Concept
The Bodily-Harm Exception
Negligent infliction of emotional distress without physical harm: threshold rule
The Bodily-Harm Exception
Section 313(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts opens one narrow door in the baseline rule that distress alone goes uncompensated. An actor who unintentionally causes emotional distress is subject to liability “for resulting illness or bodily harm” when two conditions are met.1 Section 436A marks the contrast: it denies recovery when negligence produces emotional disturbance “alone, without bodily harm or other compensable damage,” and the exception supplies the bodily harm that the baseline found missing.2 Section 312 states the intentional counterpart, which reaches the actor who intentionally and unreasonably subjects another to distress he should recognize as likely to result in illness or other bodily harm.3
Section 313(1) has a stem and two conditions. The stem names what the plaintiff recovers for: resulting illness or bodily harm. Under condition (a), the actor should have realized that his conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing the distress itself, “otherwise than by knowledge of the harm or peril of a third person.”4 Under condition (b), the actor, “from facts known to him,” should have realized that the distress, if caused, might result in illness or bodily harm.5 The conditions test different things. Condition (a) asks whether the actor was careless about upsetting someone, and condition (b) asks whether what the actor knew made bodily consequences foreseeable. The subsections below take the idea behind the exception first, then each condition, and finally the stem’s demand that illness or bodily harm actually result.
Distress as a Route to Harm
Section 306 explains how emotional disturbance can create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm. An act may be negligent as creating that risk if the actor intends to subject another to an emotional disturbance, or realizes or should realize that the act involves an unreasonable risk of doing so, and the disturbance is of such a character as to be likely to result in illness or other bodily harm.6 Three mental states therefore qualify: intent to cause the disturbance, actual realization of the risk, and a failure to realize what the actor should have realized. The risk the section names is one of bodily harm, and the disturbance is the means by which the body is reached. A shocking message can injure a person as surely as a blow, and the section treats the two as variations on one danger.
Section 313(1) is the liability side of the same rule. Section 306 says when conduct is negligent, and § 313(1) says when the actor pays for it: if the actor unintentionally causes emotional distress to another, he is liable for resulting illness or bodily harm, provided the section’s two conditions are met.7 The pairing is needed because negligence requires an unreasonable risk of a harm the law protects. The Restatement uses “injury” to denote the invasion of a legally protected interest,8 and § 436A refuses to compensate disturbance without bodily harm. Read together, the provisions imply that freedom from fright, standing alone, is not such an interest, while bodily integrity is.9 Distress enters the analysis only as the channel by which carelessness reaches the body. The limit also supplies the objective evidence the baseline rule found missing: a physician can examine an illness and trace it to a cause, while a private feeling resists verification.
The stem fixes what the defendant pays for. Distress is the cause, the bodily harm is the injury, and the defendant pays for the injury. Once the plaintiff proves it, the fright, anxiety, and suffering that accompanied it enter the recovery as damages, the parasitic principle taught earlier. The opening hypothetical shows the consequence. Both pedestrians were equally frightened, so the intensity of the fright cannot separate them. The second has a cardiac event, a bodily injury of the kind § 313(1) names, and the first has only the distress that § 436A leaves uncompensated.10 The word “resulting” adds a causal demand: if a physician traced the cardiac event to something other than the shock, the second pedestrian would have no claim either.
Two conditions follow because the unintentional actor answers for a consequence she never aimed at. The law therefore asks whether both the risk of distress and the risk of bodily consequences were foreseeable to her. That two-step test keeps the exception on fault. Compensation is one of tort law’s goals, but courts have not adopted strict liability across the board, and fault remains the most common basis for liability.11
The dissent in Bartow v. Smith supplies the reasoning by quoting comments to the Restatement rule for the actor who intentionally subjects another to distress. That rule is § 312, the intentional counterpart, so the comments reach § 313(1) only by analogy. They explain why the unintentional case needs more conditions. The actor who intends distress knows the distress, the person, and the circumstances, and so foresees bodily consequences far better than an actor who is negligent because he should, but perhaps does not, realize that distress may follow.12 The same comment adds that there are many situations in which it is reasonable, indeed inevitable, to subject another to distress likely to have serious physical consequences, so liability requires that the actor act unreasonably.13 Conditions (a) and (b) answer those two points. Condition (a) tests whether the actor was careless about the risk of distress, and condition (b) tests whether the facts the actor knew made bodily consequences foreseeable.
Unreasonable Risk of Distress
Condition (a) of § 313(1) requires that the actor “should have realized that his conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing the distress, otherwise than by knowledge of the harm or peril of a third person.”15 The sentence has two parts. One is a negligence requirement aimed at the distress itself: the actor must have been careless about the risk of upsetting someone, whatever other risks the conduct posed. The other is a carve-out that removes distress caused by learning of a third person’s harm or peril. Because condition (a) sits beneath a stem that makes the actor liable for resulting illness or bodily harm, it screens the actor’s fault first, and condition (b) then asks whether bodily consequences were foreseeable.
The first part is an ordinary breach inquiry pointed at one risk. “Should have realized” sets an objective standard: the question is what a reasonable person in the actor’s position would have perceived about the chance of upsetting someone, and the actor’s actual awareness is not the test. Section 306 states the same standard from the standpoint of fault.16 Fault must attach to the distress because distress is the pathway by which the conduct reaches the body. An actor who was careless about some physical danger, but could not reasonably have anticipated that the conduct would upset anyone, has not been careless about the step that carries the harm.
The word “unreasonable” keeps the inquiry from reaching conduct that people must be free to engage in, and delivering bad news is the plainest example. The comment quoted in the Bartow dissent says the actor must act unreasonably, because there are many situations in which it is “reasonable, indeed inevitable,” to subject another to distress recognizably likely to have serious physical consequences, such as informing an ill woman of the death of a dearly loved relative.17 That comment belongs to § 312, so it reaches condition (a) only by analogy, but the word “unreasonable” does the same work in both sections. Distress that is likely and severe therefore does not satisfy (a) when the news must be given. The inquiry asks whether the risk was justified, which is the familiar negligence balance of the likelihood and seriousness of the distress against the usefulness of the conduct and the cost of avoiding it.
Both messages announce a grave illness, and both are likely to cause severe distress, so the gravity of the distress cannot be what separates them. Justification separates them. Satisfying (a) establishes only the first of two conditions: the patient who received the wrong diagnosis would still need foreseeable illness under (b) and an actual illness or bodily harm before § 313(1) imposes liability.
The carve-out works together with subsection (2) of § 313. By excluding distress caused by knowledge of a third person’s harm or peril, condition (a) sends those claims to subsection (2), which provides that the rule of subsection (1) has no application to illness or bodily harm caused by emotional distress arising solely from harm or peril to a third person, unless the actor’s negligence has otherwise created an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to the plaintiff.18 The comment to that subsection, reproduced in Clohessy v. Bachelor, gives the standard illustration. The actor negligently runs down and kills a child in the street, and the child’s mother, in the immediate vicinity, witnesses the event and suffers a heart attack from severe distress. She cannot recover for that harm unless she was herself in the path of the vehicle or otherwise threatened with bodily harm apart from her distress at the child’s peril.19 The comment points to § 436 for the plaintiff who is threatened with bodily harm in another manner and also suffers distress at a third person’s peril.20 Condition (a) does not decide whether the mother ultimately recovers. It declines to govern her claim and leaves it to subsection (2).
The hand-off guards against open-ended liability. One victim’s injury can devastate relatives and onlookers by the dozen, and if (a) reached their distress, a single careless act would expose the actor to claims from everyone who saw or heard of the accident. Subsection (2) puts those claims on stricter footing, as the next major section develops. A pedestrian whom the same driver narrowly misses stands differently, because the fright comes from the pedestrian’s own peril and stays within (a).
Step three decides cases of necessary bad news, where the distress is plainly foreseeable and the only live question is whether the actor was justified in creating the risk. Step one decides cases brought by relatives and onlookers, because the source of the plaintiff’s distress then matters more than the quality of the actor’s conduct.
Foreseeable Illness or Bodily Harm
Condition (b) of § 313(1) adds a second foreseeability requirement: the actor, “from facts known to him,” must have realized that the distress, if it were caused, might result in illness or bodily harm.22 Condition (a) looked at the front of the causal chain and asked whether the actor was careless about causing distress at all.23 Condition (b) looks at the back of the chain and asks whether the actor should have expected the distress, once caused, to reach the body. The questions are independent, so a plaintiff who answers the first has not answered the second.
Foreseeing a fright and foreseeing an illness are different acts of foresight. People are startled, frightened, and upset every day without bodily consequence, so an actor can reasonably anticipate that conduct will upset a bystander and still have no reason to expect that anyone will fall ill. If condition (a) sufficed, every actor who carelessly risked frightening someone would answer for whatever illness followed, however remote. Condition (b) prevents that by requiring foresight about the interest the exception protects. Section 306 builds the same requirement into its definition of negligence: the disturbance must be of such a character as to be likely to result in illness or other bodily harm.24
The words “from facts known to him” fix what the actor is measured against: the information he actually held about the situation he was creating and the person it would reach. Facts that existed but stayed hidden from him do not count, and neither do facts learned after the conduct is over. Care can be exercised only over what an actor can perceive. A person who knows that a message will land on someone with a fragile health condition can deliver it gently, delay it, or arrange support, while a person who knows nothing of the condition has nothing to guard against.
The comment quoted in the Bartow dissent makes the same observation about foresight. The actor who intends distress knows the person and the circumstances and can foresee bodily consequences far better than an actor who is negligent because he should, but perhaps does not, realize that distress may follow.25 The comment belongs to § 312 and reaches the unintentional case only by analogy, but the point carries over: the negligent actor’s foresight is thinner, and condition (b) tethers it to known facts. The limit also separates this setting from ordinary physical-injury cases, where a defendant who injures a plaintiff generally answers for the full extent of the harm even when the plaintiff’s body was unusually vulnerable. Condition (b) does not import that principle into the emotional-distress setting.
The Michigan decision that replaced the impact requirement with a bodily-consequence test states the working baseline. The court measures the defendant’s conduct against the reactions to be expected of normal persons, and absent specific knowledge of the plaintiff’s unusual sensitivity, there is no recovery for a hypersensitive disturbance that a normal individual would not have suffered in the circumstances.26 That statement fits condition (b). The normal person is the default for what an actor may foresee, and specific knowledge moves the actor off the default, because facts known about this plaintiff can make a bodily reaction foreseeable that a normal-person standard would not.
The blast shows the two conditions pulling apart. The fright was foreseeable and the illness was not, so the claim fails at the second question even though the first was answered in the plaintiff’s favor. Students who stop at the foreseeability of fright reach the wrong result, and an exam stem that pairs an obviously foreseeable fright with an unforeseeable illness is built to catch them.
Known facts can reverse the outcome, and they are not limited to facts about the plaintiff’s health. The gravity of the event the actor is creating counts as well. The comment’s own example, telling an ill woman that a dearly loved relative has died, shows both kinds of fact working together: the weight of the news and the listener’s known condition combine to make serious physical consequences recognizable to the person delivering it.27
Both defendants were careless and both caused fright, so the difference between the contractor and the manager lies in what each knew. The manager held a fact that made illness foreseeable, and the contractor held none. A medical file the manager never saw, or a condition discovered only after labor began, could not have supplied that knowledge, because foresight is judged on what the actor knew when he acted. Satisfying (b) establishes only that illness was foreseeable. The plaintiff must still prove that illness or bodily harm actually resulted, which the next subsection takes up.
What Counts as Bodily Harm
The stem of § 313(1) makes the actor liable only “for resulting illness or bodily harm,” and that phrase is where the exception’s threshold sits.29 Conditions (a) and (b) ask what the actor should have foreseen before acting. The stem asks what happened to the plaintiff afterward, and it makes two demands: the plaintiff must have an illness or bodily harm, and that condition must have resulted from the distress. A plaintiff who proves careless conduct and genuine, even severe, suffering has not stated a claim under the exception until a bodily condition follows from the distress.
The Restatement’s definitions show why the line falls at the body. “Physical harm” denotes the physical impairment of the human body, or of land or chattels.30 Distress becomes an injury only when it attaches to an interest the law protects, and an illness is an impairment of the body. The requirement of a resulting illness or bodily harm therefore turns distress from an unprotected feeling into the pathway to a protected injury. It also takes over the screening work the impact rule once attempted. Impact asked whether the defendant’s negligence touched the plaintiff, a fact that said little about whether the suffering was real, while a medically recognizable condition can be examined, diagnosed, and traced to a cause. The Michigan court that overruled the impact requirement made the exchange explicit: where a definite and objective physical injury is produced by emotional distress that the defendant’s negligence proximately caused, the plaintiff may recover for those physical consequences even though nothing physically touched the plaintiff at the time of the shock.31
The test turns on the words “definite and objective,” and the same decision adds a causation burden. The plaintiff must prove that the physical harm is the natural result of the fright, in the sense that people of ordinary experience and judgment can conclude, once testimony has been given, that the harm flows from the distress the defendant’s conduct caused.32 “Physical” does not require tissue damage in the ordinary sense. The First Circuit explained in Petition of the United States that the word marks a condition susceptible of objective determination, so that a definite nervous disorder counts as a physical injury.33 The working question is whether evidence beyond the plaintiff’s own report of feeling upset establishes a condition that a physician or other observer can identify.
The Michigan facts show what sufficient proof looks like. After a negligently caused explosion, plaintiff Estelle Daley lost weight suddenly, could not perform her ordinary household duties, and was extremely nervous and irritable, and a psychiatrist diagnosed her as a chronic psychoneurotic in partial remission and attributed her condition to the explosion as the trauma that triggered it.34 The psychiatrist had also testified that she had been neurotic since childhood and that the incident did not cause her neurosis but could have broken down her balances. The court nevertheless held that the record gave a jury enough facts to find a causal relationship between the fright and a compensable physical injury.35 Observable symptoms, a recognized diagnosis, and expert testimony connecting them to the event supply the objective proof the threshold demands.
The edge of the threshold appears in the companion claim and in the dissent. The minor plaintiff, Timothy Daley, offered no expert testimony, only lay testimony that he was nervous, and the trial court found that testimony so vague it had no evidentiary value.36 The majority acknowledged that the question was close but held that he had presented facts from which a jury could infer a causal relation between the negligence and his alleged injuries, and it ordered a new trial.37 The dissent concluded that the plaintiffs suffered “indefinite and subjective injury,” and it described traumatic neurosis, emotional disturbance, and nervous upset as the very type of complaint that an objective-injury requirement exists to eliminate.38 The dissent did not reject the requirement. It said that adopting the Restatement’s rule for bodily harm resulting from emotional disturbance might be appropriate in a case of definite and objective physical injury.39 The justices therefore shared the standard and divided over its application, which is the question an exam stem will ask you to answer: whether weight loss, incapacity, and a diagnosed neurosis cross the line or remain mere upset.
The ulcer and the treated insomnia illustrate how generously many courts read the requirement. Heart attacks, ulcers, headaches, and nausea count as physical manifestations, and so do psychological conditions such as post-traumatic stress disorder, insomnia, and nightmares.40 The breadth follows from the purpose. The requirement guards against feigned claims, so a condition that a professional can recognize and diagnose does the guarding even when the condition is psychological. Some courts state the test in those terms, asking for a disorder generally recognized and diagnosed by trained professionals, or for a medically cognizable condition that requires treatment.41 Generosity has an edge, though. In Reilly v. United States, a Rhode Island court denied recovery to a mother whose child suffered overwhelming brain damage from a negligent delivery, because she had no physical symptoms of her own and emotional harm is too easy to feign.42
Jurisdictions differ on whether the requirement survives at all. Most states retain a physical manifestation requirement.43 Alaska and Illinois eliminated it in direct victim cases only, and Pennsylvania abolished it in a decision that turned out to govern only bystander cases.44 Where the plaintiff proves an independent cause of action such as invasion of privacy, the bodily-harm requirement drops away.45 The final section of this chapter maps those departures, and within the Second Restatement framework taught here the stem of § 313(1) remains the controlling test.