Concept
Common Hazards in Practice
Child trespassers and attractive nuisance
Common Hazards in Practice
Section 339 applies one test to every child-trespasser claim. The harm must come from an artificial condition on the land, and the plaintiff must then satisfy five clauses, whatever the hazard.1 The test stays fixed, but the reported cases gather around three kinds of hazard, and each kind puts a different clause under pressure. Water drowns children who may not grasp what they see, which brings clauses (c) and (d) forward: whether youth kept the child from realizing the risk, and whether the cost of guarding against it is slight beside the harm.2 A train invites a defendant to merge two questions the section keeps apart: whether the hazard is an artificial condition, and whether its danger was plain to a child of that age. A construction site tests the possessor's side of the encounter, meaning whether child trespass was foreseeable at that spot and whether the possessor knew of the pit or ditch, which are questions under clauses (a) and (b).3
These pairings mark where the pressure usually falls, and no hazard escapes the other clauses. A pool, a train, or a trench is never automatically inside or outside the section. Courts have been abandoning arbitrary rules that treat a type of hazard as understood by every child, because such rules break down where the likely trespassers are too young to appreciate the danger or where the condition carries an enhanced danger the child cannot see.4 The facts that the clauses ask about decide the case, and the child's age counts heavily among them: water that a ten-year-old understands may be beyond a toddler. The subsections below take each hazard in turn, starting with water, where a presumption about what children understand meets the varying cost of guarding.
Water Hazards
Drowning cases carry no special rule, because § 339 sends water through the same threshold and the same five clauses.5 Two clauses carry most of the weight. Clause (c) asks whether youth kept the children from discovering the condition or realizing the risk of meddling with it, and clause (d) asks whether the utility of the condition and the burden of eliminating the danger are slight compared with the risk to children.6 Comment j sets the starting point for water. It treats fire, water, and falling from a height as dangers that a child old enough to be allowed at large may reasonably be expected to understand and appreciate fully, so the section ordinarily has no application to them. The exception arises when some other factor creates a special risk that the child will not avoid the danger, such as a condition so hidden that it is not readily visible, or a distracting influence that makes it likely the child will not discover or appreciate it.7 The court in Fields drew the consequence: pools and ponds are examples of dangers that a trespassing child old enough to be allowed at large may be expected to understand fully.8
The presumption puts the plaintiff at a disadvantage from the start. A child who knew of the condition and fully understood the danger cannot recover, even a child too young to be negligent, and the plaintiff carries the burden of proof on the point.9 A nine-year-old at an open pond, with nothing concealed and nothing distracting, gives the plaintiff little to offer on clause (c), and the claim ordinarily ends there.10
Two exceptions take a case out of the presumption, and each is a different way of satisfying clause (c). The first applies when a hidden or distracting factor keeps the child from realizing the danger. Fields illustrates it with Crawford, where a landowner was liable for the drowning of a six-year-old in an uncovered settlement tank: the effluent was dark and murky and hid the true depth, a ball floated on top, and a wooden and metal bridge crossed the tank.11 Each fact either concealed how deep and dangerous the water was or drew the child's attention away from it, so the child never faced the plain open water that comment j assumes a child understands. The second exception applies when the child is too young to appreciate the danger.12 In Bennett v. Stanley, an Ohio court embraced § 339 and held that a swimming pool left unused for three years, filled with six feet of rainwater and covered with algae, could constitute an attractive nuisance to a five-year-old.13
Courts have also refused to turn the presumption into a rule about a type of hazard. In Giacona the court rejected earlier reasoning that the doctrine does not apply unless the dangerous condition is uncommon and different from natural conditions that exist everywhere, so that a body of water, natural or artificial, is a common danger and, as a matter of law, defeats liability for a trespassing child's drowning even when the child is too young to appreciate the danger.14 That reasoning, the court said, is inconsistent with the Restatement rule, and it disapproved the earlier cases to the extent their language or holdings were contrary.15 The rejection and comment j fit together. Comment j speaks of a child old enough to be at large, so it states a presumption tied to age and circumstances. It does not label all water as a danger that every child understands.
The cost of guarding moves the answer from one setting to another. Most litigated pool cases arise in densely populated areas, where trespassing children are more likely and keeping them away may not cost much.16 Reasonable care then becomes the practical question. Once the first four clauses are met, the plaintiff must also prove under clause (e) that the possessor failed to exercise reasonable care to eliminate the danger or otherwise protect the children, and the erection of a fence or other enclosure around a pool is generally held to be all that reasonable care requires.17
A canal shows how heavy the burden of guarding can become. A court reversed summary judgment for an irrigation company after a two-year-old drowned in a canal. It acknowledged that it is virtually impossible to make an irrigation ditch inaccessible to trespassing children, yet it found genuine issues of fact under § 339 that precluded holding that all irrigation ditches are categorically exempt from the doctrine.18 One court addressing that burden refused to exempt particular categories of industry. It treated the difficulty and expense of securing water as a factor within clause (d), to be weighed on the facts of each case.19 The ditch pairs a heavy burden of guarding with a plaintiff too young to appreciate any danger, and the balance is struck at trial.
A drowning fact pattern invites two shortcuts, and each skips part of the analysis. The first ends the case by calling water a common danger, the reasoning Giacona rejected for children too young to understand it.20 The second points to the low cost of a fence and moves straight to liability, which skips the presumption and clause (c). A complete answer names the child's age, says whether anything hid the water or distracted the child from it, and then weighs the cost of guarding that particular setting.
The order matters because the presumption in step two puts the plaintiff to a showing in step three, and steps four and five keep the answer from collapsing into the label water.
Trains and Moving Vehicles
Train cases tempt a defendant to merge two questions that § 339 keeps apart. The first is the threshold: does the harm come from an artificial condition upon the land?24 The second sits in clause (c): did the children, because of their youth, fail to discover the condition or to realize the risk of coming within the area it makes dangerous?25 A train is man-made, which answers the first question, yet it announces its own danger, which bears heavily on the second. Obviousness does not turn a man-made condition into a natural one. It is evidence on clause (c).
Courts that follow the Restatement treat § 339 as an exception to the general rule of landowner non-liability to trespassers. The general rule governs unless an exception is shown, and § 339 is strictly applied, only when all five elements are satisfied.26 Even then, comment o adds, liability follows only if the possessor fails to take the steps a reasonable person would take.27 Alongside the five elements sits one more limit. A restriction that Harris acknowledges, and that one court called universally endorsed, removes injuries from normally operated moving vehicles, including ordinary moving railroad traffic, from the doctrine.28
Clause (c) can end a train case even though the train is an artificial condition. One court protected defendants against liability to a nine-year-old injured while jumping trains, given the obvious nature of the risk even to a child of that age.29 Clause (c) asks about the child, so that result reflects a plaintiff old enough to see how dangerous the trains were. It does not exempt railroads from every claim by a child, and a very young child who cannot read the warning presents a different clause (c) question.
The two limits answer different questions and operate separately. An answer goes wrong in one of two ways. It calls a train a natural condition because everyone knows trains are dangerous, which skips the elements, or it assumes that any child hurt on a railroad is out of court, which skips the child.
Step three does the real work in most railroad cases, and a court that jumps to calling the train natural has dropped steps one and three together.
Construction Sites and Excavations
A construction site produces the hazards that § 339 fits best, because the builder digs the open trenches and foundation pits itself, and the section reaches physical harm to trespassing children caused by an artificial condition upon the land.32 Three clauses carry most of the analysis at a site. Clause (a) asks whether the possessor knows or has reason to know that children are likely to trespass at the place. Clause (b) asks whether the possessor knows or has reason to know of the condition and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm. Clause (c) asks whether youth kept the children from discovering the condition or realizing the risk.33 The contested questions therefore concern what the possessor could infer about the neighborhood, how long the condition stood, and what a small child could grasp. Whether the condition is man-made is rarely in doubt.
A Missouri court explained how clause (a) is proved at a site. Adopting § 339 eliminated the element of allurement and enticement, which was the fundamental difference from Missouri's earlier attractive nuisance doctrine, so the distance from a nearby playground and street to the site mattered only as evidence of whether trespassing children were foreseeable.34 The same court held that the lack of a history of known trespass cannot excuse a defendant who could reasonably have foreseen the presence of children at the site.35 That rule fits the shape of the hazard. A pit may stand open for only a short time, and a rule demanding earlier trespass would make the injured child the first proof of likelihood. The surroundings supply the inference instead: a playground next door gives a jury something to find on foreseeability that a remote lot does not.
The same case shows clauses (b) and (c) at work. The excavation was about ten feet deep, with water covering the bottom and metal form ties protruding from the foundation wall into the opening, and a jury could find that the defendant knew or should have known that such a condition involved an unreasonable risk of death or bodily harm to trespassing children.36 Where the builder dug the hole, knowledge of the condition is seldom disputed, and the argument concentrates on the gravity of the risk that the depth, the water, and the exposed metal each increased. At clause (c), the defendant asked the court to rule as a matter of law that a normal child of four years and ten months appreciates the risk of falling into an excavation.37 The comment j presumption about heights and water is keyed to a child old enough to be allowed at large, and it gives no basis for ruling that a four-year-old understood the danger as a matter of law.38
A ditch-drowning case from eastern Pennsylvania adds a time dimension. The court asked whether the condition was 'maintained,' a word that survives in clause (d)'s reference to the utility of maintaining the condition.39 The dangerous condition was created at the end of the first day of work, and enough time passed between its creation and the drowning to make maintenance a jury question.40 Water in the ditch caused the harm, but a reasonable person must be taken to have foreseen that rain, a normal phenomenon of nature, would fill a ditch located where it became a catch basin for the surrounding drainage, since heavy spring rains are not uncommon in eastern Pennsylvania.41 For a construction site, the lesson is that time on the condition starts running when the hazard is created, and a foreseeable event such as rain that later supplies the harmful feature does not restart it.
The contractor in the ditch case differs on the facts that matter. The contractor dug the ditch itself and had a full day in which to fill or guard it, so the hazard was retained and not sprung on the possessor. In a construction case the question therefore turns less on who created the condition than on how long the possessor knew of it and could have acted.
Why hold builders to these clauses is plain from Kessler v. Mortenson, where a Utah court let a jury find an attractive nuisance for a six-year-old at a residential construction site.42 The court observed that "homebuilders and landowners will be encouraged to minimize or eliminate dangers that trespassing children may be exposed to on the site."43 Liability works as an incentive because the party who digs a pit controls both its existence and its removal. Clause (d) turns that comparison into a formal element by weighing the possessor's burden of eliminating the danger against the risk to children.44