Concept
Animals and Trespassers
Harm to persons outside the land and related special rules
Animals and Trespassers
A possessor who keeps a wild animal on his land answers for the harm it does without anyone proving that he was careless. In Irvine v. Rare Feline Breeding Ctr., Inc., the Indiana Court of Appeals found that rule in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 507. The possessor is liable for harm the animal does to another’s person, land, or chattels even though he used the utmost care to confine it. The liability reaches only harm that results from a dangerous propensity characteristic of wild animals of that class, or one the possessor knows or has reason to know of.1
Why charge a keeper who did everything right? Judge Posner’s backyard tiger, which the Irvine court borrowed, answers the question. The hazard is so large relative to the value of keeping the animal that the law wants the owner to “consider seriously the possibility of getting rid of the tiger altogether,” and it supplies that incentive by refusing to make due care a defense.2 If care were a defense, an owner with a sturdy cage would owe nothing for an escape that happened anyway, and no one would ask whether the animal belonged there at all. Strict liability charges the owner with the harm that survives his best precautions, so he must weigh that cost against whatever the animal gives him.
The baseline does not settle every case. Section 507 is “subject to a number of exceptions and qualifications, which are too numerous to state in a single Section,” so the court reads it together with §§ 508, 510, 511, 512, 515, and 517.3 Three of those provisions sort plaintiffs by how they came onto the land. Section 513 makes the keeper strictly liable to persons on the land by privilege,4 § 511 withholds strict liability from trespassers,5 and § 512 sends a trespasser’s negligence claim to the ordinary rules.6 Before applying any of them, ask how the plaintiff came to be on the land.
Entrants With a Privilege
Section 513 applies the strict-liability baseline to people who come onto the keeper’s land with a right to be there. The possessor of a wild animal or an abnormally dangerous domestic animal who keeps it on land in his possession is strictly liable to persons coming upon the land in the exercise of a privilege, whether the privilege derives from his consent to their entry or otherwise.7 Because strict liability sets the keeper’s care aside, the plaintiff need not prove carelessness. The question is the plaintiff’s status, and the key word is privilege: a person with a legal right to be on the land is inside the rule, whether the right comes from the possessor’s invitation or from some other source.
The rule covers entrants because the incentive Irvine describes matters most for the people the keeper has placed within reach of the animal.8 A keeper who opens the grounds to visitors, or who holds land the law lets others enter, controls the enclosure, the animal’s habits, and the decision to keep the animal at all. The entrant controls none of these. Charging the keeper for harm to such entrants leaves the cost of the animal with the person who chose to keep it.
A privilege arises in two ways, and the rule’s wording keeps both. Consent covers the entrants the older categories call invitees and licensees, and Irvine reads § 513 that way.9 The words “or otherwise” extend the rule to persons the law admits without the possessor’s consent.
In each scene the plaintiff’s privilege fixes her place in the rule, and the keeper’s precautions drop out of the analysis. Both scenes illustrate the text of § 513; neither is a decided case. The plaintiff must still connect her injury to a dangerous propensity characteristic of animals of that class, or one the keeper knows or has reason to know of.10
Privilege also keeps the rule from reaching everyone on the land. A possessor owes no strict liability to one who intentionally or negligently trespasses, even though the trespasser has no reason to know the animal is kept there, a limit the next subsection takes up.11 The ticket holder and a person who climbs the zoo’s fence at night stand on opposite sides of that line, because only the ticket holder entered by privilege.
Strict liability to a privileged entrant has one qualification. An invitee or licensee who knows that the animal is permitted to run at large, or has escaped from control, may be barred from recovery if he acts on the possessor’s consent, or exercises any other privilege, and so exposes himself to the risk of harm from the animal.12 Section 515(2) states the defense: the plaintiff’s contributory negligence in “knowingly and unreasonably subjecting himself to the risk” that the animal will do harm is a defense to strict liability.13
The defense has two parts. The entrant must actually know of the danger, and an entrant who merely failed to notice it has not met that part. The exposure must also be unreasonable, so knowledge alone does not complete the defense, and an entrant with a good reason to go forward keeps his claim. The keeper’s fault plays no role even here, because the defense looks only at what the plaintiff knew and what he chose to do. Carelessness by the plaintiff, standing alone, is not enough.
Trespassers and Strict Liability
A possessor of land is not strictly liable to one who intentionally or negligently trespasses, for harm done by a wild animal or an abnormally dangerous domestic animal that the possessor keeps on the land, even though the trespasser has no reason to know the animal is kept there (§ 511).16 That rule marks the edge of § 513, which makes the keeper strictly liable to persons who enter in the exercise of a privilege.17 Together the two sections sort everyone hurt on the keeper’s land by one question: did the plaintiff have a right to be there? Irvine reads them side by side, treating § 511 as the provision for trespassers and § 513 as the provision for invitees and licensees.18
The rule has two parts. First, it excludes anyone who trespasses, whether intentionally or negligently. Both kinds of trespasser entered without a privilege, so the state of mind behind the entry does not save the claim. Second, the exclusion holds even when the trespasser had no reason to know the animal was kept there.19 Students tend to skip that clause. An intruder who saw no sign and heard no roar can look like a sympathetic plaintiff, yet the clause denies him strict liability all the same. The rule sorts plaintiffs by how they entered, not by what they knew.
Knowledge does matter elsewhere in the scheme. A privileged entrant who knows the animal is loose and unreasonably proceeds loses strict liability under § 515(2).20 That defense operates inside § 513 and does not decide who gets inside it. An answer that sees a mauling on the keeper’s land and reaches for strict liability without asking how the plaintiff arrived has skipped the deciding step.
The line follows from what strict liability is for. It prices the keeper’s choice to keep an animal like Judge Posner’s backyard tiger, and it charges that price for the people the keeper has put within the animal’s range, whether by inviting them or by holding land the law lets others enter.21 A trespasser stands elsewhere. He arrives over the keeper’s objection or through his own carelessness, so the keeper did not choose to expose him. And because due care is no defense, no precaution short of giving up the animal would shield the keeper from anyone who crossed the fence.
These scenes illustrate §§ 511 and 513 and are not decided cases. The animal, the keeper, and the precautions are identical in both, and only the manner of entry differs, which is the fact that moved the answer. A person who wandered across the fence line through carelessness would stand with the teenager, because a negligent trespasser is also outside the privilege.
Losing on strict liability does not end the trespasser’s case. The rules governing a possessor’s negligence in failing to prevent harm to a trespasser from a wild or abnormally dangerous domestic animal are the same as for other artificial conditions or activities on the land.22 Section 511 removes one theory, the one that dispenses with proof of fault, and leaves the trespasser a negligence claim to be tested under those ordinary rules. The next subsection takes up that claim.
Negligence Toward Trespassers
A trespasser who cannot invoke strict liability still has a claim in negligence, and § 512 says where to find its rules. The rules governing a possessor’s liability to a trespasser for negligence in failing to prevent harm from a wild animal or an abnormally dangerous domestic animal kept on the land are the same as for other artificial conditions or for activities on the land.24 The section adds no animal-specific duty. A trespasser mauled by a keeper’s lion has lost the claim that dispenses with proof of fault, and the negligence claim that remains is tested as it would be after an injury from an open pit or an unguarded machine. This subsection offers only a short cross-reference to those general rules, which belong to the wider study of what a possessor owes to entrants.
Those general rules start from the position that a possessor owes a trespasser no duty of ordinary care, and the exceptions developed as courts gave weight to concerns beyond the owner’s freedom to use the land.25 Three exceptions matter most here, and each turns on what the possessor knew or should have anticipated.
The first covers a trespasser whose presence the possessor has discovered. The great majority of courts now require ordinary care to avoid injuring a discovered trespasser by active operations, including control of forces already in motion and a warning, as in Frederick v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co.26 For a passive condition such as a pen, a possessor who sees a trespasser walking toward a concealed danger must at least warn, a rule found in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 337.27
The second covers frequent trespassers on a very limited area of the land. The possessor must anticipate them and use reasonable care in his activities for their protection, and in Imre v. Riegel Paper Corp. a well-defined path across the land was enough evidence of frequent trespass.28 The two exceptions differ in the knowledge that triggers the duty. Frederick turns on actual discovery of a particular person in peril, and Imre turns on the foreseeability of regular presence in a small area.
The third covers tolerated intruders. Some courts reason that continued toleration amounts to permission, which would make the intruder a licensee and bring § 513 into play. Yet the mere failure to take burdensome and perhaps futile steps to stop trespassing is not by itself a sign of consent.29 A jurisdiction that follows the Third Restatement sorts trespassers instead into flagrant and non-flagrant ones, a division that has been controversial.30
The intruder’s entry was wrongful in both scenes and the animal was equally dangerous, so the possessor’s knowledge is the fact that moved the answer. An exam answer that rules out strict liability under § 511 and stops has left the trespasser’s negligence claim unexamined. An answer that finds liability merely because an animal escaped has skipped the knowledge requirement.