Concept
Components of Recovery
Damages for mental distress and other intangible injuries
Components of Recovery
A personal injury verdict is a sum of items, and each item has its own kind of proof. Section 924 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts lists them: a person whose interests of personality have been tortiously invaded may recover damages for past or prospective bodily harm and emotional distress; loss or impairment of earning capacity; reasonable medical and other expenses; and harm to property or business caused by the invasion.1 Interests of personality are a person’s interests in his own body and well-being, and the section assumes that the invasion is already tortious, so liability is established. It says what the plaintiff may be paid for once the wrong is proved.
The list divides in two. Bodily harm and emotional distress, named first, form the intangible core.2 The other three items measure money the plaintiff lost or must spend, so the plaintiff proves them with evidence of amount. Sorting an item into its kind tells you what must be shown. A court that demanded receipts for pain would be treating an intangible as a pecuniary loss, and a jury that awarded a round sum for an expense no one documented would be making the opposite mistake.
The words “past or prospective” add a second dimension that runs through every item.3 A tort plaintiff ordinarily sues once and recovers once, so the jury compensates harm not yet suffered along with harm already endured.4 A future loss is a prediction, and the law needs a way to separate a prediction the evidence supports from a hope or a fear. The subsections below take the intangible core first, then the pecuniary items beside it, and then the time dimension.
Distress and Bodily Harm
Section 924(a) places bodily harm and emotional distress side by side, and the jury may compensate both in one verdict.5 The pairing follows how injuries happen. A broken leg is rarely only a broken leg: the person who suffers one also endures the fright of the collision and worry about the recovery. Section 924(a) lets the jury pay for the whole experience of the injury rather than for its physical component alone.
The Restatement defines emotional distress broadly. It includes all highly unpleasant mental reactions: fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry, and nausea.6 The same comment, written for the tort of intentional infliction, adds a filter. Liability arises only where the distress is extreme, so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it, because some degree of transient and trivial distress is part of the price of living among people.7 That filter belongs to the stand-alone tort, where the distress is the entire claim. When distress accompanies bodily harm, the breadth of the list is what matters. The jury hears about the terror, the worry, and the embarrassment, and each is a component of the damages.
Courts therefore treat distress in two ways, depending on whether it is an item of damages in another tort or the claim itself. Distress of the first kind is called parasitic, because it attaches to a wrong that is independently actionable, such as negligence that injures the plaintiff’s body, and draws its legitimacy from that host. A plaintiff who establishes the underlying tort recovers for the accompanying distress without the limits courts place on stand-alone claims, such as a demand that the distress be severe.8 The stand-alone claim, whether framed as intentional or negligent infliction, stays subject to those limits. For negligent infliction, most courts allow recovery when the defendant’s conduct results in physical contact with the plaintiff or, when no contact occurs, when the plaintiff was in the zone of danger, meaning the area in which the defendant’s conduct put the plaintiff at risk of physical harm.9
One way to see why the limits fall away is to ask what they screen for. The severity requirement keeps out trivial distress, and the contact and zone-of-danger tests confine negligent claims to plaintiffs who were close to physical danger. A broken leg and a visible scar are objective facts that make the fright, worry, and embarrassment that follow believable. When distress is the whole claim, no such fact stands behind it, so courts screen it with rules of their own.
An exam writer will test the rule by taking away the injury and leaving the fright.
Compare the three plaintiffs. The pedestrian with the broken leg recovers for her fright because it rides on a bodily injury. The pedestrian who was missed recovers, if at all, because she passes the stand-alone test. The neighbor’s claim fails under the test most courts apply, however real her fear. The later section on distress without physical harm develops those limits. The usual student error runs the other way: seeing a physically injured plaintiff and still asking whether the distress was severe.
Pecuniary Items Alongside
Beyond bodily harm and emotional distress, § 924 entitles a plaintiff to recover for loss or impairment of earning capacity, reasonable medical and other expenses, and harm to property or business caused by the invasion.11 Each is a pecuniary item, a loss that shows up as dollars the plaintiff has spent, must spend, or failed to earn. In a bodily injury case these out-of-pocket losses are called special damages, and they consist mainly of health-care expenses and lost earnings or earning capacity. They are set against general damages, the non-economic losses often called pain and suffering, although those may include other intangible losses.12
Each pecuniary item has its own subject. Earning capacity is the plaintiff’s ability to earn, which reaches further than the paychecks actually missed. A plaintiff who was not employed when injured may still recover for lost future earnings if the jury can find that she would more probably than not have worked and can determine the probable type of work and rate of pay.13 Medical and other expenses are recoverable when they are “reasonable,” a qualifier that lets a defendant contest charges or care that exceed what the injury called for.14 Harm to property or business is recoverable when it is “caused by the invasion,” so a store whose receipts fall for reasons unrelated to the tort adds nothing to the verdict, while a store kept closed because its owner was hurt does.15 Where property itself is damaged, the general measure is the loss in value or the cost to repair or replace, whichever is less, with consequential losses such as diminished profits added.16
These items differ from the intangible core in how they are proved. A medical bill exists because a provider sent it, a missing wage appears in an employer’s payroll, and a repair estimate comes from a shop that will do the work, so documents can fix the amount of each. The plaintiff must prove the loss by a preponderance of the evidence, though some jurisdictions use the older formula of reasonable certainty.17 Losses not yet incurred get relief from exactness. The jury need only find it more probable than not that they will occur and have some reasonable basis beyond sheer speculation for computing them.18 Pain and distress leave no comparable trail. The jury places a value on them without bills to anchor the figure, a subject the later section on measuring awards takes up.
An exam answer goes wrong by carrying the instinct that fits one half of that scene over to the other. A student who asks for receipts before allowing any award for anguish has applied the pecuniary pattern to the intangible core. The opposite error accepts a pecuniary figure on the plaintiff’s say-so.
The standard can still favor a plaintiff with little work history when some evidence points toward the future earnings. The jury may take account of probable future wage increases, and in the case of a child it may find that she probably would have gone to college and obtained skilled employment if some evidence supports that finding.19 The child and the invented executive both rest on prediction. What separates them is the evidence that gives the jury something to compute from.
Past and Prospective Harm
Section 924 entitles the plaintiff to recover for “past or prospective” harm, and the phrase governs every item on the list.21 Prospective harm is harm the plaintiff has not yet suffered when the verdict is returned but probably will suffer afterward, such as next year’s pain or the wages of a working life still ahead. The three principal losses of a personal injury case, wage loss, medical and other expenses, and pain and suffering, each have a past aspect and a future aspect.22 A jury valuing emotional distress likewise counts the distress still to come, and a jury valuing earning capacity counts the paychecks the plaintiff will no longer receive.
The law reaches into the future because a tort plaintiff ordinarily gets a single recovery: one action that compensates past and future losses together.23 The arrangement has advantages and disadvantages. The case does not go on forever, and the legal system avoids multiple judicial proceedings and their administrative cost.24 The price is that the verdict covers the future, so the jury must estimate it at trial.
The next question is how sure the jury must be about a future no one can see. Future losses and expenses need not be established to a certainty, either as to whether they will occur or as to their amount. The jury need only find it more probable than not that they will be incurred and have some reasonable basis beyond sheer speculation for computing them.25 The standard has two edges, and each protects a different party. Because the plaintiff recovers once, a demand for certainty would leave the plaintiff to absorb the whole risk of what medicine cannot promise. A mere possibility cannot support an award either, because the defendant would then pay for harms that most likely never come.
Students tend to err in one of two directions. Some treat every future harm as too speculative to count, which forgets that the single recovery forces the jury to look ahead. Others demand that a physician call the future harm certain, which sets a bar the law does not impose. The working question is whether the evidence makes the future harm more probable than not and gives the jury something to compute from.
How far ahead the jury must look depends on the plaintiff. A plaintiff hurt young carries a long future, and the injury itself may shorten it.
The lawyer for such a plaintiff must learn the medicine well enough to prove the complications, because the jury can compute only from the evidence it hears.26
Once the jury finds a future loss, it must price it, and here the treatment of economic and non-economic items diverges. Future economic loss is reduced to present value. The jury is typically told to discount but not told how or at what rate, so the subject frequently draws expert testimony from a statistician, economist, or actuary.27 Present value is the sum that, invested today at the chosen rate, would grow to the future amount. For illustration, at three percent compounded annually about $744 invested now grows to $1,000 in ten years, so an award meant to replace $1,000 of income ten years away would be reduced to about $744.
In most jurisdictions, damages for future non-economic harm, meaning pain and suffering, mental distress, disability, and disfigurement, are not reduced to present value.28 The logic of discounting explains the split. Present value converts a future sum of money into a smaller sum payable today, and pain is not a sum of money. The award for wages in year ten is therefore reduced, while the award for suffering in year ten is valued at what the suffering is worth.