Concept
When Status Changes
Possessor of land and entrant status
When Status Changes
Each entrant category rests on what the possessor has said yes to. Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 329, a trespasser is a person who “enters or remains upon land in the possession of another without a privilege to do so created by the possessor’s consent or otherwise.”1 A licensee under § 330 is privileged to be there only by virtue of the possessor’s consent.2 An invitee under § 332 has been invited to enter or remain for a purpose, either as a member of the public for a purpose for which the land is held open or for a purpose connected with business dealings with the possessor.3 A yes has edges. An entrant who steps past them changes category without leaving the land, so classifying the entrant at the gate is only the first step.
A possessor who consents to one use of the land has not consented to every use, and the law lets the possessor draw the line. Consent can be limited in time: Paredes’s invitation to Marshall for a birthday party does not cover a week-long stay, even if Marshall claims she is still celebrating. Consent can also be limited to certain areas: a store owner who invites customers into his showroom has not consented to their going upstairs to watch television in his apartment.4 An invitation has the same limits, for a reason that follows from what it offers. It carries an assurance of safety, and that assurance reaches only as far as the invitation does. A possessor who has readied the showroom for customers has said nothing about the apartment, and holding the possessor to the invitee standard there would impose a duty for places, times, and purposes the possessor never opened up. A person can therefore be an invitee in one place or at one time and not in another.5
Falling outside the invitation does not leave the entrant unclassified, because the possessor’s consent sorts the entrant into one of the other two categories. An entrant who goes beyond the invitation without the possessor’s consent has lost the privilege that supported the presence, and becomes a trespasser even though the original entry was permitted. An entrant who goes beyond it with the possessor’s consent is on the land by virtue of that consent alone, which is the licensee’s position.6 The trespasser category is fluid in this way: invitees and licensees alike can become trespassers when they enter areas to which no permission extends.7 Marshall, for example, becomes a trespasser if she wanders off from the party and takes Paredes’s horse for a ride, though she entered with permission.8
One judicial opinion shows how quickly the questions pile up. A real-estate agent trespasses onto a landowner’s land to value the adjoining parcel he is trying to sell. The landowner finds him, and the two discuss whether the owner will sell. The talk turns to their old college, and the owner walks with him across an acre to the property’s edge, where they talk for another ten minutes. The opinion asks what the agent is if he is hurt on the walk out, whether his status changed from invitee to licensee when the business conversation ended, and whether it matters how long the two men talked.9
The puzzle teaches that status is assigned at the moment of injury, by asking where the entrant was, when, and for what purpose, measured against what the possessor’s invitation or permission covered. The three subsections that follow take those questions in turn. An exam stem that follows one plaintiff through a whole visit usually tests exactly this, and the plaintiff’s status on arrival only begins the analysis.
Area of the Invitation
Invitee status attaches to a place as well as a purpose. The commentary to § 332 says a possessor is liable to a visitor as an invitee only for harm sustained “on the land within the scope of his invitation,” and that the visitor holds the status only on “the part of the land to which his invitation extends,” which it describes as the part “upon which the possessor gives him reason to believe that his presence is desired for the purpose for which he has come.”10
The limit tracks what an invitation tells the visitor. A possessor who opens a store lights, cleans, and inspects the aisles customers are expected to use, and a customer who follows the invitation reasonably assumes those aisles have been looked after. The rest of the building gets no such attention, and the customer has no reason to think it does. The commentary therefore ties the area to the purpose: the purpose for which the land is held open, or the business purpose behind the invitation, fixes the area the invitation includes. A person who comes into a grocery to buy groceries is invited onto the sales floor, and the boundary falls where a visit for that purpose would ordinarily lead.11 Courts find that boundary in the nature of the invitation and its purposes, custom, the layout of the premises, and the invitee’s reasonable expectations, which usually give a clear guide.12
What the visitor becomes outside the area depends on the possessor’s consent. The Restatement’s illustration is a shop that occupies part of a building whose remainder is the possessor’s residence. A customer who walks into the residence without the shopkeeper’s consent is a trespasser, while a customer whom the shopkeeper permits to use the bathroom or invites to pay a social call is a licensee.13 The two results differ in a single fact, and the definitions explain why: a privilege resting on consent alone is the licensee’s, and presence with no privilege at all is the trespasser’s.14 Neither result restores invitee status, because the invitation never covered the residence. Nor does silence supply the consent: a possessor’s failure to act against an entry is not, without more, an indication that the possessor consents to it.15
Whelan v. Van Natta applies the test to a back room. A customer bought cigarettes, asked about a box for his son, and was told by the busy grocer to go to the back room, where he would find some. He opened the door of the storage room, found it dark, and fell into an unseen stairwell while looking for a box.16 The Kentucky Court of Appeals framed the question as whether the customer’s status changed from invitee to licensee after he finished his purchase and entered the storage room, set out the Restatement’s discussion of the scope of an invitation, and affirmed the trial court’s treatment of him as a licensee.17 The grocer’s direction to go to the back room is the fact a plaintiff would press. The result still fits the Restatement test, because the sales floor is the part of the grocery held open to customers for shopping and the dark storeroom is working space behind it.
The same inquiry runs outdoors. A shopping-mall patron is an invitee in the parking lot but not while taking a shortcut through the flower bed.18 The invitation to patrons ordinarily reaches the lot and the walkways, and a planting bed gives a patron no reason to think the mall wants visitors crossing it. Nicoletti v. Westcor, Inc. is a decision cited for that illustration.19
The test also shelters the visitor who strays by honest mistake. A customer looking for a public restroom remains an invitee if she reasonably enters a storeroom by mistake,20 and Miniken v. Carr is cited for that proposition.21 Looking for a restroom is an ordinary part of a shopping visit, so her purpose is intact, and the layout is what led her to the wrong door. The residence example differs because the visitor there enters a part of the building the shopkeeper treats as private, and only the shopkeeper’s leave gives any privilege to be in it. The restroom seeker has made a reasonable error inside premises held open to her, and her status does not change.
The restroom seeker and the sign-reader both came to shop, and both wanted a restroom. What separates them is whether the layout gave a reasonable customer reason to think the door was open to customers. Students most often err by stopping once they have called the plaintiff a customer, which shows only that an invitation existed and says nothing about whether it reached the place of the injury.
Where the possessor has pointed the visitor to a particular spot, step 2 is where the argument happens, and Whelan shows that a court can still place the spot outside the invitation. The next two subsections apply the same place-and-purpose reasoning to how long an invitation lasts and to what uses it covers.
Time of the Invitation
Invitee status also expires. The commentary to § 332 measures the scope of an invitation in time as well as in space: “an invitee ceases to be an invitee after the expiration of a reasonable time within which to accomplish the purpose for which he is invited to enter, or to remain.”24 What the entrant becomes then depends on the possessor: “Whether at the expiration of that time he becomes a trespasser or a licensee will depend upon whether the possessor does or does not consent to his remaining on the land.”25 Two questions follow, in a fixed order. Has the reasonable time run? And, only if it has, did the possessor consent to the entrant’s staying?
Invitee status expires because of what the invitation was for. A possessor who invites visitors for a purpose prepares for visits of that kind, and someone still there after the purpose is accomplished is a person the possessor had no occasion to expect or look after. The measure is a reasonable time and not a fixed clock because purposes differ; a diner needs longer than a courier dropping off an envelope. The nature of the invitation and its purposes, custom, and the invitee’s reasonable expectations are usually a clear guide to how long.26 The Restatement’s rule on remaining on land reflects the same idea when it speaks of a privilege terminated “by the accomplishment of its purpose or otherwise.”27
A restaurant customer is an invitee when she parks and retrieves her car during serving hours, but not when she leaves her car in the lot and returns for it after the restaurant has closed.28 Morris v. De La Torre is cited for the first half of that comparison and Savage v. Flagler Co. for the second.29 The two customers came for the same purpose, to the same lot, and only the hour differs. During serving hours the walk back to the car is the last step of the dinner the restaurant solicited, so it falls within the reasonable time. After closing, the restaurant has stopped soliciting visits, and nothing in an invitation to diners tells a customer that anyone is looking after the lot at that hour. Losing invitee status does not settle what the late customer is. That depends on the second question.
The second question connects to the definitions. An entrant whose invitation has run out but whom the possessor lets stay holds a privilege resting on the possessor’s consent alone, which is the licensee’s.30 An entrant whose invitation has run out and whom the possessor has not let stay has no privilege at all, and the word “remains” in the trespasser definition reaches that person: the entry was lawful, and only the continued presence is in question.31 Students often treat expiration as automatically producing a trespasser. Expiration ends invitee status and nothing more, and the possessor’s consent to the continued presence, shown by words or conduct, keeps the entrant on the land as a licensee. Silence is a thin basis for finding that consent, because a possessor’s failure to act against an entry is not, without more, an indication that the possessor consents to it.32
Consent limited in time from the start produces the same results for entrants who were never invitees. Paredes’s invitation to Marshall does not cover a week-long stay. Clements, a college student who leaves her trunk at Kobe’s house for the summer and never returns for it, becomes a trespasser by failing to remove the trunk at the end of the agreed time.33 The Restatement’s rule on things left on land turns on whether consent “has been effectively terminated,”34 and the decisions on remaining in trespass to land show how consent ends. In Mitchell v. Mitchell a widow let the administrators of her late husband’s estate into her house to collect his books, then asked them to leave when they tried to take every book in the house, including some of hers. They refused and stayed for several hours trying to persuade her, and they were trespassers from the time she asked them to leave.35 A request to leave is the clearest answer to the second question, and an entrant who stays after it has no privilege left.
The real-estate agent from the opening puzzle shows why the questions come in this order. The first asks when the reasonable time for his business purpose ran out, and the second asks whether the landowner’s conduct supplied consent to his staying once it did. Elapsed minutes matter only as they bear on those two inquiries.
Purpose of the Invitation
Purpose marks the third edge of an invitation. Both branches of invitee status are defined by the reason for the visit: a public invitee comes as a member of the public for a purpose for which the land is held open, and a business visitor comes for a purpose connected with business dealings with the possessor.38 Area and time fix where and for how long a visitor holds that status, and purpose fixes what the visitor may be doing there. An invitation to enter for one purpose may therefore carry no assurance of safety when the entrant uses the land for an inconsistent purpose.39 Permission works the same way, because consent to entry on one occasion or for one purpose is not a general consent to entry.40 A party guest who returns a week later to fish in the host’s pond is a trespasser if the birthday invitation reasonably meant entry for the party itself.41
The limit follows from what an invitation or a permission communicates. A possessor who admits someone has a particular kind of visit in mind, and any assurance of safety the admission carries concerns that kind of visit. A restaurant has readied itself for diners, and a neighbor who lets children play in the yard has considered what play in a yard involves. The licensee’s privilege likewise exists only by virtue of the possessor’s consent, so it extends as far as the consent does.42 If an invitation traveled with the entrant to every new purpose, limited consent would become an open license, and a possessor could admit no one safely, since every admission would be an admission for everything.
The decisions show the principle working on entrants who began with permission. In Chapman v. Willey a man had the owner’s permission to visit his wife at a motel, went there to fight another man instead, and was treated as a trespasser.43 The permission was for a visit to his wife, and a trip made to fight fell outside it. In Brown v. Dellinger two children who had been permitted to play in a neighbor’s yard ignited a charcoal burner in the garage and caused $28,000 in damage, and they were treated as trespassers.44 Play in a yard is what the neighbor had agreed to, and a fire in a garage is a different use. In Copeland v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc. a couple allowed their veterinarian to bring along a student who said she was considering a career in veterinary medicine. She did not disclose that she worked for a television station, and she secretly videotaped the treatment of the couple’s cat for a report on the veterinarian’s practice.45 The court found a trespass because she used the visit for something other than an educational or vocational purpose, which carried her beyond the scope of the invitation.46
Brown and Copeland reached court as claims against the entrants for trespass to land. They appear here because they ask the question the premises categories ask: how far does the possessor’s consent reach? A trespasser is a person who remains on land without a privilege created by the possessor’s consent or otherwise, and consent given for one purpose supports no presence for a different one.47 The three cases still differ from one another. In Chapman the entrant’s actual aim was incompatible in kind with the visit that had been permitted. In Brown the entrants were the very children the neighbor had admitted, and what they did went beyond the play the neighbor had allowed. In Copeland the visit looked like the permitted one from the outside, and the difference lay in an undisclosed purpose, so the consent the couple gave covered an educational visit, which is a different visit from the one that occurred.
Not every departure from the stated errand ends invitee status. A purpose defeats the assurance of safety only when it is inconsistent with the purpose that supported the entry, so a compatible side purpose leaves status where it was. Some side errands are close. In Markle v. Hacienda Mexican Restaurant the plaintiff drove into a shopping center to eat at a restaurant there, saw a friend, and was transferring an item from his vehicle to the friend’s when he fell in a pothole. The court treated it as a jury question whether the transfer fell within the scope of the invitation.48 A borderline side errand in an exam fact pattern therefore calls for an argument on both sides and a note that the jury may decide it.
What Tomas becomes depends on the same fact that decided the area and time questions. If the store consents to the race, he is on the land by virtue of that consent alone and is a licensee. If the store does not consent, he has no privilege for that use and is a trespasser.49 An exam stem that gives the plaintiff a lawful entry invites the instinct to classify at the door and stop, and the inquiry continues by asking what the plaintiff was doing when hurt, measured against the purpose for which the possessor admitted that plaintiff. The opposite instinct, which treats every detour as a forfeiture, fails on facts like Markle’s.