Concept
Duty to Warn of Hidden Conditions
Duty owed to licensees
Duty to Warn of Hidden Conditions
A possessor who knows of a hidden danger must either fix it or tell the licensees who are about to meet it. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 342 builds that duty from three requirements, and it makes the possessor liable for physical harm caused to licensees by a condition on the land “if, but only if,” all three are met:1
- the possessor knows or has reason to know of the condition, should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to licensees, and should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger;
- the possessor fails to exercise reasonable care either to make the condition safe or to warn the licensees of the condition and the risk involved; and
- the licensees do not know or have reason to know of the condition and the risk involved.
Courts quote the section in just this form, as the court did in a footnote in Hansen v. Richey.2
“If, but only if” makes the list exhaustive as well as sufficient. A missing requirement ends the claim, so an answer must test each requirement against the facts and cannot stop at the first one that fits.
The three requirements describe a single situation from three sides: the possessor holds information about a hidden danger that the licensee lacks. The duty is one of disclosure. A possessor’s liability to licensees, a Kentucky court explained, “is not based upon a duty to maintain [the land] in safe condition” but upon “his duty to disclose to them the risk which they will encounter if they accept his invitation or permission.”3 A New Jersey court stated the same idea from the guest’s side: a social guest is “at least entitled to the same knowledge possessed by the host of dangerous conditions.”4 Clause (a) fixes what the possessor knows and what the possessor should expect the licensee to miss. Clause (c) fixes what the licensee actually knows. Clause (b) fixes what the possessor must do about the difference. The sections below follow that order of thought: the possessor’s knowledge, concealment from the licensee, and the possessor’s response.
A duty this narrow belongs to a tradition that strongly favored landowners. The special duty limitations protecting landowners and occupiers were not restricted, if not entirely eliminated, until the last third of the twentieth century.5
Possessor’s Knowledge
Clause (a) opens with two questions that are easy to run together. The first concerns information: what did the possessor know about the condition, or what had the possessor been told or shown that would lead a reasonable person to conclude it was there? The second concerns evaluation: would a reasonable person holding that information see an unreasonable risk of harm to licensees?6 The first question looks to the possessor’s own experience, and the second measures the possessor against an outside standard.
“Reason to know” is a notice idea, and it stops short of inspection. In Perry v. Williamson, a person in the tree business had told the owners that a tree on their land was dead, that it had not leafed out the year before, that limbs had been falling off for some time, and that it needed to be cut down.7 That information gave the owners knowledge of the condition. The court took care to separate notice or knowledge of this kind from a duty to inspect, and it applied the Restatement comment that the possessor must use reasonable care “either to make the land as safe as it appears, or to disclose the fact that it is as dangerous as he knows it to be.”8
The line matters because a possessor can pass along only what the possessor has. A possessor who has learned nothing has nothing to disclose, and a rule that made the possessor answer for whatever an inspection would have turned up would add a duty that clause (a) does not state. The Restatement (Third) of Torts § 51 does add it. It extends liability to dangers the landowner should reasonably have known, a change that has not always been welcomed even in an age when householder’s liability insurance is common.9
Which standard applies depends on the jurisdiction. Most courts still begin by classifying the entrant under the traditional categories, though a substantial number have held that the duty of ordinary care reaches licensees.10 Connecticut moved by statute: in 2012 it superseded the majority opinion in Laube v. Stevenson with a rule that a social invitee is owed the same standard of care as a business invitee.11 Under the Second Restatement, the first question is what the possessor knew or had been told. Asking only whether a diligent owner would have found the hazard borrows the Third Restatement’s standard.
Once the possessor knows of the condition, the second question is objective. Where the proofs show that the landowner knew of a particular condition, the New Jersey court explained, “[t]he inquiry is not whether the defendant realized the condition held any risk but whether a reasonable man would be cognizant of it.”12 The standard follows from the premise that the guest is entitled to the knowledge the host holds. A host who has seen the facts cannot avoid the duty by saying they did not seem dangerous.
Concealed From the Licensee
Two parts of § 342 look at the gap from the licensee’s side. The end of clause (a) requires that the possessor expect licensees not to discover or realize the danger, and clause (c) requires that the licensees in fact not know, or have reason to know, of the condition and the risk involved.14 Because liability follows “if, but only if” every requirement is met, a possessor who fully understands a hazard is still not liable under this section when the licensee already has that understanding or can see the danger unaided.
A warning transfers information, so a licensee who already holds the information leaves nothing to transfer. The New Jersey court built the duty on the premise that a social guest is entitled to the host’s knowledge, and it drew the matching limit: when “the guest is aware of the dangerous condition or by a reasonable use of his faculties would observe it, the host is not liable,” because the guest failed to use due care.15
Two routes close the guest’s side of the gap, and either one is enough. A guest who was told of the danger, or who saw it earlier, has actual knowledge. A guest who would have perceived it by ordinary use of the senses has reason to know. The second route explains the rule for obvious hazards: a hazard that is obvious does not involve an unreasonable risk of harm to the licensee, and the duty is to warn of hazards that are not obvious.16
The knowledge that defeats a claim must reach both things clause (c) names, the condition and the risk. A guest who sees that one stair tread is painted a different shade has learned a fact about the tread but nothing about whether it will hold, so a warning from the host would still have told that guest something new.
New Jersey applies the same logic to a trespasser. As in the case of a gratuitous licensee, the trespasser’s awareness of the peril is an absolute bar to recovery, because the occupier’s liability arises out of the want of due care to warn of the concealed danger.17
The liability cases follow a common pattern: the owner holds the information, and nothing the guest can see supplies it. See Barry v. Cantrell and Rushton v. Winters.18
In each house the host knew the railing was rotted, and what changed the result was what the guest knew or could see. Clauses (a) and (c) ask related but different questions. Clause (a) asks what the possessor should expect, and clause (c) asks what the licensee in fact knew or had reason to know. Test them separately, because a guest told of the danger by someone else defeats the claim under clause (c) even when the host reasonably expected the guest to remain in the dark. The New Jersey court’s explanation that the guest failed to use due care shows how close clause (c) comes to a comparison of fault, but under the Second Restatement the clause is part of the text and must be satisfied.19
Warning or Making Safe
Once the possessor’s knowledge and the licensee’s ignorance are established, clause (b) asks what the possessor did about the danger. Liability attaches only if the possessor “fails to exercise reasonable care to make the condition safe, or to warn the licensees of the condition and the risk involved.”21 The clause is phrased in the alternative, and each alternative answers the same problem. Repair removes the danger, and a warning removes the ignorance. Either one, taken with reasonable care, discharges the possessor’s duty under this section.
The choice between them belongs to the possessor. Because liability to licensees rests on disclosure and not on a duty to maintain the land, the possessor must use reasonable care “either to make the land as safe as it appears, or to disclose the fact that it is as dangerous as he knows it to be.”22 The New Jersey court described the same pair of choices when it said the law places on the landowner the duty to disclose the dangerous condition to the social guest “or to correct it.”23 A licensee therefore cannot demand repair. A licensee is entitled to be told.
The owners in Perry show the choice at work. Having been told that the tree was dead, they could have felled it or they could have told their guests to stay away from it. The court found the make-safe-or-disclose standard appropriate on those facts and gave no weight to the tree’s being natural. Under the Restatement comment, it is immaterial whether a dangerous condition that the possessor knows of, and expects licensees not to discover, is natural rather than artificial.24 Because the duty is one of disclosure, the origin of the hazard is beside the point: a guest standing beneath a dead limb faces the same hidden risk as a guest stepping onto a rotted board. The knowledge requirement still does the limiting, since a dead tree the owner has never noticed triggers nothing.
Clause (b) names what a warning must contain: “the condition and the risk involved.” A general caution that never identifies the rotted tread leaves the guest as uninformed as before. And because the duty is to disclose the risk the licensees “will encounter,” the warning has to reach the guest before the guest meets the danger.25 Once a guest has been told, clause (c) takes over: a guest who knows of the condition and the risk cannot recover under this section.
The repair alternative has its own limit, set by the phrase “as safe as it appears.” An owner who nails a thin board over a rotted plank so that the deck looks sound has made the land look safer than it is. That owner has neither made the land as safe as it appears nor disclosed how dangerous it is.
Everything in this unit describes the traditional licensee rule. A substantial number of courts now hold that the duty of ordinary care extends to licensees, and even to trespassers, a development the closing sections of this chapter take up.26