Concept
Proving the Harm
Damages for mental distress and other intangible injuries
Proving the Harm
The Restatement (Second) of Torts allows compensatory damages for bodily harm and for emotional distress without proof of pecuniary loss.1 The rule excuses the plaintiff from producing receipts and payroll records. It does not excuse the plaintiff from proving the injury. A plaintiff who claims months of fear or years of pain must still show that the fear and the pain occurred and that the defendant's wrong caused them. The relaxed rule governs how the harm is valued once it exists; the demand for proof governs whether there is any harm to value.
Court and jury divide the work. Whether the kind of harm the plaintiff claims is legally compensable is a question for the court.2 Once the court admits a category of harm, what this plaintiff actually suffered becomes a question of fact,3 and the jury can answer it only from evidence.
Breaking an award into components lets us focus on each element (the bodily harm, the distress, the pecuniary items) and ask what evidence shows it.4 The breakdown has hazards. A single loss may fit more than one component, which risks omission or double recovery, and the names of the components change from context to context.5
Two questions of proof follow. The first is who must show that harm occurred, and how persuasively. The second is what evidence carries that showing when, as with pain and distress, no invoice exists, and what added threshold of severity applies when distress is the whole claim.
Burden and Standard of Proof
The plaintiff carries the burden of proving that harm occurred, and the rule that excuses proof of pecuniary loss leaves that burden in place.6 In negligence the harm must be real before any damages question arises. The plaintiff must prove actual harm, usually personal injury or property damage; as basketball commentators say, “No harm, no foul.”7 Nominal damages, the token sum awarded when a wrong is established but no loss is shown, are not recoverable in negligence, although they are in intentional torts.8 A plaintiff who proves only that the defendant was careless has therefore proved no claim.
Intentional torts work differently. The plaintiff need not even know the wrong occurred: a patient touched inappropriately while under anesthesia can recover for battery although she never realizes it happened.9 Negligence is built the other way. Carelessness that hurts no one completes no tort, and no nominal award exists to mark the lapse.
The plaintiff whose only complaint is emotional distress, with no physical harm behind it, meets the same obstacle: in most situations a negligence plaintiff who suffers only distress, or only purely commercial loss, cannot recover.10 A later section takes up the exceptions. A physically injured plaintiff has cleared the gate, and the distress that accompanies the injury then comes in as an item of damages.
Once actual harm is in the case, jurisdictions differ on how persuasive the proof of loss must be. In some, the ordinary rules that govern the elements of the claim also govern damages: the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the losses claimed have occurred or will occur.11 Medical malpractice is one setting where this standard applies. The plaintiff must show compensable harm caused by the defendant's wrongful act, and damages are proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence.12 Other jurisdictions keep the traditional rule that damages must be proved to a reasonable certainty.13 The older rule probably took hold because damages are a particular dollar amount, and a precise figure seemed hard to prove by a mere preponderance.14
The two formulations differ in how freely a judge may disturb a verdict. Under a preponderance standard, a court reviewing a verdict would have to rule that no reasonable juror could have found the amount more likely than not. Under reasonable certainty, the court need only rule that no reasonable juror could have found the amount reasonably certain, a ruling that seems more modest and less invasive of the jury's role.15 The rule thus emboldens judges by weakening the rhetoric required to intervene in jury awards, and it shifts the balance of power between judge and jury.16
For intangible harm, courts apply the certainty requirement with considerable latitude. Distress, pain, suffering, lost joy, indignity, outrage, and loss of reputation resist measurement with any certainty, so as long as the existence of these losses can be demonstrated, the requirements of the rule are satisfied.17 The reason is plain once you ask what dollar-level precision would demand. No market prices a month of fear, and no invoice exists for a sleepless night, so a rule that required the exact amount would defeat recovery for the very losses the law set out to compensate. The plaintiff must therefore establish through evidence that the harm exists, and the jury fixes the amount.
Pecuniary losses get a harder look. Courts may expect somewhat more evidence that such a loss exists; some are satisfied once its existence is established with reasonable certainty, while others require both the existence and the amount to be proved with reasonable certainty.18 Rejecting the collision victim's claim because she offered no dollar figure would apply a pecuniary-loss demand to an intangible item.
One refinement shifts the risk of uncertainty onto the defendant. Under the wrongdoer rule, an exception to the certainty requirement, jurors have room to estimate the loss where the lack of certainty results from the wrongdoer's conduct.19 The exception makes sense: a defendant whose conduct blurred the loss should not profit from the blur. It softens a strict test without removing the plaintiff's duty to show that a loss occurred.
Evidence of Distress
Distress, the Supreme Court said in Carey v. Piphus, is a personal injury familiar to the law, customarily proved by showing the nature and circumstances of the wrong and its effect on the plaintiff.21 The case arose from a denial of procedural due process, and a later section returns to it. Here it states the proof problem every distress claim faces. The Court held that neither the likelihood of such injury nor the difficulty of proving it justifies awarding compensatory damages without proof that the injury actually was caused.22
The Court recognized that distress, which includes mental suffering and emotional anguish, is essentially subjective. Genuine injury of this kind, it said, may be evidenced by one's conduct and observed by others, provided juries receive appropriate instructions and the award rests on competent evidence concerning the injury.23 The Court also noted a lower court's remark that humiliation can be inferred from the circumstances as well as established by testimony, and it read that remark as treating actual injury as a question of fact.24
Proof of this kind avoids two extremes. A rule that demanded objective confirmation would leave nothing for the plaintiff who suffered intensely but bore no outward sign. A rule that accepted a bare assertion would let any plaintiff add anguish to a lawsuit at no cost. Competent evidence gives the jury facts from which to infer the distress, and it gives a reviewing court something to test.
Defamation law applies the same principle. Actual injury there is not limited to out-of-pocket loss; it includes impairment of reputation and standing, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering. Awards must be supported by competent evidence concerning the injury, although no evidence need assign a dollar value to it.25 Another decision drew the same line. Plaintiffs ordinarily need not prove with exactitude the amount of damages for intangible injury, but the record there held no proof of individualized injury, such as mental distress, and the Court saw no occasion to consider how much proof a particular award requires once actual injury is shown.26 Proof that harm exists and proof of what it is worth are different tasks, and a plaintiff who cannot price the suffering may still prove it.
A plaintiff can draw on several kinds of evidence, and the strongest cases combine them:
- The circumstances of the wrong, from which a jury may infer distress, humiliation in particular.27
- The plaintiff's own account of what the plaintiff felt and how daily life changed afterward.28
- The plaintiff's conduct and the observations of others, such as family, friends, or coworkers who saw the plaintiff change.29
- The defendant's purpose. When the defendant set out to cause the suffering, that conduct is stronger proof that suffering occurred than any physical injury that may or may not have followed.30
Jurors need little help with the first items, because they know from their own lives the disagreeable emotions that may follow a defendant's conduct; whether distress produced a bodily injury is the harder, medical question.31 Medical testimony can strengthen a showing, but the customary proof is the nature and circumstances of the wrong and its effect on the plaintiff.32 Violent circumstances can do much of the work. In Daley v. LaCroix a car left the highway, sheared off a utility pole, and set off a great electrical explosion that damaged the plaintiffs' house; an event that violent bears on what the people in the house went through.33
The competent-evidence requirement also gives courts a yardstick for reviewing awards. In Trivedi v. Cooper a judge examining a jury's award concluded that $50,000 was a generous award, the maximum that does not shock the judicial conscience, and not out of line with other cases.34 A later section explains how courts compare and reduce awards. The point here is that evidence, and not the jury's sympathy, must carry the sum.
When distress is the whole claim, weak evidence can end the case. The stand-alone tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress has a fourth element, severe distress, which requires the plaintiff to show a severely disabling emotional response to the defendant's conduct.35 Severity therefore does two jobs: it bears on the amount of recovery, and it is a necessary element of any recovery.36 In the case that states this rule, the court held the evidence of severity legally insufficient to go to the jury. It added that a plaintiff's preexisting susceptibility to distress does not necessarily preclude liability if the conduct intensified the preexisting condition.37
The threshold screens out ordinary upset, which life supplies without help from defendants. Proving that distress occurred asks whether it happened; severity asks how serious it was, and the stand-alone tort makes that second question a condition of recovery.
Defendants sometimes meet a distress claim with a defense that has nothing to do with proof. In Snyder v. Phelps, Westboro moved for summary judgment on the ground that the First Amendment insulated its speech from liability.38 That defense lies outside this chapter. Its presence is a reminder that proving distress clears the plaintiff's first hurdle and not necessarily the last. Cases that touch speech involve a Snyder v. Phelps-style defense in addition to the proof problems covered here.
The severity element belongs to the stand-alone tort. When the plaintiff has been physically injured or has proved another recognized tort, distress is an item of damages in an established cause of action. If a cause of action is otherwise established, damages may be given for mental suffering naturally ensuing from the acts complained of, and in torts such as assault, battery, false imprisonment, and defamation, mental suffering frequently constitutes the principal element of damages.39 The plaintiff proves it the ordinary way, through testimony about the experience, the circumstances of the injury, and witnesses who saw its effects, and the jury values it.