Concept
The General No-Duty Rule
Duty owed to adult trespassers
The General No-Duty Rule
A possessor of land is not liable to a trespasser for carelessness. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 333 states the baseline: except as stated in §§ 334 through 339, a possessor is not liable to trespassers for physical harm caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care (a) to put the land in a condition reasonably safe for their reception, or (b) to carry on his activities so as not to endanger them.1 The two prongs track the two ways land hurts people: through the state of the premises and through what the possessor does on them. A plaintiff who proves only that the possessor was careless in either respect has not yet stated a claim. The opening clause matters as much as the prongs, because it makes § 333 a starting point. The sections it names describe situations in which the possessor does owe some care, and later parts of this chapter take them up.
The rule is a privilege, and it does not rest on any view that trespassers deserve their injuries. A trespasser hurt on the land by anyone other than the possessor is not barred from recovering, so the limit on the possessor's duty cannot come from the trespasser's wrongdoing. It belongs to the possessor solely because of his right to exclusive possession and control of the premises,2 and it reflects his privilege to exclude persons in protection of his property rights.3 The privilege reaches further than a safety rationale would explain. It can leave an invitee and a trespasser standing side by side, both injured by the same careless act, with the invitee recovering and the trespasser barred.4
The privilege has softeners and limits. In many cases the landowner would not have been negligent even under an ordinary-care standard, so the rule is less harsh than it sounds, and modern courts have modified it by both definitions and exceptions.5 The exceptions appear where the foreseeable probability of trespassers and the nature and extent of the foreseeable harm outweigh the burden of precautions and the value of the right to exclude.6 This section covers the baseline for undiscovered trespassers, those whose presence the possessor neither knows of nor has reason to know of. It takes up the condition prong first, then the activity prong, and then the floor of intentional and wanton harm beneath both.
Conditions on the Land
Section 333(a) excuses a possessor from any duty "to put the land in a condition reasonably safe for their reception."7 The possessor need not inspect for hazards, repair what is defective, or otherwise ready the land as a careful owner would for expected guests. The traditional scheme withholds a duty of reasonable care from trespassers, and trespassers take the premises as they find them.8
The excuse holds even when the possessor was careless. In Sheehan v. St. Paul Ry. Co., a trespasser hurt by a poorly maintained railroad roadbed had no claim for the defect, because the railroad owed no duty to make the roadbed safe for someone it had no reason to expect there.9 The case separates two questions that students often run together. Negligent maintenance is a breach only of a duty that runs to the person hurt. Section 333(a) withholds that duty from the undiscovered trespasser, so proof that the possessor let the land decay does not start the claim.
The reason follows from what the duty would demand. A duty to make land safe is measured against the people the possessor can foresee using it, and an owner who has invited customers knows whom the premises were readied for. No comparable group exists for undiscovered trespassers. A possessor held to a duty of reasonable safety toward unknown intruders would have to treat every outbuilding, field, and attic as though a stranger might be in it. That burden cuts against the right to exclude, which is the interest the privilege protects.10
The owner's conduct is identical in both scenes, since the stair rotted unattended and nobody inspected it. Only the plaintiff's status changed the answer, which is why classifying the entrant came first in this chapter.11
Two limits keep the rule from being overstated. First, § 333 opens with the words "Except as stated in §§ 334-339," so the no-duty rule governs only until one of those exceptions applies.12 Second, the exceptions that reach conditions on the land ask for a warning, not a repair. A possessor who has created or maintains a dangerous artificial condition must warn constant trespassers on a limited area who will not discover it.13 A possessor must likewise warn known trespassers who are in dangerous proximity to a concealed condition involving a risk of death or serious bodily harm.14 Even where no exception applies, the possessor remains liable for intentional injury, traps, and wanton harm, the floor taken up in the last part of this section.15
Activities on the Land
Section 333(b) excuses a possessor from any duty "to carry on his activities so as not to endanger" trespassers.17 Prong (a) concerns the state of the land, and prong (b) concerns what the possessor does on it, such as running a machine, driving a vehicle, or conducting an industrial operation. For an undiscovered trespasser, the possessor need not look out for people he has no reason to think are present.
Care in conducting an activity depends on knowing who is in the way, because a driver slows, steers around, or stops only for someone he has reason to expect. A possessor who owed care to strangers he cannot foresee would have to survey his premises before every movement or suspend operations altogether. The privilege spares him that burden because it protects his exclusive possession and control of the land.18
In a scene like that one, the rule often reaches the result ordinary negligence principles would reach, because a reasonably prudent possessor can usually ignore the parts of the premises where visitors are forbidden.19 The rule is not confined to such places, however. It applies to a portion of the premises that is open to the public or frequently used by invitees, even when trespassers and invitees are equally likely to be present. It also bars recovery by a technical trespasser who was there in the good-faith but mistaken belief that he had a privilege to be there and meant no harm.20
The driver's carelessness and the force of the impact were the same for both victims, so status alone produced the different outcomes. The privilege rests on the possessor's control of the land and not on any view that the trespasser did wrong, which is why it can leave an injured trespasser without a remedy where ordinary negligence principles would have allowed one.21
On an exam, this prong usually turns on a single variable, which is what the possessor knew. The operative word is undiscovered: the possessor owes no care in conducting activities because he has neither knowledge of the trespasser nor reason to know of the trespasser's presence. The nature of the activity does not move the answer. The same loader driven across the same yard with the same inattention produces a barred claim when the operator had no reason to know of the teenager. It produces liability when the operator sees the teenager step into its path and keeps driving.22 That second result belongs to the known-trespasser rule of § 336, developed later in this chapter. A possessor who knows that trespassers constantly intrude upon a limited area also owes reasonable care in conducting active operations there, under § 334.23 Section 333(b) is therefore the default that §§ 334 and 336 reverse, each on a different showing of foreseeability.
Intentional and Wanton Harm
Section 333 excuses a possessor from one thing only, the failure to exercise reasonable care to make the land safe for trespassers or to conduct activities so as not to endanger them.25 Every operative word in that rule describes carelessness, so the privilege ends where carelessness ends. Beneath it lies the traditional minimum duty to a trespasser: the possessor must not cause intentional injury, set a trap, or cause wanton injury.26 A merely careless possessor keeps the privilege. A possessor who injures deliberately, or in reckless disregard of the safety of others, does not.
The privilege stops there because of what it protects. It exists to spare the possessor, as the holder of exclusive possession and control, the effort of inspecting, repairing, and watching for strangers he had no reason to expect.27 Declining to hurt someone on purpose costs nothing comparable, so the justification does not carry over. The possessor's privilege does not extend to intentional torts, and trespassers may not be shot merely for trespassing.28
A spring gun shows the line. An owner who rigs one inside an outbuilding to shoot whoever enters is liable to the trespasser who is shot, even though § 333 would excuse mere carelessness in that same outbuilding. The owner's ignorance of who will come is no defense, because the harm was planned in advance and the device carries out the owner's choice against whoever trips it.29
Between carelessness and intent lies a gray area called willful and wanton or reckless conduct, which lies on the fault continuum between mere negligence and the intent required for an intentional tort. Courts and lawyers most often say willful and wanton, and the Restatement says reckless.30 The word willful misleads, because no intent to cause injury is required. The phrase is an idiom for conduct that evinces a reckless disregard of the safety of others.31
Most jurisdictions have adopted a blanket rule that a possessor is liable to a trespasser for willful and wanton or reckless misconduct, while some courts recognize no general rule of that kind. Almost all traditional jurisdictions nonetheless embrace the special rules for discovered trespassers and for frequent trespassers on a limited area. Those rules cover the most common situations in which a possessor might act recklessly toward a trespasser, and they go further by imposing liability for ordinary negligence.32
In Bremer v. Lake Erie & W.R. Co., a railroad was held liable when its engineer recklessly ran past a signal and injured a trespasser riding on the train.33 A different engineer on a different night shows how narrow the line is.
The harm and the missed signal are the same in both scenes, so the answer turns on the actor's state of mind alone. A possessor who rigs a device, or who proceeds in reckless disregard of a danger he perceives, falls on the liable side of this floor even if the victim was never discovered. A mere failure to inspect, repair, or look out falls on the excused side.