Concept
Duty to Aid Invitees
Duty owed to invitees
Duty to Aid Invitees
Most of this chapter asks whether a possessor was careless about a condition on the land or about its own activities. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A(3) asks something else: what a possessor must do once a person on the premises is already in peril. A possessor of land who holds it open to the public, the section says, is under a similar duty to members of the public who enter in response to the invitation.1 The word similar points back to the earlier subsections of § 314A, which place a duty to act on common carriers toward their passengers and on innkeepers toward their guests. The duty to aid invitees belongs to the law of special relationships, not to the law of dangerous conditions.
It needs a special relationship because the background rule runs the other way. The common law generally imposes no duty to act to help a person in peril, even when help would cost almost nothing. A stranger who watches a swimmer struggle and does not throw a rope is not liable for the drowning. The reason is that a duty to rescue would have no logical stopping point. If knowing of the peril were enough, everyone who learned of it would owe the same duty to the same victim, and the law could not say who had to act. An exception must therefore single out one defendant, and it does so by requiring a relationship that exists before the emergency begins.
The relationship between a possessor who holds land open to the public and an entrant who accepts the invitation answers the stopping-point problem in three ways. The entrant has put himself on premises the possessor controls, which separates the possessor from everyone else who might learn of the emergency. The entrant also depends on the possessor for help, because the staff, the telephone, and the knowledge of the premises are in the possessor's hands, not the entrant's. And the possessor can usually help at small cost: pressing a stop button or calling for medical aid takes little effort. Because the duty runs only to members of the public who enter in response to the invitation, the status questions at the start of this chapter, including who counts as a public invitee and what the invitation covers, decide who is protected.
What the possessor owes is the duty § 314A assigns to carriers and innkeepers: reasonable action to give first aid and to protect the entrant against unreasonable risk of harm, once the possessor knows or has reason to know of the peril. The knowledge requirement keeps the rule from becoming a duty to patrol every corner of the premises for people in trouble. The obligation begins when employees see the problem or should recognize it. The standard is reasonable care, and calling for medical help, giving basic first aid, and keeping the person safe until others arrive are the kinds of steps that meet it.
The relationship must exist before the emergency, and merely witnessing an emergency does not create it. In Estate of Cilley v. Lane, the defendant found a man who had entered her trailer and shot himself, and she did not call 911 although she easily could have. The court found no duty to aid, because she had no relationship with him of the kind that triggers the duty and her trailer was not land held open to the public. The ease of the call supports the exception where a relationship exists, but it cannot supply one that is missing. A cashier who sees a customer collapse in an aisle stands where the store stands. A pedestrian who sees a stranger collapse on the sidewalk stands where the bystander stands under the general rule.
Exam facts usually test this rule through the employee who sees and does nothing. A stem about a customer ignored in distress is not asking whether a dangerous condition existed under § 343. It asks three questions: did the plaintiff enter land held open to the public in response to the invitation, did the possessor know or have reason to know of the peril, and was reasonable help withheld? A stem in which a person with no connection to the premises discovers an emergency fails at the first question, however easy the rescue would have been. The rule also reaches only the possessor's own failure to help. Harm inflicted on entrants by other people falls under a separate rule on third-party acts, which the next section develops.