Concept
Trespassers
Possessor of land and entrant status
Trespassers
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 329 defines a trespasser as “a person who enters or remains upon land in the possession of another without a privilege to do so created by the possessor’s consent or otherwise.”1 Three phrases carry the definition. “In the possession of another” ties the category to the possessor, the subject of the preceding section. “Enters or remains” reaches both the arrival and the later moment when a person stays after permission has ended. And “consent or otherwise” names two sources of privilege: the possessor’s consent in the usual case, and the law itself in the rest.2
Trespasser is the residual category. Today the primary line runs between entrants who come by invitation, permission, or privilege and entrants who come without consent or other privilege, and the trespasser is the second kind.3 Consent marks that line because the possessor ordinarily decides who may come onto the land and on what terms. The possessor never agreed to receive the trespasser, and so had no occasion to prepare for the visit. The words “or otherwise” keep out of the category a person whom the law itself authorizes to be on the land, even though the possessor never agreed to the entry.
The label matters because tort law does not order compensation whenever a defendant causes harm. Compensation is one of its goals, but courts have not adopted strict liability across the board, and fault remains the most common basis for liability.4 A possessor’s duty to an entrant begins with the entrant’s classification, and this section supplies only the classification. What each category carries by way of duty belongs to later readings.
Entry Without Privilege
The core case is the entrant who holds neither source of privilege: no consent from the possessor and no rule of law authorizing the entry. The category covers anyone who enters another’s land without the owner’s express or implied consent.5 Consent draws the line because a landowner holds the right to exclude others, and that right includes the power to decide who will be received.6 A guest admitted by permission is someone the possessor could anticipate. A trespasser is someone the possessor never agreed to receive, which is why the traditional rules attach a more limited set of duties to that visit.
The label asks only whether the possessor had a say in the entry, so the entrant’s state of mind plays no part. A hiker who crosses a boundary in good faith, meaning no harm, is still a trespasser. Nor does the label brand the entrant a wrongdoer. A trespasser injured by anyone other than the possessor is not barred from recovering, which shows that the possessor’s limited duty cannot rest on the entrant’s misconduct. It is a special privilege that belongs to the occupier solely by reason of the right to exclusive possession and control of the premises.7
The same reasoning reaches an entrant who made no choice at all. A person carried unconscious onto the land by others may be a trespasser for purposes of the possessor’s duty of care, and Copeland v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. is cited for that classification.8 The possessor had no say in that entry either, and the category does not measure the entrant’s conduct, even the conduct of doing nothing. Innocence and helplessness leave the possessor in the same position: never having agreed to receive the visitor.
Consent may be express or implied, so words or conduct that communicate welcome will supply it.9 Silence does not. Courts have sometimes explained that a defendant’s continued toleration of trespasses amounts to permission to use the land, which would make the entrant a licensee. In most cases, however, a possessor’s failure to take steps against trespassing that would be burdensome, expensive, and perhaps futile is not in itself an indication that the possessor consents to the entry.10 The reason is practical. If inaction counted as permission, the possessor of a large tract could keep the trespasser category only by fencing and patrolling every boundary, and a possessor who could not afford to do so would lose it without ever choosing to admit anyone.
The category and the tort of trespass to land are different things, even though both use the word. The tort protects the right to exclude, and any intentional incursion onto another’s land is actionable, whether or not damage results.11 Intent here means a purpose to cause the intrusion or substantial certainty that it will result, and an entrant who mistakenly believes the land belongs to the entrant has no defense.12 The hiker above has therefore committed the tort and is also a trespasser for premises purposes, because his walking was intentional even though his belief about the boundary was wrong. The two inquiries come apart once the entrant’s conduct drops out. The person carried unconscious onto the land performed no intentional act of entry, yet may still be a trespasser for premises purposes, because the category is broader than the group of entrants who might be sued for the tort.13 The category is also fluid: a person who is an invitee or licensee in one part of the premises becomes a trespasser by entering an area to which no permission extends.14 The difference traces to function. The tort protects the possessor’s right to exclusive possession, while the category determines the landowner’s duty of care to an entrant hurt on the land.15
That covers the entrant who holds no privilege at all. The next subsection turns to the second source of privilege, the one that arises by operation of law and removes from the category entrants whom the law itself authorizes to be on the land.
Entrants Privileged by Law
The definition of trespasser ends with two words that matter here. An entrant is a trespasser only if the entry lacks a privilege created by the possessor’s consent “or otherwise.”17 A privilege to be on land can therefore come from a source other than the possessor, and an entrant who holds one is not a trespasser, even if the possessor never agreed to the visit and would have refused it.18 The licensee definition is narrower. Section 330 reaches a person privileged to enter or remain on land “only by virtue of the possessor’s consent.”19 Set the two definitions side by side and a gap opens. An entrant whose privilege comes from the law escapes the trespasser category, because a privilege exists, yet fits poorly in the licensee category, because the privilege does not rest on consent. Firefighters and police officers are the standard examples.
These entrants fit none of the three categories cleanly because each category was built around the possessor’s choice about who comes in, and an official enters by the law’s choice. A privilege created “otherwise” does not depend on the possessor’s consent, so the official could enter over the possessor’s objection. Invitee status fails for a parallel reason. An invitee comes by invitation and, in the business setting, deals with the possessor in a potential economic exchange.20 An official acting under legal authority ordinarily has neither an invitation nor a transaction with the possessor. The gap is real, and courts have had to fill it themselves.
Courts have filled it by sorting officials according to why they come. Some public officers enter for a purpose connected with the possessor’s business and essential to it, because the business could not lawfully operate without them. Sanitary and safety inspectors are the leading example, and courts commonly treat them as invitees. Fire and police officers respond to emergencies and have no dealing with the possessor, and they are generally placed lower, as licensees under a privilege the law confers. That placement stretches the consent-only text of § 330, but it follows the line courts draw today between entrants who come with some privilege and entrants who come with none.21
The strain of fitting officials into categories designed around consent and invitation has led some courts to set the categories aside for police and firefighters and to apply ordinary reasonable care. A separate group of rules limits a possessor’s liability to professional rescuers. Most jurisdictions that impose such a limit do so on grounds other than the rescuer’s status on the land: some reason that taxpayers who already fund rescuers’ compensation should not be charged twice, and others rely on assumption of risk and public policy. Some jurisdictions still base liability to rescuers on land-possessor duties.22 Those limits belong to the firefighter’s rule and related doctrines, which are separate from the entrant categories and are not developed here.
Official authority is not the only privilege that operates without the possessor’s agreement. Under the private-necessity privilege of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 197, a person may enter or remain on another’s land when entry is, or reasonably appears to be, necessary to prevent serious harm to the actor or to the actor’s land or chattels. Because § 329 asks about a privilege created by consent “or otherwise,” an entrant who holds that privilege is not a trespasser for that entry, whatever the owner thinks of the visit.
A privilege that does not rest on consent has limits, and the limits keep it from overriding the possessor’s right to exclude. Such a privilege lasts only as long as its purpose. The rule on things left on another’s land makes the point: an actor who placed a thing there under a privilege conferred irrespective of the possessor’s consent commits a trespass by failing to remove it after the privilege has ended, whether by the accomplishment of its purpose or otherwise.23 The same logic reaches entrants. A firefighter who lingers after the fire is out, or a canoeist who stays after the storm has passed, has remained beyond the privilege.