Concept
Conditions Versus Activities
Duty owed to licensees
Conditions Versus Activities
Every licensee claim has to be sorted before any element is checked: did the injury come from the state of the land, or from something the possessor was doing? Restatement (Second) of Torts § 342 governs the first, and § 341 governs the second.1 The sort still matters in most courts, which continue to begin by classifying the entrant under the traditional categories, even though a substantial number now extend ordinary care to licensees or even trespassers.2
A rotted plank, a hidden hole, and a dead tree are conditions. For harm from a condition, § 342 makes the possessor liable only if three things line up. The possessor knows or has reason to know of the condition, should realize that it poses an unreasonable risk to licensees, and should expect that they will not discover the danger. The possessor then fails to make the condition safe or to warn of it and of the risk. And the licensee does not know or have reason to know of the condition and the risk.3 The duty is to disclose or fix a hidden danger the possessor already knows about. It does not require the possessor to inspect the land for the licensee's benefit, since inspection is the invitee's rule.
A car rolling down a driveway, a machine in operation, and a load swinging overhead are activities. For harm from an activity, § 341 makes the possessor liable for failing to carry on the activity with reasonable care for the licensee's safety. Again the liability runs only if the possessor should expect that licensees will not discover or realize the danger, and the licensees do not know or have reason to know of the possessor's activities and the risk involved.4 The duty here is reasonable care in conduct that is already under way.
Both sections are phrased 'if, but only if,' a restrictive form that carries forward the old special duty limitations favoring landowners and occupiers. That land ethic was so strong that those limitations were not restricted, if not entirely eliminated, until the last third of the twentieth century.5 An exam stem that tests the sort usually describes two injuries on a host's property that look alike and expects each to go to a different section.
The only fact that moved between the two scenes is the source of the harm. The plank claim asks what Pruitt knew, because § 342 attaches liability to a known, concealed danger that the possessor left unwarned of and unrepaired.6 The driveway claim asks how Dunmore drove, because § 341 measures the activity itself against reasonable care. The possessor's knowledge triggers liability for a condition, and the possessor's conduct triggers liability for an activity.
Classifying the harm as an activity does not end the analysis. Section 341 still requires that the possessor should expect the licensee not to discover or realize the danger, and that the licensee not know or have reason to know of the activity and its risk.7 A guest who watches the car begin to back toward the spot and steps behind it anyway satisfies neither requirement, so the claim fails even though the harm came from the possessor's conduct. The same logic runs through the concealment requirement for conditions. A licensee who already holds the information a warning would supply cannot complain that the warning was missing.
The more demanding duty gives litigants a reason to relabel. An opinion describing the older law observed that, in an apparent attempt to avoid the general rule limiting liability, courts had broadly defined active operations, sometimes giving the term a strained construction in cases involving dangers known to the occupier.8 The motive is easy to see. A plaintiff hurt by a defect the owner knew about would otherwise have to fit within § 342, which asks the possessor only to warn or make safe. Describing the same hazard as part of the possessor's ongoing operations moves the claim to a general reasonable-care standard. A careful answer therefore asks what the possessor was doing when the harm occurred. A hazard that sits on the land whether or not the possessor is doing anything at that moment is a condition, even when the possessor knew of it. An essay can note that some courts have stretched the activities label to reach such cases, but it should not present the stretch as the baseline rule.