixing permissible pain and suffering damages according to the victim’s age and the severity of the injury: a certain amount for death at a given age, for paralysis at a given age, for loss of an arm at a given age, and so on. It would be fairer than dollar ceilings but less workable, and only legislation could create it.36
- A carve-out would leave pain and suffering damages unlimited for substantial or permanent loss or impairment of bodily functioning or substantial and permanent disfigurement. It would risk some jury abuse but might operate as a considerable constraint in many cases.37
Legislatures have found schedules much less attractive than absolute ceilings, which ignore the problem of equity among victims. Many states therefore still operate with only remittitur and additur, while others have enacted ceilings.38 Scholars continue to propose new ways of calculating pain and suffering damages, one emphasizing the importance of full compensation.39
Step four is where this subject meets the last one. A cap and a remittitur can both reduce a verdict, but only remittitur depends on the record. A defendant who says an award is too large because the plaintiff’s proof was thin is making a review argument, and a defendant who points to the statutory ceiling is making a cap argument.