Concept
Modern Departures From the Rule
Duty owed to adult trespassers
Modern Departures From the Rule
Everything in this chapter so far follows the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Under it, a possessor is not liable to a trespasser for failing to make the land reasonably safe or to conduct activities with reasonable care, except as §§ 334 through 339 provide.1 That scheme is the default for exam answers, and it still organizes the law in most states, where courts begin by classifying the entrant even though a substantial number have extended ordinary care to licensees or even to trespassers.2 In a state that has discarded the categories, the first question changes from what the entrant was to whether the possessor acted reasonably.
Rowland’s Attack on the Categories
The leading critique comes from Rowland v. Christian, where the California Supreme Court argued that the labels trespasser, licensee, and invitee, the immunities built on them, and the exceptions to those immunities often fail to reflect the factors that should decide whether a possessor is immune.3 Among the factors the court listed were the closeness of the connection between the injury and the defendant’s conduct, the moral blame attached to that conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, and the prevalence and availability of insurance. Each bears little relationship to the entrant’s classification.4
The court also made a point of principle. A person’s life or limb is no less worthy of protection, and a loss no less worthy of compensation, because he came onto the land without permission or without a business purpose. Reasonable people do not ordinarily vary their conduct according to such matters, so making the duty of care turn on the injured person’s status is contrary to modern social mores and humanitarian values.5 The common-law rules, the court said, obscure rather than illuminate the considerations that should govern duty, and reasoning of this kind has led some courts, in particular situations, to reject the rigid classifications and apply ordinary principles of negligence.6
A dissent answered that the decision “appears to open the door to potentially unlimited liability despite the purpose and circumstances motivating the plaintiff in entering the premises of another.” It also quoted the majority’s own caveat that the parties’ status may “have some bearing on the question of liability.”7 That caveat matters for exam purposes, because it shows that even the majority did not treat the entrant’s status as irrelevant.
How States Have Responded
Courts that followed Rowland did not move together, and trespassers are where they part ways most sharply. Several positions are worth keeping straight.
- A minority of states apply reasonable care under all the circumstances to every entrant, trespassers included. They decide cases one at a time by weighing the foreseeability of harm to the entrant, the magnitude of the risk, the individual and social benefit of maintaining the condition, and the burden on the possessor of providing adequate protection.8 Mark v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. shows California applying that approach to a trespasser.
- Another minority keeps the common-law duty for trespassers and all other unlawful entrants while applying reasonable care to lawful ones.9 West Virginia took this course in Mallet v. Pickens, abandoning the invitee and licensee distinction while preserving the traditional rules for trespassers.10 One court explained the logic of keeping the trespasser line this way: sweeping away every distinction among trespassers, social guests, and business invitees “is a drastic step to take because there may be, and often is, good reason to distinguish between a trespasser and a social guest,” while there is “little or no reason to distinguish between a social guest and a business invitee.”11
- Many decisions adopting Rowland did not involve trespass at all, and some that did raise the issue declined to extend the duty to trespassers. Wood v. Camp (Florida), Nelson v. Freeland (North Carolina), and Peterson v. Balach are among the cases in that group.12
Two further departures leave the old structure largely standing but trim its harshest edge. Massachusetts illustrates the first. In Pridgen v. Boston Housing Authority the court addressed the trapped, imperiled, and helpless trespasser and rejected any rule that would exempt an owner who knowingly refrains from reasonable action that would prevent injury or further injury. An owner who ignores a trapped trespasser’s plight and takes no affirmative action to help him cannot claim immunity.13 The second is the Restatement (Third) of Torts, which divides trespassers into two groups. An ordinary trespasser is owed reasonable care, but a flagrant trespasser is owed only a duty not to act in an intentional, willful, or wanton manner to cause physical harm. The lower standard rests on the possessor’s privilege to exclude persons in protection of property rights.14 The split remains controversial, and some states have passed legislation preserving the no-duty rule.15
A fact pattern that names a Rowland state, frames the trespasser’s claim as ordinary negligence, or separates ordinary from flagrant trespassers has left the Second Restatement behind. The analysis then turns to foreseeability, the magnitude of the risk, the benefit of the condition, and the burden of precautions,16 with the entrant’s status as at most one circumstance bearing on liability.17 A fact pattern that gives no such signal calls for the sequence taught above: classify the entrant, then ask what the possessor knew about the person and about the place.