Concept
Normal Responses to Danger
Particular Intervening Forces and Their Effect on Liability
Normal Responses to Danger
Negligence that creates a danger sets people in motion. Some panic, some scramble to save themselves or their property, some rush in to help, and some push past an obstacle the defendant has put in their way. Any of these reactions can injure the person who acts or someone nearby, and the defendant then blames the reaction for the harm. Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 444, 445, and 446 answer that defense for three families of reaction: responses to fear or emotional disturbance, efforts to avert threatened harm, and efforts to remove an impediment to the exercise of a right or privilege. Each section gives the same answer. A normal reaction of that kind is not a superseding cause of the harm it produces, so the defendant whose conduct created the emergency or the obstacle remains liable.1
These rules apply to reactions the question that opens this chapter: whether a defendant's liability should be cut off even though the conduct was negligent and a factual cause of the plaintiff's injury. Foreseeability alone cannot settle that question, because foreseeability is an accordion concept that stretches or shrinks with the detail and precision that foresight is required to have. Many torts teachers therefore find it helpful to express foreseeability in terms of the risk idea.2 Sections 444 through 446 fit that approach. A reaction to the danger the defendant created is a response to conditions the defendant produced, and the Restatement leaves such a response inside the defendant's liability instead of treating it as an interruption.
The reason follows from how people behave under pressure. Someone confronted with a sudden danger has little time to weigh alternatives, so the emergency itself drives the reaction, and a careful actor would have expected some such reaction. The defendant could have prevented every one of these reactions by taking the care that avoids creating the emergency, which makes the defendant a fairer bearer of the loss than the person who reacted.
The word normal marks the limit in all three sections, and it carries an older idea. In Ryan v. New York Central R.R. Co., Judge Hunt explained why the owner of the building on which negligently thrown sparks fell could recover by asking whether the result was one “to have been anticipated the moment the fire was communicated,” and he called the building's destruction “the ordinary and natural result of its being fired.”3 Normal does not mean careful. A defendant who negligently creates an emergency must anticipate negligent defensive acts by those in peril, though not foolhardy or unreasonable ones.4 A reaction on the wrong side of that line loses the protection of these sections and is judged under the general foreseeability test taught earlier in this chapter.
Each section below runs the same inquiry, and a problem under any of them can be worked in four questions.
The subsections that follow run from reflex to choice: fright first, then efforts to avert harm, then rescue as the best-known case of such efforts, and last the plaintiff who pushes past an obstacle the defendant created.
Fear and Emotional Disturbance
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 444 provides that an act done by another in normal response to fear or emotional disturbance, to which the defendant's negligent conduct is a substantial factor in subjecting that person, is not a superseding cause of harm the act does to the actor or to a third person.5 The section has three parts. The defendant's negligence must be a substantial factor in exposing the frightened person to the fear or disturbance. The reaction must be a normal one. And the harm may land on the person who reacted or on someone else. When all three are present, the reaction is a link in the causal chain and does not break it.
Fear does not break the chain because of what fear does to judgment. A person who sees a vehicle bearing down or a load dropping has no time to weigh alternatives, so the decision to jump, run, or swerve comes from the emergency and not from deliberation. That makes the reaction a response in the sense developed earlier in this chapter: it grows out of the conditions the defendant created and does not merely find the plaintiff at a spot the defendant happened to choose.
The defendant need not have predicted the reaction. Chief Judge Magruder, discussing a traffic mix-up in Marshall v. Nugent, observed that before the disturbed waters have become placid and normal again, the events between the culpable act and the plaintiff's eventual injury “may be bizarre indeed; yet the defendant may be liable for the result.” No one in the defendant's position could predict in advance just how the negligence would work out to another's injury, but “this in itself is no bar to recovery.” He added that close proximate-cause cases are normally left to the jury, and he found no error in refusing to direct a verdict for the defendant on the issue.6
The rule protects a plaintiff hurt by someone else's frightened reaction as well as the person who reacted, because the section reaches harm done by the reacting person's act to a third person.7 The defendant's carelessness created the whole disturbance, so the person who bolts and the person struck by the bolting person are both injured by consequences of one emergency.
The first requirement ties the rule to the defendant's own fault. A pedestrian who panics at an alarm sounded by a stranger, or at a fire unconnected to anything the defendant did, is not responding to the defendant's conduct. Section 444 has nothing to attach to in that situation, and the ordinary foreseeability analysis governs the intervening act.
A normal response need not be wise. People in fright stumble, overreact, and choose poorly, and a defendant who creates an emergency must anticipate negligent defensive acts by those in peril. The line falls at conduct that is foolhardy or unreasonable.8 The section also protects only a response to fear. Conduct that begins after the fear has passed, and serves some unrelated purpose, is a new decision and not a reaction to the danger.
Falling outside section 444 does not by itself excuse the defendant. It means only that the section's protection is unavailable, so the general test taught earlier decides whether the later act was foreseeable or so extraordinary that it supersedes.
Harm that a distressed person does to himself has its own authorities, treated in the section on later harm from the original injury, and two of them mark the boundary of § 444. Suicide has been held not to supersede when it results from an insanity, caused by the defendant's tort, that prevents the victim from realizing the nature of his act or controlling his conduct.9 Where a seller instead negligently supplies the means, the courts have gone the other way. In Scoggins v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. the ammunition went to a minor, and in Runyon v. Reid the barbiturates were sold without refill authorization; each court treated the suicidal act as a superseding cause, although the cases suggest the result might differ if the seller had reason to suspect the buyer's intent.10
Efforts to Avert Harm
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 445 provides that when the defendant's negligent conduct threatens harm to another's person, land, or chattels, the normal efforts of the other or of a third person to avert the threatened harm are not a superseding cause of harm resulting from those efforts.12 The threat may be aimed at a body, at real property, or at personal property. The person who makes the effort may be the one threatened or someone acting for that person. And the harm the section leaves with the defendant is harm that results from the effort itself, whether it falls on the person making it, on the person being protected, or on someone nearby. Section 444 reaches a reaction driven by fright; § 445 reaches a purposeful attempt to defeat the danger, although a single jerk of a steering wheel will often fit both.
The law protects these efforts because of the position the negligence creates. Someone facing a danger must either absorb the harm or act, and acting risks a new injury. Only the defendant chose to create that dilemma. If the injury from the effort were charged to the plaintiff as an independent choice, the defendant would profit from the self-protective instinct the negligence provoked, and people would learn that trying to limit a loss forfeits recovery for it. The qualifier normal keeps the rule tied to the risk that made the defendant careless. A normal effort can still be careless, because efforts made in the seconds an emergency allows are often clumsy, and a defendant who negligently creates an emergency must anticipate defensive acts that are themselves negligent, though not ones that are foolhardy or unreasonable.13
Protection extends to land and chattels because the interest in a building or a machine is as worth defending as the interest in a body, and the defendant's negligence is just as much the source of the emergency when property is what is threatened.
The protection has two limits. First, a threat must be present. Section 445 covers efforts to avert “the threatened harm,” so a tenant who returns the day after firefighters have put out a negligently started fire and declared the building safe, to fetch a framed photograph from under a damaged ceiling, is not averting anything. The danger has ended, and the ordinary foreseeability analysis governs the return trip. Second, the effort must be normal. A foolhardy or unreasonable effort is not the kind a negligent defendant must anticipate,14 and courts decide on the facts whether a particular intervention was one that ordinary people would make. Robinson v. Butler is a decision to read for how a court answers that question.
A plaintiff's own carelessness in defending against the danger raises a related question with a different answer. A plaintiff's later conduct can in principle be a superseding cause, but to qualify it must be more than the ordinary contributory negligence that matters when fault is apportioned.15 Mesick v. State of New York shows how demanding that standard is: the plaintiff swung on a rope tied to a tree branch out over a water hole and fell onto jagged rocks, and his conduct was held not to be a superseding cause.16 A court that labels a plaintiff's later negligence superseding revives the old rule that contributory negligence bars recovery entirely, and the better approach lets the ordinary comparative-fault rules apply.17 A person who defends carelessly but not foolhardily against a danger the defendant created therefore keeps the claim, and the factfinder reduces it by that person's share of fault.
Rescue Doctrine
Section 445 reaches the efforts of a third person as well as those of the person threatened, and its best-known application is the rescue doctrine. The doctrine holds that if a rescuer of a person hurt or put in peril by another's negligence or intentional wrongdoing is injured in the course of the rescue, the original wrongdoer is responsible in damages for the rescuer's injury.19 As the New York court put it in Wagner v. International Railway Co., the wrongdoer “may not have foreseen the coming of a deliverer. He is accountable as if he had.”20
A mountain-highway wreck shows the shape of the claim. A speeding driver skids in front of another car and runs it off the bank, trapping its driver. A passerby ties a rope to the grille of his own car, slides down, and frees the trapped driver, but slips on the climb back up, breaks his arm, and finds the grille badly bent. The speeding driver is liable to the passerby for the broken arm, including medical expenses, lost wages, and general damages for pain and suffering, and for the damage to the grille.21 The slip was the rescuer's own, yet it is harm resulting from an effort to avert a danger the driver created, which is the category § 445 leaves with the defendant.
The doctrine rests on foreseeability. Rescuers, even negligent ones, are to be expected,22 and the defendant need not have foreseen this particular rescuer, because the wrongdoer is held accountable as if he had foreseen a deliverer.23
A rescuer looks like the textbook case of a plaintiff who assumed a risk, since a rescuer sees the danger, understands it, and chooses to enter. At common law, assumption of risk barred recovery entirely, even when the defendant had negligently created the risk, because the gist of the defense was consent and free choice.24 A few courts have barred rescuers on exactly that ground, but the Second Restatement avoids the harsh result by concluding that rescue is not “voluntary.”25 The policy logic is direct. A bar would penalize the conduct the law most wants to encourage, and it would let a wrongdoer count on someone else's courage to limit the cost of the wrong.
The rescuer's own conduct is judged more gently than an ordinary plaintiff's. A rescuer cannot be charged with contributory fault by reason of conduct during the rescue attempt unless he or she acted recklessly.26 Ordinary carelessness in the heat of a rescue therefore does not reduce the claim, while recklessness can. That rule matches the expectation, noted above, that rescuers will come even when they are not careful.
Later decisions test the edges of the doctrine. They ask who counts as a rescuer, whether the peril was real or only apparent, how reckless a rescue can be before the protection ends, and whether the defendant's wrong proximately caused the particular harm the rescuer suffered. Read McCoy v. American Suzuki Motor Corp., re Estate of Keck v. Blair, Sanders v. Frank, Maltman v. Sauer, Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Calhoun, and Clinkscales v. Nelson Securities, Inc. for how courts draw those lines.
Impeded Rights
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 446 provides that if the defendant intentionally or negligently impedes the exercise of another's rights or privileges, the other's normal efforts to remove the impediment, or to exercise the right or privilege notwithstanding its existence, are not a superseding cause of harm resulting from such efforts.29 The section is a close relative of § 445. Under § 445 the danger is a physical threat that the plaintiff tries to avert; under § 446 it is an obstacle standing between the plaintiff and something the plaintiff is entitled to do, such as using a road, passing through a doorway, or occupying a place. The law protects two responses to an obstacle: clearing it away, and exercising the right anyway by going around or through it. The defendant's state of mind does not change the rule, which applies to an impediment placed deliberately and to one left carelessly.
The reason for protecting these efforts begins with the choice the obstruction forces on the right-holder. A person entitled to use a road must either give up the right or act to keep it, and acting can cause a fresh injury, such as a strained back from dragging a barricade or a collision on an unfamiliar route. Only the defendant created that choice. If the injury from the plaintiff's reasonable response were charged to the plaintiff as an independent decision, the wrongdoer would turn the wrongful impediment into its own excuse. The word normal limits the rule: an effort that ordinary people would not make falls outside the section and is governed by the general foreseeability test.
The harder exam question is whether a defendant who forces a detour answers for whatever befalls the traveler on it. Section 446 answers only part of that question. It keeps the plaintiff's decision to clear the obstruction or go around it from counting as a superseding cause. It leaves to the ordinary scope-of-risk analysis the separate question whether the harm that occurred is connected to the obstruction. In Doss v. Big Stone Gap, a car was on a road detour that took it near an airstrip because the defendant had negligently failed to maintain the road from which the car detoured, and a crash-landing airplane struck the car. The court imposed no liability.30 The crash had nothing to do with the condition of the road. The same reasoning excludes a tree that falls on a detouring car and an unexpected flood.31
The criminal law teaches the same lesson in its starkest form. A shoots at B and misses, but the shot makes B turn north; B is then struck by lightning and killed, a result that would not have happened but for the shot.32 The but-for link exists, yet the shot supplied only the place where the lightning struck. Forces of that kind would have found any traveler on the road, so they are coincidences in the sense taught earlier in this chapter, and a coincidence breaks the chain unless it was foreseeable.
A third person's crime raises a different kind of problem. A defendant who negligently requires a plaintiff to detour is not liable for a robbery on the detour so long as the defendant had no reason to know that the plaintiff faced an increased risk of attack.33 Beyond the detour, it is probably impossible to state a comprehensive rule for when a negligent defendant remains liable after a third person's crime, and the Restatement (Third) treats intervening acts that are unforeseeable, unusual, or highly culpable as possibly outside the scope of the risk.34 Courts have found liability in some recurring situations, as where the defendant's own act defeats a protection the plaintiff placed around person or property to guard against crime. In Garceau v. Engel, the defendant, who had leased floor space in the plaintiff's jewelry store, went to the store on a holiday and left the key in the front door.35 Kentucky has likewise said that criminal conduct no longer automatically interrupts the causal link. In Britton v. Wooten, a spark that ignited trash negligently allowed to accumulate next to a building could have been set accidentally, negligently, intentionally, or even criminally, and still have been foreseeable.36 The section on intentional and criminal acts takes these cases up in full.