Concept
Liability for Consequent Harm
Bodily harm resulting from emotional disturbance and extent of liability
Liability for Consequent Harm
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 456 builds outward from a claim that already exists. When an actor's negligent conduct has caused bodily harm to another and made the actor liable for it, the actor also answers for two further consequences.1 The first is "fright, shock, or other emotional disturbance resulting from the bodily harm or from the conduct which causes it."2 The second is "further bodily harm resulting from such emotional disturbance."3 Read together, the clauses form a chain: negligent conduct, bodily harm for which the actor is liable, emotional disturbance resulting from that harm or that conduct, and further bodily harm resulting from the disturbance. The earlier sections on fright asked when a plaintiff may recover for bodily harm that fright produces. This section asks how far the defendant's responsibility runs once liability for bodily harm exists.
The first link has to hold before the rest can matter. Comment a states that § 456 "applies only where the negligent conduct of the actor has resulted in bodily harm to another, and has made the actor liable for such bodily harm."4 A plaintiff must therefore win a claim for bodily harm before the section adds anything. A plaintiff whose only injury is emotional disturbance has nothing to build on and falls under the rule of § 436A: a negligent actor is not liable for emotional disturbance alone, without bodily harm or other compensable damage.5
The two clauses of § 456 mark two layers of consequence. The first reaches the emotional disturbance that follows the injury or the conduct behind it. The second reaches the physical harm that the disturbance can itself cause. The sections below take them in that order.
Emotional Disturbance From the Injury
Clause (a) adds emotional damages to a bodily-harm claim that already exists. It names two sources of compensable disturbance: the bodily harm itself and "the conduct which causes it."6 A broken leg may bring pain, grief, and worry, and the sight of the danger before it strikes may bring terror. Both are covered, so long as the defendant is already liable for the bodily harm.7
Consider a pedestrian struck by a negligently driven car and left with a broken leg. The driver is liable for the leg. The terror of watching the car come on results from the driver's conduct, which is the second source clause (a) names, so the terror is compensable too. It is compensable even though it injured nothing physically, because recovery for such disturbance is allowed "even though the emotional disturbance does not result in any further bodily harm."8
Beynon v. Montgomery Cablevision Ltd. Partnership shows the clause in litigation. The petitioners relied on the comments to § 456 as the rationale for letting a jury award damages for fright felt before impact. The respondents did not disagree. They said there was no need to decide whether Maryland accepts § 456, because Maryland law already requires a demonstrable or objectively determinable injury before pre-impact fright is compensable.9 Their point was that the Restatement question need not be reached, since the objective-injury requirement does the work.
The comments explain why disturbance can ride along with bodily harm. Where tortious conduct results in bodily harm and makes the actor liable for it, "a cause of action is independently established, and there is sufficient assurance that the resulting emotional disturbance is genuine and serious."10 The same comments explain the caution about bare distress. Without the guarantee of genuineness that bodily harm supplies, disturbance may be too easily feigned, because it depends largely on the plaintiff's subjective testimony. Allowing recovery could also open too wide a door for false claimants. And a merely negligent defendant's fault is not so great that the defendant should make good a purely mental disturbance.11 The broken leg answers the first two worries, because it is objective evidence that something real happened to this plaintiff. The third loses force as well, since the defendant's negligence has already made it answerable for a physical injury.
The range of compensable disturbance is wide. In addition to physical pain, most courts let a plaintiff claim damages for fright and shock sustained during the occurrence, anxiety about the future, loss of peace of mind, humiliation from disfigurement or disability, mental distress from losing the ability to enjoy a normal life, and inconvenience in daily activities.12 Authority is not unanimous, so the list describes the majority position and not a uniform rule.
The broken bone is the fact on which an exam question usually turns. Suppose the same careless act frightens two people and injures only one.
The fractured ankle is the only fact that separates the two. Okafor's terror is compensable as part of a claim for bodily harm. Lindqvist's falls under the rule that a negligent actor is not liable for emotional disturbance alone.13 Clause (a) cannot be used to get around that rule, because it only extends a claim that has already been established.
That separate question is the subject of clause (b), which reaches further bodily harm resulting from the disturbance, as when terror triggers a cardiac event.14
Further Bodily Harm
Clause (b) reaches "further bodily harm resulting from such emotional disturbance."16 The word "such" points back to clause (a), so the disturbance that can lead to further injury is the fright, shock, or other disturbance that resulted from the original harm or from the conduct that caused it.17 Clause (a) added emotional damages to the claim. Clause (b) recognizes that the disturbance can itself injure the body, as when terror or grief brings on a cardiac event or a miscarriage. The chain runs through four links: negligent conduct, bodily harm for which the actor is liable, emotional disturbance resulting from that harm or that conduct, and further bodily harm resulting from the disturbance.
Each link depends on the one before it, and the phrase "resulting from" appears at every step. The first link requires that the defendant already be liable for bodily harm, which puts a real wrong and a real injury at the head of the chain. A plaintiff with no original bodily harm has nothing for clause (b) to extend. The later links confine the defendant to what the disturbance actually produced. The clause does not make a defendant answerable for every ailment that follows an injury. It reaches only physical harm that the disturbance brought about.
Daley v. LaCroix, a 1970 decision of the Michigan Supreme Court, shows where the later links are fought out. A car left the highway near the plaintiffs' farm, traveled 63 feet in the air, and sheared off a utility pole. The snapped high-voltage lines struck the electrical lines into the plaintiffs' house and caused a great electrical explosion.18 A psychiatrist, Dr. Goldin, testified that Estelle Daley had been neurotic since childhood and that the incident did not cause her neurosis.19 The case is useful here for the shape of the dispute and not for any holding on § 456. The contest is medical, and it asks whether the frightening event or something older produced the plaintiff's condition. That is the question the last link asks, and the next section returns to preexisting conditions.
Fuller v. Preis offers an analogy for how far a chain of consequences can run, though it concerns suicide and not fright. The court stated that an act of suicide, as a matter of law, is not a superseding cause in negligence law precluding liability, and it observed that an initial tortfeasor may be liable for the wrongful acts of a third party if foreseeable.20 The passage says nothing about § 456, so it is no construction of clause (b). What it contributes is a point about scope: even a later event as grave as suicide does not, as a matter of law, break the chain of responsibility. Whether liability follows turns on tracing the event back to the injury.
Both passengers satisfied the first two links, and the last link separates them. Reyes's miscarriage traces to the disturbance the defendant's conduct produced, while Dunning's illness traces to a source the defendant did not create. The usual exam error is to read clause (b) as a promise to pay for any illness that follows an injury, when the clause reaches only physical harm that the emotional disturbance itself brought about.
Every link carries its own burden of proof, and that is where the remaining limits do their work. The next section takes up the requirement that the harm be real and objective, the normal-person standard against which the disturbance is measured, and the treatment of preexisting conditions.