Concept
Vendors and Lessors
Harm to persons outside the land and related special rules
Vendors and Lessors
The rules earlier in this chapter all address a possessor, the person who occupies the land and controls what happens on it. A possessor answers under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 371 for physical harm outside the land that results from an activity he carries on there when he realizes or should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk to others.1 A household member who acts or carries on an activity on the land is treated as though he were the possessor.2 But land changes hands. A seller delivers a deed; a landlord hands over the keys. Afterward someone else holds the possessor's role, and a plaintiff hurt by a danger on the land must work out who still answers for it. This part asks who owes the duty after a sale or a lease.
Control supplies the answer, because responsibility for a danger tends to rest with the person who can find it and fix it. A buyer who takes title and possession can walk the grounds, hire an inspector, and repair what is dangerous; the seller, who no longer holds the land, can do none of these things. A tenant in possession likewise decides how the premises are used and what is done to them, while a landlord out of possession ordinarily has no right even to enter without the tenant's permission. Tracing liability to control explains why a transfer can move it away from the transferor.
Control has a limit, and the limit is the outsider. A buyer or tenant could inspect the land and bargain over price, rent, or warranties before taking it. A pedestrian on the public way or a neighbor next door could do neither. Each rule below therefore balances the shift in control against the helplessness of people outside the land. The first subsection covers vendors, who give up their whole interest. The next three cover lessors: the general rule that frees a landlord from liability to the tenant and the tenant's guests, then the landlord's continuing liability to outsiders, first for dangers present at the transfer and then for dangers and tenant activities that arise later. The lessor's further duties to tenants and their guests come in the next major section.
Vendors of Land
Once the purchaser takes title and possession, the purchaser answers for dangers on the land, to himself and to others on it, and the vendor is freed from responsibility.3 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 352 states the rule.4 Courts call the result caveat emptor, a label that names the outcome without explaining it. The rule appears instead to track what buyer and seller expect when they make the deal, at least as to people who come onto the land after the sale.5
Those expectations make sense once you ask who can do what after closing. The buyer can walk the grounds, hire an inspector, bargain over price, and repair whatever is dangerous; the seller, who no longer holds the land, can do none of these. Jackson v. Scheible, an Indiana decision, reasoned in just this way and held that a vendor owes no duty to protect against a dangerous condition because he no longer controls the property.6 Price completes the logic: a buyer who finds or suspects a defect pays less, and a seller who sold at that discount should not pay for the same risk twice. A builder-vendor may fare worse. O'Connor v. Altus distinguished a former owner from a former owner who was also the builder, which signals that some jurisdictions treat the builder differently.7
A vendor who hides a danger loses that protection for a time. A vendor who knew of a danger on the land and concealed it remains responsible for harm that results after the transfer, but only until the purchaser discovers the danger or has reason to know of it, or perhaps until the purchaser has had time to make it reasonably safe.8 If the purchaser already knew of the danger or had reason to know of it, the vendor escapes liability altogether.9 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 353 states the exception.10 The general rule frees the seller because the buyer could inspect and bargain; concealment removes that chance, since a buyer cannot price or repair a defect kept out of sight. The same reasoning sets the endpoint. Once the buyer knows or should know of the danger, the buyer can protect against it, and responsibility passes to the buyer.
The vendor's position changes when the danger reaches people outside the land. As to them, the vendor remains responsible for negligence in creating or maintaining the condition, and that responsibility ends only when the purchaser discovers the danger and, perhaps, has a reasonable opportunity to make it reasonably safe.11 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 373 sharpens the rule. A vendor who created or concealed the condition stays responsible until the purchaser both discovers the danger and has an opportunity to make it safe, while a vendor who merely allowed a dangerous condition to remain is relieved once the purchaser has a reasonable opportunity to discover it.12 The longer tail exists because outsiders took no part in the sale. They did not inspect, bargain, or take a discount for the risk, and the vendor who created the danger is the party who first put them at risk. The tail still ends: a purchaser who knows of the danger and has a fair chance to act is now the party in position to protect them.
Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Hercules, Inc. shows a purchaser trying to escape the vendor rule by relabeling its claim. PECO, a utility, bought the Chester, Pennsylvania site from Gould, which had acquired it from Hercules, and PECO later sued Hercules in private nuisance over conditions on the land.13 The Third Circuit assumed that Hercules had created a nuisance and remained liable for it, so the question became to whom Hercules could be liable.14 The answer was that Hercules owed Gould and, in turn, PECO only the limited duty that caveat emptor allows, and PECO conceded that Hercules had not violated that duty.15 PECO could not recover for breach of a duty Hercules may have owed to others, namely its neighbors.16
The court distinguished the two classes of plaintiffs by asking who could protect themselves. Neighbors, unlike purchasers of the land where a nuisance exists, have no opportunity to protect themselves through inspection and negotiation. PECO, by contrast, acted as a sophisticated and responsible purchaser that inquired into the site's past use and inspected it carefully, so the court found it inconceivable that the price did not reflect environmental risk.17 Where caveat emptor applies, a vendee's private nuisance claim for conditions on the land transferred, absent fraudulent concealment, would negate the market's allocation of resources and risks and expose vendors who sold at appropriately discounted prices to "unbargained-for liability to remote vendees."18
A comment to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 840A, which the court cited, shows the other side of the line: a vendor who created a nuisance on the land has a responsibility toward those outside it and is not free to end that liability by passing the land to a third person.19 The duty Hercules may have owed therefore ran to its neighbors, not to the purchaser. The court limited its reasoning to sales without fraudulent concealment, so a purchaser who proves that the seller hid the problem stands on different ground.20 The court also saw a somewhat analogous rule for tenants, who cannot recast a landlord's limited liability as a private nuisance claim. That rule appears below with the lessor's general rule.21
The Lessor's General Rule
Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 355 and 356 state the traditional landlord rule in two parts, divided by timing. One covers a dangerous condition that came into existence after the lessee took possession; the other covers a condition, natural or artificial, that existed when the lessee took possession. Each part frees the lessor from liability to the lessee and to others on the land with the lessee's consent.24 Each also opens by excepting the situations, taken up in the next major section, in which the lessor is liable anyway.25 This subsection stays with the baseline, because the exceptions make sense only against what they depart from.
The baseline comes from how property law treats a lease. A lease is traditionally the equivalent of a sale of the premises for a term, so the lessee becomes the owner and occupier and is entitled to exclusive possession, even against the lessor unless the lease provides otherwise.26 Absent a contrary provision, the lessee alone has the right and the responsibility to keep the premises in repair and to decide how they are maintained and used.27 In Borders v. Roseberry, the Kansas Supreme Court drew the tort consequence. The lessee acquires an estate in the land and takes on the responsibilities of one in possession, toward those who enter and those outside the boundaries alike. The lessor keeps only a reversionary interest, the right to have the land back when the term ends, and has no right even to enter without the lessee's permission.28
Tort responsibility for land has traditionally followed possession and control, and the sale analogy explains why the landlord drops out.29 Possession and control let a person see a hazard, decide how the premises are used, and fix what is broken. A landlord who has surrendered exclusive possession and cannot enter without permission holds none of those powers, so a duty placed on him would fall on the person least able to carry it out. The tenant sits where the land buyer sits: like other buyers, the tenant becomes responsible for the premises, and the landlord does not.30 The vendor rule rests on the same allocation.
The allocation follows possession and control, not the duty to repair. A tenant whose duty to repair is narrow still carries a possessor's tort liability.31 A claim against a landlord therefore turns on who held possession and control of the place where the hazard sat, and ownership of the building does not answer that question. For the rented space itself, the answer is usually the tenant.
The two timing propositions rest on slightly different logic. For a condition that arises after possession passes, control does nearly all the work: whatever develops after the keys change hands develops on land the landlord no longer occupies and cannot see. For a condition that already existed when the lease began, the result is harder to accept, because the landlord may have built the defect or known of it. The answer is the sale analogy again. A tenant takes the premises as found under the doctrine of caveat lessee, the leasing counterpart of caveat emptor, so the landlord generally has no liability for defects existing at the time of the lease.32 Under the law as it stood in the early 1970s, the landlord had no duty to repair obvious defects present when the lease began, none to repair hidden defects so long as he disclosed them to the tenant, and usually none to repair defects that arose during the lease.33 For a hidden defect, disclosure to the tenant satisfied the law.
Borders v. Roseberry shows the rule in its usual setting. A tenant's social guest slipped on the front steps of a single-family house after water dripping from the roof froze there, and the guest argued that the landlord owed a duty to repair the condition.34 The court began from the general rule: a landlord is not liable to the tenant or to others entering the land for defective conditions existing at the time of the lease.35 The guest's status as a visitor changes nothing, because the rule covers others on the land with the tenant's consent, and the steps lay within premises the tenant possessed.36 Unless an exception fits, responsibility for the steps rested with the tenant.
The rule loses its footing where the landlord never handed over control. Take a defective elevator that several tenants of an apartment house use. The landlord kept that part of the premises, so the sale logic has nothing to attach to, and he is liable if he failed to use reasonable care to keep it safe, provided he could have discovered and corrected the condition with reasonable care.37 The elevator and the front steps in Borders differ in one respect: whether possession of the hazardous area passed to a tenant.
The rule shields the landlord only from claims by the tenant and by people on the land with the tenant's consent, and a tenant cannot reach around it by relabeling the claim. In Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Hercules, Inc., the Third Circuit noted that courts have not let tenants circumvent the traditional limits on lessor liability by casting a claim for defective conditions on premises they control as private nuisance. The court relied on Harris v. Lewistown Trust Co., where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court confined a landlord out of possession's liability for a condition amounting to a nuisance to owners or occupants of nearby property, persons temporarily on that property, and persons on a neighboring highway or other places. A tenant or the tenant's invitees could not recover on that theory.38 Outsiders can recover, and a lessor who transfers possession in a condition he realizes or should realize unreasonably endangers persons outside the land remains answerable to them.39 The next two subsections take up that rule.
The general rule describes the law as it stood in the early 1970s, and it remains the starting point because later change is measured against it. The landlord's tort liability has since grown enormously, and in many jurisdictions liability, not nonliability, is now the baseline.40 The sale analogy has weakened for practical reasons. The typical modern lease is a contract for space in the landlord's building, not a transfer of a plot of ground. The residential landlord often has superior bargaining power. And the landlord, who collects the rent, has the greater incentive and resources to maintain the premises and is best placed to spread costs and insure.41 Most states now recognize an implied warranty of habitability in residential leases, though not in commercial ones.42 Depending on the rule a jurisdiction follows and the facts, the result may be liability of the landlord, of the tenant, of both, or of neither.43 The section on lessor exceptions returns to that trend.
Conditions Existing at Transfer
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 379 addresses the landlord who hands over land already carrying a danger to people beyond its boundary. A lessor who transfers possession in a condition he realizes or should realize involves unreasonable risk of physical harm to others outside the land is subject to the same liability for harm the condition later causes them as though he had remained in possession.45 Borders v. Roseberry lists this rule as a recognized exception to the landlord's general freedom from liability for conditions existing at the time of the lease.46 The general rule shields a lessor from claims by the lessee and by people on the land with the lessee's consent. Section 379 answers a different plaintiff, the person outside the land, such as a traveler on the public way or a neighbor on adjoining property.47 The phrase as though he had remained in possession sets the measure: the lease does not reduce the lessor's exposure to outsiders.
The reason lies in who bears the risk. A lease reallocates control of the land, and the general rule follows that reallocation by treating the tenant as the person who can inspect and repair. An outsider had no part in that arrangement. A pedestrian on the highway or the owner next door could not inspect the premises or bargain over the danger and can avoid it only by staying away. Where a condition dangerous to the traveling public or to persons on adjoining property exists when the lease is made, the lessor should not be permitted to escape liability by leasing the premises to someone else.48 His liability rests on his failure to correct the dangerous condition while the land was under his full control, so it attaches to what he did or left undone as the person in charge, and a later lease does not rewrite that history.49
Two limits tie the rule to fault. The first is notice: the landlord must have actual or constructive notice of the condition, meaning the knowledge the law attributes to a person who would have learned of it by looking with reasonable care.50 Constructive notice gives the landlord a duty to inspect while he controls the land, but the duty has an edge: a failure to inspect creates liability only if a reasonable inspection would have disclosed the dangerous condition that caused the injury.51 The second limit is time. Even a landlord with notice must have a reasonable period in which to eliminate the condition before liability attaches.52 Both limits ask what the lessor could have done while he still controlled the land, which is the same question the rule's rationale asks.
The two chimneys were equally defective on the day of transfer. Notice, and what a reasonable inspection would have found, separate the claims.
Because the landlord's liability rests on his failure to correct the condition while he controlled the land, nothing the tenant learns or promises after taking possession releases him. He is not absolved merely because the tenant knew of the condition or should have discovered it after taking possession.53 As to outsiders, it is likewise immaterial that the tenant promised to alter or repair the condition or that the lease exonerates the lessor, although such terms may affect the rights between lessor and lessee.54 A tenant's promise to eliminate the condition or to indemnify the landlord, meaning to reimburse what the landlord pays third persons, gets the same treatment: the landlord stays liable to the injured outsider and looks to the tenant for reimbursement. A few cases hold that such a promise absolves the landlord of further responsibility, but that view draws at least two criticisms.55
Liability under § 379 does not remove the tenant from the case. The tenant is the possessor when the injury occurs, and the landlord's liability does not negate the tenant's, so the injured outsider may recover from either.56 When the dangerous condition predates the lease and the injury follows the tenant's taking possession, the landlord is liable for failing to correct it while he controlled the land, and the tenant is liable for controlling the premises when the injury happened.57 A hillside shows the structure. Large rocks sat naturally but precariously on a slope, and a former tenant's terracing had loosened the soil around them. The owner leased the land to a new tenant, and the rocks later broke loose, rolled onto an abutting public road, and injured several motorists. The owner answers for failing to correct the condition while in possession and control, and the current tenant answers on the strength of present possession and control.58 A motorist can name both, and the lease and any indemnity terms decide only who bears the loss between them.59
The same logic reaches each person who held control in turn. A tenant who subleases is liable as a landlord on the same basis as an owner-landlord. If the condition predates the original lease, the owner-landlord and the tenant-sublandlord answer for their separate failures to eliminate it while the property was under their control, and the subtenant answers as the possessor.60 A few jurisdictions apply res ipsa loquitur against the landlord, and a few courts appear to impose strict liability, but those are departures from the notice requirement.61
The rule has two edges. As to plaintiffs, it protects persons outside the land, while the tenant and the tenant's guests proceed under the lessor's general rule and its exceptions. As to timing, a condition that arises after the tenant takes possession, without the landlord's knowledge, did not exist while the landlord controlled the land. The landlord is generally not liable to outsiders for it, and the tenant, as the party in possession and control, answers for it.62 The next subsection takes up that later-arising danger.
Later Conditions and Activities
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 377 governs the danger that appears after the tenant has moved in. A landlord who has made no express covenant to repair is not liable to people outside the leased property for injury caused by a dangerous condition that arose after the tenant took possession, provided he did not know of the condition. The tenant, as the party in possession and control, answers for it.64 The previous subsection dealt with conditions that existed when the lease began, where the landlord stayed liable because he failed to correct the danger while he still controlled the land. A later condition changes the timing, and the timing changes the result. While the landlord controlled the land there was nothing to correct, and after possession passed he lost both control and the practical ability to learn what was happening.
Tort liability for land has traditionally rested on possession and control, so a landlord out of possession generally escapes liability for conditions that develop after possession passes.65 Two gaps explain the result. The first concerns control: the tenant holds exclusive possession, decides how the space is used and what gets repaired, and may keep the landlord out. The second concerns information: a hazard that develops inside premises the tenant occupies shows itself first to the tenant, which makes the landlord the person least likely to know of it. Holding title closes neither gap, which is why asking who owns the building starts from the wrong question.
Three routes bring the landlord back into responsibility for a later danger. Each restores something the transfer took away: a promise that puts the duty to repair on him, a statute that does the same, or his knowing consent to a risky activity. The rest of this subsection concerns liability to people outside the premises. The tenant's own recovery against the landlord, and that of the tenant's guests, falls under the lessor exceptions in the next major part.
The first route is a covenant to repair, the landlord's promise to repair or maintain the premises in a safe condition. The weight of authority holds that a landlord who makes the promise and breaks it is liable for injury to persons and property outside the leased property caused by dangerous conditions that performance would have eliminated. Lommori v. Milner Hotels, Inc. reached that result, and Restatement (Second) of Property, Landlord & Tenant § 18.2 follows the same approach.66 A few courts deny recovery on the ground that a breach of contract gives no right of action to a person who is not a party to the agreement.67
A covenant adds the landlord to the list of defendants without removing the tenant from it. The tenant remains the possessor, and the injured person may recover against either one.68 Where the landlord had notice of the danger and an opportunity to repair it, the tenant who pays an outsider appears to be entitled to indemnification from the landlord for what the tenant must pay.69
The second route is a repair duty that a statute or administrative regulation places on the landlord, which assigns the burden of repair to him without any promise on his part. The weight of authority holds that a landlord who fails to perform that duty is liable to persons outside the leased property for the personal injury or property damage that results, as in Moretti v. C. S. Realty Co. and Restatement (Second) of Property, Landlord & Tenant § 18.3.70 Most courts treat the violation as negligence per se, meaning that breach of the statute itself establishes breach of duty, although a minority refuses to rest tort liability on the statute at all.71 As with a covenant, the tenant's duty to outsiders survives, and the outsider may sue either party.72
Both routes carry two safeguards that keep the landlord from answering for a hazard he could not have known about or fixed. He must have actual or constructive notice of the defect, constructive notice being the knowledge he would have gained by using reasonable care, and he must have had a reasonable time in which to repair it.73 For a defect that arose after possession passed, courts divide on how much notice is required. Some impose liability if reasonable care would have let the landlord discover the defect in time to repair it, while others appear to require that he actually be told.74 On the statutory route, a major factor in deciding what the landlord could reasonably have discovered is his ability to inspect premises under the tenant's exclusive control.75 That factor comes from the fact that produced the general rule, since the landlord's blind spot is the tenant's control.
The third route differs in kind, because the danger comes from what the tenant does and not from the state of the building. A landlord is generally liable for personal injury and property damage to persons outside the leased property caused by the tenant's activities there when those activities involve an unreasonable risk of harm to others and are carried on with the landlord's consent or knowledge, as Restatement (Second) of Property, Landlord & Tenant § 18.4 provides.76 The consent or knowledge may be express or implied from the circumstances, so a landlord cannot escape by leaving his approval unwritten.77 A landlord who knows of a risky use and lets it proceed has contributed to the danger and could have refused, and that supplies the link to the harm that bare ownership lacks.
Three limits keep the rule tied to what the landlord accepted. A landlord who did not consent and reasonably would not have contemplated the activity is not liable. Where the risk results from the tenant's failure to take normal precautions, the landlord escapes unless he knew the tenant would not carry on the activity with reasonable care, because what he approved was the activity done carefully. And consent to or knowledge of one dangerous activity does not support liability for other, unauthorized activities.78